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Statism, Nationalism, and Cosmopolitanism: An Essay on the Scope and 
Structure of Distributive Justice 
Abstract 
According to many political philosophers, one cannot consistently think that 
the world is radically unjust while denying that the well-off members of that world have 
highly demanding and enforceable duties to rectify or at least try to improve the 
situation. The consistent position is either to admit that the world is not radically unjust 
or to accept that the well-off have highly demanding duties of global justice. 
Interestingly, though, many well-off people seem unwilling to accept either of these 
alternatives; they are sure that the world is unjust, but they are also fairly sure that they 
don’t have any highly demanding and enforceable duties to rectify the situation. Are the 
philosophers right? Are the people who believe both of these claims simply confused? 
In this essay I argue that the people who hold both claims to be true may not be 
as confused as many philosophers think they are. I begin by refuting the positions of 
‘Statists’ and ‘Nationalists’, both of whom argue that claims of radical injustice can only 
arise within the boundaries of contemporary nation-states, and that the belief about the 
radical injustice of the global distribution is therefore simply false. I argue that statist 
justifications for this ‘domestic scope restriction’ of justice are self-contradictory, 
because when properly understood they actually imply that the scope of justice is 
global. And I argue that nationalist justifications for the domestic scope restriction are 
untenable, because when properly understood they actually entail the implausible 
conclusion that the scope of justice is more severely restricted than even the domestic 
scope restriction suggests. 
Having rejected the statist and nationalist positions I turn my attention to the 
more positive task of explaining why people who hold the two ‘inconsistent’ claims are 
not, in fact, as confused as they might initially seem to be. The solution to the problem 
lies in the way we understand the concept of distributive justice itself. The central aim 
of this thesis is to defend a new way of interpreting the concept along the lines of what 
I call the ‘dual-component model of distributive justice’. In order to develop and 
defend this model I begin by conducting a detailed analysis of the four main ways in 
which the concept of distributive justice has traditionally been interpreted. These are: 
the currency view; the institutional view; the coercion view; and the fairness view. I 
argue that the currency view and the institutional view should be rejected. I then claim 
that the coercion view and the fairness view both capture a necessary and important 
truth about justice, but that neither view on its own is sufficient to explain the full range 
of our intuitions about justice. 
My solution is to combine the coercion view and the fairness view within a 
single conceptual framework. The dual-component model of justice consists of two 
distinct sets of principles to which different roles are assigned within the theory. One 
set of principles, which corresponds to the fairness view of justice, specifies an ideally 
fair distribution. The other set of principles, which corresponds to the coercion view, 
specifies the limits on how people may be justifiably coerced. Both sets of principles – 
both ‘components’ – must be satisfied before a distribution can be declared fully just. 
The dual-component model promises to explain how and why the radical 
injustice of the global distribution, on the one hand, and the duties that well-off 
individuals have to respond to this situation, on the other hand, can be seen as two 
distinct issues. If my argument is right then the reason why Statists and Nationalists, as 
well as many other approaches to justice, are coming up with the wrong conclusions is 
because they misunderstand the nature of justice itself. 
 
Richard Child, PhD Thesis, The University of Manchester, August 2010. 
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(1) Introduction 
I .  The g lobal  jus t i c e  t r i l emma 
Consider the following claim: 
 
Distributive claim: The current global distribution of material and non-
material goods is radically unjust. Those who are badly-off under the current 
distribution have a claim to redistribution which, if satisfied, would lead to a 
significant increase in justice. 
 
A significant number of philosophers endorse the distributive claim. And they 
are not alone. Many relatively well-off people around the world also agree that the 
current global distribution is radically unjust.1 Consider the popularity in the UK, 
Canada and other countries of the recent ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign (which 
officially ended in 2006), and the continued (though less vocal) support shown for its 
parent organisation – the worldwide civil society known as The Global Call to Action 
Against Poverty (GCAP). In the name of the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign an 
estimated 225,000 people marched in Edinburgh on the eve of the G8 summit in 
Gleneagles, Scotland in July 2005, and the campaign enjoyed the support of over 540 
member organisations including many faith groups, trade unions and charities.2 What is 
particularly noteworthy about campaigns such as ‘Make Poverty History’ is their 
specific concern with global justice as opposed to charity; when people support these 
campaigns they do so not out of sympathy, but because they want to see justice in the 
world.3 
                                                
1 Since I am mainly interested at this stage in reporting the views of non-philosophers, I leave 
deliberately vague the answers to questions that we are going to have to address later on. In particular 
I make no commitment to any particular ‘currency’ of global justice (e.g. resources, welfare, 
opportunities, capabilities, etc.) or any particular criterion for its distribution (e.g. sufficientarian, 
prioritarian, egalitarian, etc.). 
2 Though the campaign is no longer active, the list of former members can still be found at, 
http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/whoweare/members-a.shtml. 
3 GCAP’s self-declared mission is to ‘[challenge] the institutions and processes that perpetuate 
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However, while the widespread support for organisations whose stated mission 
is to achieve global justice suggests that many people think the current global 
distribution is unjust, it remains the case that very few of these people are doing much 
to rectify the situation. And, indeed, most well-off people seem to think that there is 
nothing unjust about the fact that few of those who could make a difference are in fact 
doing anything about it. They therefore appear to endorse a second claim: 
 
Duty claim: Relatively well-off individuals do not have a strong, enforceable 
duty to make the kinds of significant changes in their lives that would be 
required in order to eradicate global injustice.4 
 
Evidence for the widespread commitment to this claim can be found 
throughout our everyday lives. We are surrounded by vast wealth – most obviously in 
the form of expensive houses, cars, appliances, clothes, furniture, food, but also in the 
money people have stored in accounts and investments of various kinds – wealth that 
could bring huge benefits to the worst-off inhabitants of the planet. And yet we see no 
widespread or concerted effort to force or even encourage people to cash-in their 
investments or take money from their savings in order to transfer wealth to the global 
poor. People are unashamed of themselves, and uncritical of others, when they buy 
expensive cars and other goods, even though buying cheaper versions of the same 
items would free up money to bring healthcare or education benefits to the 
disadvantaged. There would be outrage if the government decided to raise income tax 
by twenty or thirty percent in order to redistribute the extra money globally, and there 
would be even greater outrage if badly-off individuals from developing countries 
travelled en masse into developed countries in order to take money and goods directly 
                                                                                                                                    
poverty and inequality across the world to defend and promote human rights, gender justice, social 
justice and security needed for survival and peace’, http://www.whiteband.org/about-gcap/what-is-
gcap. 
4 The plausibility of this claim obviously depends to a large extent on what counts as a ‘significant’ 
change, and unfortunately there is no neat and uncontroversial way of answering this question. In the 
next paragraph of the main text I discuss some examples which, I think, illustrate the “least 
significant” significant changes that people might make. The point is that since people do not seem 
willing even to make these significant changes, they are unlikely to be willing to make even more 
significant changes. 
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from well-off citizens. A reasonable conclusion to draw from all this is that most 
people think that the well-off are under no duty of justice to make any significant 
changes to their lifestyles for the sake of making the world more just. 
Now consider a third claim: 
 
Conceptual claim: The claims that people have as a matter of justice, unlike 
claims grounded in other moral values, entail the existence of strong, 
enforceable duties on others to respect or satisfy these claims. 
 
It would appear that most of the relatively well-off individuals who are 
committed to the distributive claim and the duty claim are also committed to the 
conceptual claim. Most of these people, for instance, think that their fellow citizens 
have a duty of justice to pay tax which the state may legitimately enforce. Most people 
think that they have a duty of justice not to violate others’ personal property, and that 
these others would be justified in using some degree of force against them in order to 
protect their property. And most people think everyone has an enforceable duty of 
justice to respect others’ freedom of expression or right to vote. Compare the way 
many people think about these duties of justice with the way they think about duties 
grounded in other moral values. Friends should help one another out, but most people 
do not think they would be justified in coercing their friends into helping them out. 
People should give money to charity, but most people do not think we could justifiably 
coerce people into giving money to charity. People should generally stick to their 
promises, but people rarely think they are justified in coercing people into sticking to 
their promises. While there is bound to be some disagreement about where to draw the 
line between moral duties and duties of justice, the general view held by most people 
appears to be more or less in line with the view stated by the conceptual claim. That is, 
while people seem to believe they are open to moral criticism for failing to fulfil their 
moral duties, the coercive enforcement of a duty only seems appropriate when the duty in 
question is a duty of justice. 
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I have suggested that many people, when considering the distributive claim, the 
duty claim, and the conceptual claim separately and in isolation from the others, would 
endorse all three. The problem is that, when all three claims are considered together, 
they are not obviously compatible with each other. If the distributive claim and the 
conceptual claim are true, for instance, then this would seem to imply not only that the 
badly-off have some significant claims of justice on the well-off but that these claims 
ground enforceable duties on the well-off to make significant changes to their lives in 
order to satisfy these claims. But, of course, this implication directly contradicts the 
duty claim. If, on the other hand, the conceptual claim and the duty claim are true, then 
the distributive claim would appear to be false, since if claims of justice ground 
enforceable duties and the well-off have no significant enforceable duties to the badly-
off then it seems unlikely that the global distribution is radically unjust. Finally, if the 
distributive claim and the duty claim are both true, then the conceptual claim itself 
seems likely to be false, since the fact that the well-off do not owe any significant 
enforceable duties to the badly-off even though the global distribution is radically 
unjust suggests that in fact there is no conceptual link between claims of justice and 
enforceable duties. 
On the face of it, then, it would appear that we are faced with a trilemma. While 
any two of (a) the distributive claim, (b) the conceptual claim, and (c) the duty claim, 
can be simultaneously true, it cannot be the case that all three are true. I refer to this as 
the ‘global justice trilemma’. Here are the three claims of the global justice trilemma 
restated more concisely: 
 
(a) The distributive claim: the global distribution is radically unjust. 
 
(b) The conceptual claim: claims of justice ground enforceable duties. 
 
(c) The duty claim: relatively well-off global inhabitants owe no ‘significant’ 
enforceable duties to the less well-off. 
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I shall shortly discuss the various ways in which one might try, and indeed many 
have tried, to resolve the global justice trilemma. Before that, however, it is perhaps 
worth acknowledging that the way in which the three claims are formulated obviously 
leaves a great deal of room for interpretation. This is intentional. I do not pretend that 
the trilemma sets up a highly specific problem which we can ‘solve’ through 
philosophical analysis. It would be nice if it did, but unfortunately global justice is too 
complicated an issue to be reduced in this way. The point of the trilemma is rather to 
provide a starting point for discussion. It is to help us see where and how people are 
disagreeing and to assist us in moving the debate forward. The hope is that in trying to 
explain where the formulation of the three claims goes wrong we will be forced to work 
out what we agree on and what we disagree on. 
II .  Escaping the tr i l emma 
Generally speaking there are two ways of escaping a trilemma. The first, which I 
shall refer to as the accommodationist approach, is to explain how all three claims can 
be plausibly and simultaneously endorsed. The second, which I shall call the rejectionist 
approach, is to explain why one (or more) of the trilemma’s claims can, and should, be 
rejected. In a moment I shall explain why I believe the accommodationist approach is 
the best way of responding to the trilemma, and I shall outline the version of the 
accommodationist approach that will be developed in greater detail in this essay. Before 
that, however, I shall briefly discuss some different versions of the rejectionist 
‘response’ which have appeared in the literature.5 There are three different versions of 
the response, each one of which corresponds to one of the three claims of the 
trilemma. 
 
 
 
                                                
5 I place ‘response’ in quotes because the rejectionist views I shall consider here are obviously not 
intended as responses to the global justice trilemma, though they can be construed as such. 
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The rejection of the distributive claim 
The most common rejectionist strategy is to deny the truth of the distributive 
claim. One version of this strategy is to invoke what we might describe as an ‘argument 
from culture’. The argument is that different societies and cultures place varying 
degrees of value on material wealth and the trappings of western style ‘development’ 
and thus, although the global distribution is marked by very large inequalities of 
material goods, and although these inequalities would normally be thought to raise 
problems of radical injustice if they obtained within a single society, they do not raise 
similar problems of injustice when they obtain across different societies. Aside from the 
objectionable cultural essentialism implicit in this argument, the argument fails on its 
own terms because the empirical claim it relies on is simply false. While there is of 
course some variation in the value placed on material development by different 
cultures, this variation is nowhere near wide enough or widespread enough to vindicate 
the justice of the global distribution with its egregious inequalities. Since this argument 
is in any case rarely invoked in the philosophical literature I simply put it to one side in 
what follows. 
A much more common version of the first rejectionist strategy, of which there 
are, by contrast with the earlier version, many examples in the literature, is to argue that 
the global sphere simply lacks the kind of rule-bound practices and institutional 
structures that are a prerequisite of our ability to make coherent and meaningful 
judgements of justice and injustice in the first place. A number of writers, including 
Thomas Nagel, Andrea Sangiovanni, Michael Blake, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia, have 
all recently defended this view.6 Because, argue these writers, the relevant practices 
and/or institutions do not exist at all, or exist only in a highly attenuated form, at the 
global level, claims about global justice and injustice are incoherent. If this is right, then 
the ostensible ‘trilemma’ is really no such thing, for if we are unable to make any 
                                                
6 T. Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33 (2) (2005), 113-147; 
A. Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (1) 
(2007), 3-39; M. Blake, 'Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy', Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 30 (3) (2001), 257-296; S. Meckled-Garcia, 'On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: 
Constructivism and International Agency', Journal of Political Philosophy, 16 (3) (2008), 245-271. 
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judgments of justice that apply globally, then the distributive claim itself must be 
meaningless. 
In chapter 2 I explain why the strategy employed by these writers for rejecting 
the distributive claim is mistaken. In their attempts to emphasise the ‘disanalogy’ 
between the domestic (i.e. statist) and global spheres these writers typically display a 
distinct lack of sensitivity to the actual experiences of individuals who live on different 
sides of salient political boundaries.7 The rules and institutional structures of states may 
be intended to apply in the first instance to citizens, but when we are working out what 
people are due as a matter of justice it is not enough, in a world such as ours where the 
vast majority of people have the physical capacity to move relatively quickly and easily 
between states, to appeal only to their intended effects – we must consider their actual 
effects. When we do this, and we compare the circumstances of individual citizens with 
those of individual non-citizens we will see that the apparent disanalogy between the 
domestic and global sphere is no such thing. Far from justifying the restricted scope of 
justice, arguments which link the coherence of judgements of justice to the influence of 
rule-bound practices and institutions entail that justice is indeed global in scope. 
A third version of the first rejectionist strategy attempts to refute the 
distributive claim not by focusing on the cultural idiosyncrasies of different societies, or 
the rule-bound practices and institutions of states, but on the moral significance of 
people’s membership of different nations. The argument here is similar in form to those 
statist arguments considered in the previous paragraph which rely on the disanalogy 
between the domestic and global institutional spheres. The claim is that judgements of 
radical injustice such as the one asserted by the distributive claim can only sensibly be 
applied in intra-national rather than inter-national settings. The reason for this is simply 
that the demanding standards of justice invoked by the distributive claim do not, as the 
distributive claim implies, apply universally. Instead, they only apply within groups 
whose members stand in an ethically significant relationship with one another as co-
                                                
7 For more detailed discussion of the wide variety of forms that such ‘disanalogy arguments’ can take 
see, S. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), pp.270-9. 
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nationals. Thus, while the current level of global inequality may be cause for some kind 
of ethical concern, it is false to claim of the global distribution that it is radically unjust, 
since this kind of judgement can only hold between members of the same nation. 
This nationalist rejection of the distributive claim has been discussed in great 
detail by numerous writers, most notably David Miller and Samuel Scheffler.8 In 
chapter 3 I explain why it is mistaken. I do not deny that co-nationals may sensibly be 
thought of as standing in an ethically significant relationship with each other; perhaps 
co-nationals do owe each other so-called ‘associative duties’, in the same way that  
friends and family are often thought to. Rather than deny the very possibility of co-
national associative duties, I argue that any associative duties that do exist between co-
nationals are unable to provide a convincing explanation and justification of the norms 
of justice that are typically thought to apply universally between citizens. The reason for 
this is that any plausible attempt to show that co-national associative duties can indeed 
hold between citizens must allow for the possibility that some citizens might not owe 
any associative duties to their co-nationals, even though they continue to reside within 
the same state. Since those who support the restriction of the scope of justice to the 
boundaries of the state are usually unwilling to countenance the possibility that some 
citizens, as well as all non-citizens, might be excluded from the scope of justice, the 
nationalist justification for the restricted scope of justice must be rejected. If domestic 
inequality is thought to raise problems of radical injustice, then the explanation for this 
is not that citizens are also co-nationals. And if our judgements of radical injustice do 
not depend on a pre-existing co-national relationship, then this cannot be put forward 
as a reason for why such judgements might not apply globally. 
Before moving on to discuss the remaining rejectionist strategies for dealing 
with the trilemma (i.e. the rejection of the conceptual claim and the rejection of the 
duty claim) I must briefly explain why I shall not be devoting any serious attention to 
                                                
8 D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), and D. Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); S. Scheffler, Boundaries 
and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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John Rawls’s argument in The Law of Peoples.9 In many ways, The Law of Peoples would 
seem to be a prime candidate for inclusion in the current discussion. Not only does 
Rawls appear to reject the distributive claim, but the way he describes his notion of 
‘peoples’ strongly suggests that they share the defining characteristics of both states and 
nations: like states, Rawls’s peoples possess a ‘reasonably just constitutional democratic 
government that serves their fundamental interests’; and like nations, Rawls’s peoples 
are united by ‘common sympathies’.10 After rejecting the ‘pure’ statist account and the 
‘pure’ nationalist account, the natural thing to do might therefore seem to be to 
consider the combined approach offered by Rawls. There are three reasons, however, 
why I shall not be discussing LoP in any detail. 
First, although combining the statist and nationalist arguments for the restricted 
scope of justice undeniably strengthens that conclusion, this is one of those situations 
in which the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. That is, when the statist and 
nationalist arguments are combined, they do not metamorphose into some new, more 
powerful argument that requires separate attention, they remain vulnerable to the same 
counter-arguments as they were before they were combined. Thus, if my objections to 
the ‘pure’ versions of each argument are sound then the combined version of the 
arguments, even in the hands of Rawls, should pose no new challenge. Second, LoP has 
already received a huge amount of critical attention, and I see no point in adding my 
voice to the choir if I have nothing original to say.11 Third, though, and most 
importantly, insofar as I do have something new and interesting to say in response to 
Rawls’s theory of international justice, it is not in response to the substance of his 
approach but to its underlying form. The value of LoP lies in its systematic 
development of a particular way of interpreting the concept of justice, and I shall 
discuss this interpretation in detail from chapter 4 onwards. Thus while I decline to 
                                                
9 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
10 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.23. 
11 For just a small sample of this criticism, see, M. C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality, Species Membership, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); T. Pogge, 
'Do Rawls's Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?' in R. Martin and D. A. Reidy (eds.), Rawls's Law 
of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 206-225; Caney, Justice 
Beyond Borders. 
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engage with the substance of Rawls’s theory of international justice, I nevertheless 
engage with its conceptual underpinnings in what I hope is a fruitful way in later 
chapters. 
 
The rejection of the conceptual claim 
While many writers have felt compelled to reject the distributive claim, those 
who object to the conceptual claim are less common. Whatever differences exist 
between the main competing conceptions of justice in the literature, most agree that 
justice necessarily ‘trumps’ other values in some way, and that this special priority of 
justice in turn explains the fact that duties of justice, unlike other moral duties, can be 
justifiably enforced via some form of coercion. (I have so far formulated the conceptual 
claim in terms of duties, but we might equally well formulate it in terms of rights by 
saying that, while other values may be capable of grounding rights, the rights grounded 
in justice not only take precedence in case of conflict but can be justifiably enforced if 
necessary). Whether the claim is formulated in terms of rights or duties, however, what 
is important is the necessary priority that justice has over other values, and the 
uniqueness of the link between justice and coercion. Those who reject the conceptual 
claim reject one or both of these purported elements of the concept of justice. And in 
doing so they escape the global justice trilemma, for if claims of justice do not 
necessarily ground enforceable duties, then the claims of those who are badly-off under 
a radically unjust global distribution do not necessarily generate any enforceable duties 
of justice on the well-off. 
Perhaps the best-known writer who rejects the conceptual claim is G.A.Cohen. 
Precisely how Cohen understands the concept of justice is not entirely clear,12 but much 
of what he says suggests that, for him, there is no inherent link between the demands of 
justice and the presence of coercively enforceable duties. Cohen explains that he does 
not ‘see how anyone…can deny the possibility that certain facts, or other values, might 
                                                
12 For an ultimately aborted attempt to answer this question, see, A. Williams, 'Justice, Incentives and 
Constructivism', Ratio, 21 (4) (2008), 476-493, p.491. 
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make it inappropriate, or too difficult, or too costly, to produce justice’.13 Presumably if 
it can be inappropriate, too difficult, or too costly to produce justice, then it can also be 
inappropriate, too difficult, or too costly to enforce its ‘production’. What this shows is 
that, for Cohen, questions about the justice of a distribution are independent of 
questions about the enforceable duties that people have. This is what enables Cohen to 
say (or would have enabled him to say if he had wanted to say it) that although the global 
distribution is radically unjust, the well-off do not necessarily have any enforceable 
duties to rectify the situation. 
I think there is much to be said for Cohen’s understanding of justice (and I am 
far more sympathetic to his view than many other writers), but I also think that the 
outright rejection of the conceptual claim is a mistake. This might appear problematic: 
if Cohen’s view of justice is incompatible with the conceptual claim, then how can I 
endorse both? The solution lies in coming up with an interpretation of justice that will 
allow us to both to endorse the conceptual claim while at the same time incorporating 
Cohen’s insights into the nature of justice. At the end of this introductory chapter I 
shall present a brief sketch of the kind of thing I have in mind. Much of this essay will 
then be devoted to mapping out the various interpretations of the concept of justice 
that have been proposed in the literature (chapters 4 and 5) and explaining in detail how 
the new model I am proposing marks an improvement on these interpretations.   
 
The rejection of the duty claim 
The third and final version of the rejectionist approach is the denial of the duty 
claim. Theorists who favour this strategy insist on the truth of both the distributive 
claim and the conceptual claim and are happy to simply bite the bullet when this 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that relatively well-off individuals around the globe 
owe highly demanding duties of justice to the global poor. Indeed, according to 
proponents of this strategy, the very fact that the distributive claim and the conceptual 
claim together imply the falsity of the duty claim is itself proof that the intuitions which 
                                                
13 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
p.302. 
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underpin the duty claim are highly suspect. When the well-off have got such a good 
deal under the current distribution it is not difficult to think of alternative explanations 
for why their ‘moral intuitions’ tell them that they have no demanding duties of justice 
to the global poor. 
This uncompromising view has its contemporary origins in Peter Singer’s article 
‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, in which Singer famously argued that: ‘if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything 
of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’.14 Singer’s original 
discussion was presented as part of a theory of morality, rather than justice, but its 
central point is just as relevant to the latter domain as the former. If our world really is 
radically unjust then it is likely that some people have got much more than they should 
have (or would have, in a perfectly just world), while others have got much less than 
they should have (or would have, in a perfectly just world). And when each one of the 
individuals in the former group has it within his power to radically enhance and perhaps 
even save the lives of dozens of individuals in the latter group, it is clear that Singer’s 
principle will have some very demanding implications for those who are well-off under 
the current global distribution. This fact is no embarrassment to those who are 
sympathetic to Singer’s arguments. Indeed, it is precisely in order to get well-off 
individuals to do more to alleviate global justice that many proponents of this view 
argue for it in the first place.15 
The Singerian bullet-biting approach has an attractive simplicity to it, but this 
simplicity comes at a price. While it is no doubt true that the well-off have an ulterior 
motive for convincing themselves that they have no enforceable duties to eradicate or 
seriously alleviate global injustice, the fact is that this intuition, as I explained above, is 
shared not only by those who think the global distribution is not radically unjust, but 
also by many of those who think the global distribution is radically unjust. I am less 
                                                
14 P. Singer, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (3) (1972), 229-243, 
p.231. 
15 See, e.g., Peter Unger’s uncompromising ‘liberationist’ approach to the problems of global 
inequality in, P. Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
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willing than Singer to reject these intuitions as simply confused or misguided. This is 
not to say, of course, that the normative theoretical buck stops at people’s common 
sense intuitions. If we are unable to come up with any legitimate moral reasons for our 
intuitions about the duty claim, then its coincidence with our self-interest becomes the 
default explanation, thus vindicating its rejection. As I argue in chapter 8, however, the 
duty claim is supported by legitimate moral reasons, and the Singerian rejection of it 
may well be too quick. 
III .  The just i c e  gap 
I said above that the way in which the three claims of the trilemma are 
formulated leaves a great deal of room for interpretation. This unavoidable vagueness 
means there will inevitably be times when we can’t be sure how to classify a particular 
theory in relation to the trilemma. I mentioned David Miller as an example of someone 
who may well reject the distributive claim on the grounds that the kind of radical 
inequality which pervades the global sphere can only be considered a radical injustice 
insofar as it holds between the members of a particular national group. But Miller also 
holds a sufficientarian conception of global justice which affirms that everyone is 
entitled to the satisfaction of a fairly robust set of basic needs as a matter of justice. 
Indeed, Miller is explicit that ‘a just world would also be a world in which disparities 
between rich and poor countries would be far smaller than those that exist now’, and 
this suggests that he might, in fact, accept the distributive claim.16 This kind of 
ambiguity makes it difficult to know whether Miller’s view amounts to a rejectionist or 
an accommodationist approach to the global justice trilemma. 
A theory of global justice is accommodationist on my view if it endorses all 
three claims of the trilemma (while explaining, of course, how it is possible to do so 
consistently). And when we look more closely at Miller’s view we find there is good 
evidence to suggest that his position should actually be interpreted as 
accommodationist, rather than rejectionist. The clue lies in Miller’s suggestion that 
there exists what he calls a ‘justice gap’ – a ‘gap between what people in poor countries 
                                                
16 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p.53 (emphasis added). 
 20 
can legitimately claim as a matter of justice…and what the citizens of rich countries are 
obliged, as a matter of justice, to sacrifice to fulfil these claims’.17 Since Miller also 
appears to endorse the conceptual claim,18 his belief in the justice gap would seem to 
justify the accommodationist interpretation of his view. 
The key to justifying the accommodationist view therefore seems to lie in 
explaining how the phenomenon of the justice gap is possible. Accommodationists 
must provide reasons for why the legitimate claims of the global poor which arise from 
an unjust global distribution do not in turn give rise to a correlative set of enforceable 
duties on the global rich to satisfy these claims. Miller himself provides only the briefest 
of sketches as to what these reasons might be. They include the problem of allocating 
responsibility for remedying global injustice fairly between nations, and the fact that the 
institutional and cultural idiosyncrasies of particular nations may make it more difficult, 
or more costly, for them to remedy injustice than it is for other, equally wealthy, 
nations.19 In the context of Miller’s ‘nation-centric’ approach, which in the sphere of 
global political morality typically interprets nations as the primary actors and tends to 
reduce individuals to their roles as members of particular nations, these reasons offer a 
very plausible explanation for the existence of the justice gap. But of course not 
everyone accepts this nation-centric view. 
A different view, often referred to as the ‘cosmopolitan’ approach, eschews the 
priority of national membership and instead takes individuals qua individuals as the 
primary units of moral concern. Cosmopolitans do not deny the importance to some 
people of their national membership, just as they don’t deny the importance of family 
or friends. For cosmopolitans what is important is that the roles we have as members 
of particular families and particular nations do not determine the content of justice at 
the fundamental level. In practice this distinction between nation-centric and 
cosmopolitan views may not make much difference – whether or not it does depends 
                                                
17 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p.274. 
18 ‘Some responsibilities may give rise to duties…that we have good reason to perform, without being 
required to perform them as we are required to perform duties of justice…Duties of justice are 
enforceable, in the sense that third parties may be justified in applying sanctions to those who default 
on them’, Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p.248. 
19 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp.273-4. 
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on the substance of particular conceptions of these views. The real difference lies at the 
theoretical level – with the arguments that are produced by proponents of the two 
views in order to justify their substantive conclusions. 
While I am broadly sympathetic to the cosmopolitan approach and its focus on 
the primacy of the individual, I think we need to be careful that in adopting such an 
approach we do not end up losing sight of the particular concerns that give significance 
to people’s lives. We are not just loci of preferences and desires, we are also people 
with particular allegiances, projects, and attachments. These commitments are often 
things that people have worked hard for, and invested a great deal of time and effort 
into, and developing a plausible theory of justice necessarily involves taking them into 
account in the right way. 
In this essay I develop an approach to justice that allows us to incorporate this 
insight while maintaining a broadly cosmopolitan focus on the primacy of the 
individual. According to this approach, one way of explaining the justice gap is by 
appeal to the distinction between the personal and impersonal moral standpoints. As 
Thomas Nagel points out, fully satisfying the reasonable claims of the global poor in a 
world such as ours might entail imposing costs on the global rich that it would not be 
unreasonable of the latter to reject.20 The reason for this is not that the nation in which 
these wealthy individuals reside will unfairly suffer in cultural or economic terms 
compared to other nations, but that these well-off individuals, who have led their lives 
in a not obviously unjust or immoral way, who have spent large amounts of time and 
effort pursuing long term projects, who have developed valuable relationships, and who 
have cultivated certain preferences based on reasonable expectations of future 
satisfaction, may be forced to give up on their projects, hopes for the future, and 
perhaps even some of their relationships. Of course, from the purely impersonal 
standpoint that cosmopolitans are sometimes tempted to adopt, it is hard to appreciate 
the normative force of this reason. If the claims of the global poor are genuine claims of 
justice, it is not clear how the costs to the global rich of satisfying these claims could 
                                                
20 T. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.170-9. 
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make it reasonable for the latter to refuse to satisfy them. However, by distinguishing 
the impersonal moral standpoint from the personal moral standpoint and, crucially, by 
assigning independent roles within a conception of justice to the claims of justice that arise 
from the impersonal moral standpoint and the claims of justice that arise from the 
personal moral standpoint, the justice gap can, I believe, be explained entirely from 
within a cosmopolitan approach. 
IV. The dual- component model  o f  d is tr ibut ive  just i c e   
Explaining and vindicating the justice gap from a cosmopolitan perspective 
involves conceptualising justice along the lines of what I call the ‘dual-component 
model of distributive justice’. In order to develop and defend this model I begin with a 
detailed analysis of the concept of distributive justice itself. In chapters 4 and 5 I 
distinguish between four different interpretations of the concept of justice: the currency 
view; the institutional view; the coercion view; and the fairness view.21 The currency 
view of justice holds that distributive justice can be defined in terms of its concern with 
the distribution of particular things. I conclude that even when we define the currency 
of justice in the most general and abstract terms we can, the explanation for why 
matters concerning the distribution of a particular thing are matters of justice and not 
something else must rely on something other than the nature of the thing itself. The 
currency view therefore fails to provide a useful definition of justice. The institutional 
view of justice holds that the concept of justice can be defined by the fact that its 
constitutive principles apply only to institutions, and not (directly) to actions or 
distributions. I consider several arguments for this view and conclude that none of 
them is successful. 
Having rejected the first two interpretations of justice in chapter 4 I turn my 
attention in chapter 5 to the two remaining interpretations: the coercion view and the 
fairness view. The coercion view of justice holds that justice is to be identified with that 
                                                
21 An ‘interpretation of a concept’ is different from a ‘conception’. One might ‘interpret the concept 
of justice’ as one that applies to the basic institutional structures of nation-states. A ‘conception’ of 
this particular interpretation of the concept provides a substantive account of how the basic 
institutional structure of a nation-state should be designed in order to count as just. 
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subset of our moral claims and demands whose fulfilment may be justifiably enforced 
through the exercise of coercion. This enforceable sub-domain of morality is picked 
out by a set of principles which specify the limits of justified coercion. Since these 
principles apply directly to actions the idea is that they can be used to generate 
normative recommendations about which acts are permissible and which acts are not 
permissible according to justice. The fairness view of justice, on the other hand, holds 
that justice is to be identified with what I refer to as the ‘ideal of basic distributive 
fairness’. Basic distributive fairness is itself a difficult concept to define. For now it will 
suffice to say that basic distributive fairness obtains when all existing goods and bads 
are distributed according to how they would be distributed by an ideally impartial 
observer if all moral, prudential, and practical constraints were removed and the 
impartial observer was thus able to distribute goods in exactly the way he wanted. The 
ideal of basic distributive fairness is defined independently of any consideration of the 
intrinsic qualities of the actions that might be necessary to realise it. Thus, unlike the 
coercion view of justice, the principle(s) that constitute the fairness view of justice are 
not intended to generate any action-guiding recommendations. 
I argue that the coercion view and the fairness view both capture important 
aspects of the concept of justice, but that neither view on its own provides a complete 
and satisfactory account of justice. If all we have is a set of principles which tell us 
when the exercise of coercion is justified, then we will be unable to say when any 
particular distribution is truly fair (and hence just), and we will therefore be unable to 
work out what people should do (over and above what they can be justifiably be 
coerced to do) in order to realise such a distribution. On the other hand, if all we have 
is a conception of the ideal of basic distributive fairness, then in our efforts to realise 
this ideal we may end up infecting the distribution with injustice after all as we exercise 
unjustified coercion over people and thus fail to treat them with the respect they are 
due. 
In chapter 6 I argue that the solution to the incompleteness of, respectively, the 
‘pure’ coercion view and the ‘pure’ fairness view lies in combining them within a single 
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conceptual framework provided by the dual-component model of justice. The central 
claim on which the dual-component model is based is that there are two necessary 
conditions of a fully just distribution, each of which corresponds to one of the two 
views of justice which comprise the dual-component model: First, a fully just 
distribution must mirror the ideal of ‘basic distributive fairness’. Second, a fully just 
distribution must have been brought about without any violation of the principles of 
justified coercion. Satisfying the first condition requires a principle or set of principles 
which identify the qualities that a distribution must possess if it is to mirror the ideal of 
basic distributive fairness. Because these principles ‘apply’ directly to distributions I 
refer to this as the ‘distributive component’ of justice. Satisfying the second condition 
requires a principle or set of principles which specify the limits of justified coercion. 
Because these principles apply directly to actions I refer to this as the ‘interactional 
component’ of justice.  
In chapter 7 I argue for a particular conception of the distributive component 
of justice. I claim that a distribution is only fully just when everyone has an equal 
opportunity for well-being, where a person’s ‘well-being’ is defined in terms of the 
satisfaction of their ideal personal preferences, and where a person has an ‘equal 
opportunity for’ well-being when she has an equally effective opportunity to 
successfully execute (one of) her most rational life plans. (A person’s ‘most rational life 
plan’ is the plan of life that offers the highest degree of ideal personal preference-
satisfaction, and there may be several possible life plans that fit this description for a 
particular person). As a ‘welfarist’ conception of justice the principle of equality of 
opportunity for well-being is potentially vulnerable to what is known as the ‘fair shares 
objection’ to welfarism. At the end of chapter 7 I explain why the principle of equality 
of opportunity for well-being is not in fact vulnerable to the objection. 
In chapter 8 I provide further support for the dual-component model by 
providing some examples of the role played by the interactional component. While I do 
not attempt to work out the detailed content of the principles of the interactional 
component I do discuss two specific considerations – freedom of occupation and (what 
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I call) ‘stability of expectation’ – which it seems likely the interactional component will 
ultimately have to be sensitive to. My discussion here is divided into two parts. In the 
first part I focus on situations in which the distributive component of justice is already 
satisfied and the practical problem we face is how best to maintain the ideal of basic 
distributive fairness (represented by the principle of equality of opportunity for well-
being). I argue that considerations related to the value of freedom of occupation mean 
that it would be unjust to force people to do certain types of work, even if this is the 
only way to ensure that equality of opportunity for well-being is maintained. In the 
second part I focus on situations in which the distributive component is not already 
satisfied and the practical problem we face is not how to maintain the ideal but how to 
realise it in the first place. In this situation, as well as considerations related to freedom 
of occupation, we are going to have to consider the importance to people of having 
some degree of stability of expectation. To explain what the idea of stability of 
expectation involves, and to illustrate its importance for the theory of justice, I discuss a 
series of ‘divided world’ examples in order to show why it would unjust to embark on a 
wholesale disruption of people’s stability of expectation, even when this disruption is 
necessary in order to realise equality of opportunity for well-being. 
It is important to notice that in both the situations discussed in chapter 8 it is 
always open to individuals to volunteer to act so as to either maintain or realise equality 
of opportunity for well-being. When they do so volunteer, there is a subsequent pay-off 
in terms of the maintenance or realisation of full distributive justice. The implication is 
that if they had not volunteered to act in this way, then not only would there have been 
a loss in terms of justice, but there would be nothing we could justifiably do to 
coercively prevent this loss. 
V. Conclus ion 
Returning to the global justice trilemma, we can now see why the dual-
component model represents an accommodationist strategy. The dual-component 
model is obviously compatible with the distributive claim, since the global distribution 
is clearly a long way from satisfying the ideal of equality opportunity for well-being. The 
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dual-component model is also compatible with the duty claim, since the claims that the 
well-off have as a result of the interactional component of justice go some way to 
protecting them against the coercively enforceable duties they would otherwise have as 
a result of the claims that the badly-off have in virtue of the distributive component. 
Finally, the dual-component model is also compatible with the conceptual claim, since 
it is fully compatible with the idea that claims of justice ground enforceable duties of 
justice. The trick is that claims of justice now go both ways. The global poor have 
claims of justice grounded in the distributive component of justice (i.e. claims to 
equality of opportunity for well-being). The global rich have claims of justice grounded 
in the interactional component of justice (e.g. claims to freedom of occupation and the 
protection of stability of expectation). These claims all have the potential to generate 
enforceable duties of justice. But in order to work out what duties of justice people 
actually have, we need to combine the claims within a single framework of distributive 
justice. This is how the dual-component model escapes the global justice trilemma. 
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(2) Justifying the Domestic Scope Restriction: The Failure of Statism 
I .  Introduct ion 
We live in an age of global migratory potential – a time when a vast number of 
people have the physical capacity to move relatively quickly and easily between states. 
In this chapter I use this fact to motivate a powerful objection to so-called ‘statist’ 
conceptions of distributive justice. 
Statism is the view that there is something normatively peculiar about the state 
which entails that the ‘domestic’ duties of justice that citizens owe to one another are 
significantly more demanding than the global duties of justice that citizens owe to non-
citizens.22 Precisely what this greater demandingness consists in is a question I leave 
open. It might be that domestic duties have both positive and negative content, whereas 
global duties have only negative content. Or it might be that domestic duties are 
concerned with individuals’ relative standing, whereas global duties are concerned only 
with individuals’ absolute standing. Or it might be that domestic duties are egalitarian 
duties, whereas global duties are not.23 The important point is that although there are 
several different ways of explaining and elaborating the general distinction between 
more demanding and less demanding duties of justice, the distinction itself remains 
both theoretically and practically significant. And in light of this, we need some 
convenient way of referring to the two sides of the distinction. I shall refer to more 
demanding duties of justice (whatever their precise content) as falling under the scope 
of ‘strong norms of distributive justice’ and to less demanding duties (again, whatever 
                                                
22 Statism is thus to be distinguished from nationalism. Nationalists often agree with statists about the 
‘domestic scope restriction’ – which holds that the demands of justice are stronger within states than 
without – but they disagree with the characteristic statist justification for this restriction which 
appeals directly to the normative peculiarity of the state, rather than to the (normatively more basic) 
nation that underpins it. I discuss the nationalist justification for the domestic scope restriction in 
chapter 3. For discussion of the idea that a ‘missing nationalist premise’ underlies many ostensibly 
statist positions, see, K. C. Tan, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and 
Patriotism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.177-9. 
23 For further discussion of the doctrine of statism and the different forms it can take, see, J. Cohen 
and C. Sabel, 'Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34 (2) (2006), 147-
175, p.150. 
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their precise content) as falling under the scope of ‘weak norms of distributive justice’.24 
To emphasise: there is no hard and fast rule for distinguishing between strong and 
weak norms of distributive justice – it all depends on the context of the discussion in 
which these terms are employed. In the context of the current discussion, statism is the 
view that strong norms of distributive justice only apply between citizens, whereas weak 
norms of distributive justice, if they apply at all, apply between citizens and non-
citizens. 
The objection to statism that I develop in this chapter focuses initially on a 
particularly common and influential statist argument based on the notion of reciprocity. 
I use the fact of global migratory potential to show how the passive respect for a state’s 
borders displayed by billions of non-citizens plays at least as important a role in 
supporting the stability of the conditions necessary for wealth creation within that state 
as the passive respect towards the state’s domestic law shown by the state’s own 
citizens. If, as proponents of reciprocity-based justice hold, strong norms of distributive 
justice only apply between those who uphold schemes ‘without which no one would 
have a satisfactory life’25 then strong distributive justice is fundamentally global, not 
statist, in scope.  
Having demonstrated the failure of the reciprocity-based argument for statism I 
go on to analyse the general problem facing any attempt to justify the domestic scope 
restriction. Purported justifications for statism must satisfy three conditions: they must 
demonstrate that strong norms of distributive justice are triggered when people relate 
to each other in certain specific ways; they must demonstrate that citizens do relate to 
each other in these specific ways; and they must demonstrate that citizens and non-
citizens do not relate to each other in these specific ways. In a world characterised by 
the fact of global migratory potential the task of satisfying these three conditions is 
much more difficult than many proponents of statism seem to realise. I argue that their 
complacency can be explained by the institutionalist bias inherent in their methodology. 
                                                
24 For ease of exposition I shall sometimes abbreviate these phrases even further to, respectively, 
‘strong distributive justice’ and ‘weak distributive justice’.  
25 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.13. 
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By focusing on the formal role or function of institutions, rather than the actual 
experience of individuals who are subject to these institutions, traditional justifications 
for statism remain blind to the subtleties and complexities of the normative terrain they 
ostensibly aim to map out. Only when we reject the institutionalist view and, instead, 
adopt an approach that is more sensitive to the particular circumstances of individuals, 
can we truly appreciate the scale of the challenge that purported justifications for 
statism must overcome. The challenge has not been met so far, and I argue that it is 
unlikely to be met in the future. 
The chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I distinguish two 
contrasting approaches to theorising about justice – the relational approach and the 
nonrelational approach. I then explain in section III why statism has become the 
dominant form taken by relational theories of justice, and I outline in more detail the 
general justificatory strategy employed by its proponents. In the following two sections 
I narrow the focus of my argument in order to develop my objection based on the fact 
of global migratory potential (I shall call this the ‘immigration objection’ to statism). In 
section IV I present the version of reciprocity-based statism that will form the main 
target of my critique, namely, the extremely clear and persuasive version put forward 
recently by Andrea Sangiovanni. In section V I offer a detailed refutation of 
Sangiovanni’s position by showing how the immigration objection is fatal for his 
argument. In section VI I defend the immigration objection from a potential rejoinder 
and I clarify the contingent nature of the argument in order to pre-empt a potential 
misunderstanding about how the objection works. I then explain in section VII why the 
immigration objection should be taken seriously, not just by those who favour 
reciprocity-based justifications for statism, but by all proponents of the statist doctrine. 
II .  The scope o f  jus t i c e :  re lat ional  vs .  nonre lat ional  approaches 
Emerging from the literature are two distinct and contrasting approaches to 
theorising about justice, the choice between which has an important role to play in 
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defining the scope of strong distributive justice.26 The two approaches have been 
labelled under a variety of different names and there is no sign yet of any terminological 
consensus. For the purposes of the current discussion I shall label them the ‘relational’ 
approach and the ‘nonrelational’ approach.27 
The two approaches reflect two different theories about the grounding of 
fundamental principles of justice. According to proponents of the relational approach, 
fundamental principles of justice are grounded in particular ‘contexts of distribution’.28 
A context of distribution is a distinct kind of human relationship or sphere of 
interaction – such as a family, a church, a nation, or a trade bloc – within which both 
the way people act and the goods they produce and exchange can be said to have 
certain specific meanings and values. According to the relational approach, the way in 
which we work out the scope and content of the principles of justice which regulate the 
distribution of goods within these contexts is by interpreting the point of the relevant 
practice and/or the value of the relevant relationship and/or the meaning of the 
relevant goods.29 In each case the aim is to uncover the ‘relationship of appropriateness’ 
which links a context and its regulative principle(s) and which explains why the scope 
                                                
26 For the sake of brevity, I shall from this point on use the phrase ‘the scope of justice’ in place of 
the longer phrase ‘the scope of strong distributive justice’. The reader should continue to bear in 
mind, however, that many statists hold that weak distributive justice applies globally. 
27 These terms (which I borrow from Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice’, p.5) represent what I think is the 
clearest and most accurate way of labelling the two approaches. They are preferable, for instance, to 
the terms ‘contextualist’ and ‘universalist’, which were first proposed by David Miller in an earlier 
discussion of the distinction (see D. Miller, 'Two Ways to Think About Justice', Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, 1 (1) (2002), 5-28). The main problem with Miller’s terminology is that it risks being 
confused with other well-known dichotomies involving the idea of ‘universalism’ (e.g. the distinction 
between universalism and particularism and the distinction between universalism and relativism). A 
third way of drawing the distinction, which has been adopted by a number of recent authors, is 
between ‘practice-dependent’ and ‘practice-independent’ approaches to justice (see, e.g. M. Ronzoni, 
'The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 37 (3) (2009), 229-256; A. Sangiovanni, 'Justice and the Priority of Politics to 
Morality', Journal of Political Philosophy, 16 (2) (2008), 137-164). The problem with this way of 
drawing the distinction is that it forces us to refer to some principles of justice as ‘practice-
dependent’ when what they are really dependent on is not some kind of dynamic rule-governed 
activity (as implied by the term ‘practice’), but, rather, some kind of non-rule-governed relationship, 
based on shared meanings or shared values. The term ‘relational’ captures both of these possibilities 
(activity and relationship) and is thus to be preferred on these grounds.  
28 Miller, 'Two Ways to Think About Justice', p.10. 
29 For a detailed description of this kind of interpretive exercise, see, e.g., A. James, 'Constructing 
Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33 (3) 
(2005), 281-316; Sangiovanni, 'Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality'. 
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and content of the principle(s) are what they are.30 Not every context of distribution 
grounds its own principle(s) of justice, of course, and those that do are open to various 
different interpretations. The key point is that, on the relational approach, in order to 
explain why a purported principle has the scope or content its proponents claim it does, 
the justification must ultimately refer back to the relevant context of distribution, there 
can be no appeal to some overarching, more fundamental principle of justice.31 
Proponents of the nonrelational approach, in contrast, deny that principles of 
justice are grounded in contexts of distribution. Instead, they believe that we can 
identify overarching, fundamental principles of justice that ‘apply in every circumstance 
in which questions of justice arise, regardless, for instance, of the specific type of 
resource that is being distributed, the institutional setting in which the distribution is 
taking place, and so on’.32 This leaves open a number of questions, of course, including 
the question of what the correct nonrelational grounds of the fundamental principles of 
justice are. Well-known answers to this question include the libertarian claim that the 
fundamental principles of justice are grounded in our recognition of each individual’s 
right of self-ownership, and the luck-egalitarian claim that the fundamental principles of 
justice are grounded in our recognition of the unfair effects of brute luck on persons’ 
prospects. Both of these views are nonrelational because the quality or condition that 
grounds the fundamental principles of justice in each case is conceptually independent 
of the social or political context within which it is observed. 
My own view is that the nonrelational approach is the right way to theorise 
about justice. But the relational approach has received a number of sophisticated 
defences in the recent literature, and these arguments demand close attention in their 
own right. My aim in this essay is therefore not to defend the nonrelational approach 
directly but, rather, to demonstrate that the relational approach, at least in the ‘statist’ 
form it typically takes, is not as compelling as its proponents think. 
                                                
30 Miller, 'Two Ways to Think About Justice', p.11. 
31 Ibid., p.11. 
32 Ibid., p.9. 
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III .  Stat i sm: the most  common form of  re lat ional  theory 
I suggested above that contexts of distribution can take a plurality of different 
forms (I gave the examples of families, churches, nations, and trade blocs). While this 
is, strictly speaking, correct, there is one particular context of distribution that has 
attracted far more attention from relational theorists than any other: the contemporary 
nation-state. Allen Buchanan may be right that the old Westphalian world of 
economically self-sufficient, distributionally autonomous and politically homogenous 
states has ‘vanished’33, but it remains true that the institutions of contemporary states 
are (or, at least, have the potential to be) the primary influence on individuals’ life-
prospects. The modern state’s ability to coordinate action, collect information, transfer 
goods, and impose its will is unrivalled. As contexts of distribution go, then, the state is 
particularly salient. 
What follows from the fact that the state is an especially important context of 
distribution? To answer this question we need to know how proponents of statism 
typically go about satisfying the three conditions I referred to in the introduction, and 
which I shall label respectively as the ‘normative condition’, the ‘inclusivity condition’, 
and the ‘exclusivity condition’. 
It is perhaps rather surprising, bearing in mind the emphasis placed by the 
relational approach on the context-sensitivity of principles of justice, that the normative 
condition can be satisfied without reference to the state at all. In order to satisfy the 
normative condition of statism what needs to be shown is that some of the ways in 
which people can conceivably relate to each other are such that, when people do relate 
to each other in these ways, their interactions should be regulated by strong norms of 
distributive justice. Strictly speaking, this can be an entirely a priori exercise, since it can 
be carried out even if no one actually relates to each other in these ways. This is not to 
deny, of course, that the fact that people do actually relate to each other in the specified 
ways lends support to the argument. But it is important to separate the conceptual truth 
that underlies the normative condition from the real-life examples in which this 
                                                
33 A. Buchanan, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World', Ethics, 110 (4) 
(2000), 697-721, p.701. 
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condition is satisfied. Two common attempts to satisfy the normative condition of 
statism are represented by the ‘reciprocity-based approach’ and the ‘coercion-based 
approach’. The former approach claims that strong norms of justice apply to people 
who willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of certain 
benefits, whereas the latter approach claims that strong norms of justice apply to 
people whose autonomy is violated by a central coercive authority.34 
Assuming for now that both these attempts to satisfy the normative condition 
are successful, the next task for the proponent of statism is to demonstrate that, for 
either approach, the inclusivity and exclusivity conditions are satisfied. This is where the 
element of social interpretation that is characteristic of the relational approach to justice 
becomes relevant. The idea is that through an interpretive analysis of the role and 
function of the state (the details of which need not concern us here),35 the statist 
theorist comes up with a characterisation of the normative peculiarity of the state 
which, when combined with the particular conception of the normative condition 
already in hand, will result in a theory that explains why only the citizens of the state, 
and not non-citizens, relate to each other in a way that triggers strong norms of justice. 
Proponents of the reciprocity-based approach, for instance, typically characterise the 
state as an exclusive cooperative venture for the mutual advantage of citizens that is 
unique in its ability to provide the stable conditions necessary for wealth creation. 
Proponents of the coercion-based approach, on the other hand, typically characterise 
the state as constituting a central coercive authority that violates the autonomy of its 
members but not the autonomy of non-members. When we combine the former 
‘cooperative practice’ interpretation of the state with the reciprocity-based view, or the 
latter ‘political coercion’ interpretation of the state with the coercion-based view, the 
domestic scope restriction follows, or so we are told, as a matter of course.36 
                                                
34 The best-known statement of this view can be found in, M. Blake, 'Distributive Justice, State 
Coercion, and Autonomy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30 (3) (2001), 257-296. 
35 See footnote 29. 
36 The ‘cooperative practice view’ and the ‘political coercion view’ have been identified by a number 
of different theorists under a variety of names. The specific labels I use here are borrowed from 
Miller, 'Justice and Boundaries', Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 8 (3) (2009), 291-309, but see 
also, C. Barry and L. Valentini, 'Egalitarian Challenges to Global Egalitarianism: A Critique', Review 
of International Studies, 35 (3) (2009), 485-512, and, S. Caney, ‘Global D
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However appealing one finds the methodology sketched above, what should be 
clear is that any particular conception of statism is vulnerable to criticism at (at least) 
three distinct points: in its attempt to satisfy the normative condition, in its attempt to 
satisfy the inclusivity condition, and in its attempt to satisfy the exclusivity condition. 
No doubt different conceptions of statism are more vulnerable on some of these points 
than others. In what follows, however, my objective is to exploit the third point of 
vulnerability in particular. My ultimate aim is to use the fact of global migratory 
potential to show that any version of statism will have difficulty satisfying the exclusivity 
condition. Before that, though, I initially develop the immigration objection by applying 
it to the reciprocity-based approach to show that, when it is combined with the 
cooperative practice interpretation of the state, the exclusivity condition cannot be 
satisfied. I focus on the reciprocity-based approach rather than the coercion-based 
approach partly because I think it is the more plausible of the two, and partly because 
the coercion-based approach has already been subjected very recently to detailed critical 
scrutiny.37 
IV. The rec iproc i ty -based just i f i cat ion for  s tat i sm 
As with so many of the views widely held by political philosophers, the best-
known proponent of the claim that strong norms of justice are triggered by 
considerations of reciprocity is John Rawls: 
The intuitive idea [behind Justice as Fairness] is that since everyone’s well-being 
depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory 
life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation 
of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated.38 
Rawls thought that the only fair way to ‘draw forth the willing cooperation of 
everyone taking part’ in a joint venture for mutual advantage was to include them in the 
                                                                                                                                    
State’, Political Studies, 56 (2008), 487-518. 
37 See, in particular, A. Abizadeh, 'Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not 
Site) of Distributive Justice', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (4) (2007), 318-358; R. Pevnik, 
'Political Coercion and the Scope of Distributive Justice', Political Studies, 56 (2008), 399-413.  
38 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.13. 
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scope of a scheme of strong distributive justice. And since Rawls is the best-known 
proponent of statism it is plausible to interpret his argument concerning the link 
between cooperation, reciprocity, and inclusion in a scheme of strong distributive 
justice, as representing his answer to the normative condition of statism. But even if 
this interpretation is correct, and even if one is convinced by Rawls’s answer to the 
normative condition of statism, his view cannot be considered a fully-fledged version of 
reciprocity-based statism until we have some explicit answers to the inclusivity and 
exclusivity conditions. Rawls was obviously aware of this. But, rather than argue the 
point, he (in)famously chose to assume the problem away.39 In the absence of a 
substantive argument for this assumption it would be unfair, not to mention inaccurate, 
to criticise Rawls’s view as if it was a conception of reciprocity-based statism. 
Compare the quote from Rawls with the following quote from Andrea 
Sangiovanni: 
We owe obligations of egalitarian reciprocity to fellow citizens and residents in the 
state, who provide us with the basic conditions and guarantees necessary to develop 
and act on a plan of life, but not to non-citizens, who do not.40 
Whereas Rawls talks loosely about ‘everyone’ (in part, no doubt, because he has 
already assumed the boundaries of the world he is talking about) Sangiovanni explicitly 
distinguishes between those who are inside and those who are outside the cooperative 
scheme which provides the ‘conditions and guarantees necessary to develop and act on 
a plan of life’. Sangiovanni thus offers us explicit answers to all three conditions of 
statism. Before applying the immigration objection to Sangiovanni’s view it will be 
helpful to reconstruct the precise steps his argument takes. The first of five premises 
recalls another core Rawlsian idea about the arbitrariness of talents: 
 
                                                
39 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.7, p.401. For well-known critiques of Rawls based directly on the 
falsity of this assumption, see, C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999); T. Pogge, Realizing Rawls, (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1989). 
40 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.20. 
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(P1) Talented individuals do not deserve their place in the distribution of native 
endowments.41 
 
P1 plays a conditional, negative role in the argument. It says that if the exercise 
of talent creates wealth, then the talented have no prior moral claim to this wealth 
simply because it was their talent that was exercised. Of course, we still need a positive 
argument for redistributing this wealth if such redistribution is to avoid the charge of 
arbitrariness, and this is where the idea of reciprocity comes in.42 Talents count for little 
(financially at least) unless there is a market for them – both in the sense that they are 
recognised as talents in the first place (perhaps because of cultural idiosyncrasies or 
changes in fashion) and that, once recognised, they can be used to create wealth. The 
positive part of Sangiovanni’s argument, which rests on this idea, consists of four 
further premises. The first two empirical premises are intended to satisfy the inclusivity 
condition: 
 
(P2) In the world as it is now, the stable conditions necessary for wealth creation 
through the exercise of talent are provided by the institutions that comprise 
modern states.43 
 
(P3) In a number of ways – for example, ‘through taxation, through participation in 
various forms of political activity, and through simple compliance’ – citizens 
maintain the institutions that comprise modern states. 44 
 
The fourth premise is intended to satisfy the normative condition: 
                                                
41 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.89. 
42 ‘From the bare assumption that [talents are] morally arbitrary, no obligation to share follows. The 
lucky ones could admit that their luck is morally arbitrary, and still ask “Why share?”’ A. Gibbard, 
'Review: Constructing Justice', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (3) (1991), 264-279, p.269. 
43 ‘When well-functioning…basic state capacities, backed by a system of courts, administration, 
police, and military, free us from the need to protect ourselves continuously from physical attack, 
guarantee access to a legally regulated market, and establish and stabilise a system of property rights 
and entitlements’, Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.20. 
44 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.20. 
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(P4) The principle of reciprocity: those who willingly contribute to the conditions 
necessary for the accumulation of benefits are owed a fair share of these benefits. 
 
It is important to emphasise that what is doing the work in Sangiovanni’s 
argument is not the fact that citizens are coerced by the state into paying taxes, 
participating in political activity, and complying with laws and social rules. Part of the 
reason why Sangiovanni thinks that reciprocity-based accounts of statism are preferable 
to coercion-based accounts lies in the fact that citizens can (and usually do) do all of 
these things without their compliance being guaranteed by a coercive authority. I shall 
say more about this important point below. 
The fifth and final premise of Sangiovanni’s argument is intended to satisfy the 
exclusivity condition: 
 
(P5*) Only citizens, and not non-citizens, contribute to the conditions necessary for 
wealth creation in a particular state. 
 
Because the state offers the stable conditions necessary to extract value from 
individuals’ talents and because the state, in turn, is maintained by its members 
(citizens), and only its members, the demands of reciprocity entail the statist conclusion 
that: 
 
(SC) Only the distribution of goods between citizens (and not non-citizens) should 
be regulated by strong norms of distributive justice. 
 
The problem with this argument is that, even if we accept P1-P4, the statist 
conclusion does not follow, because P5* is false. If my argument in the next section is 
right, what it shows is that Sangiovanni’s doctrine of reciprocity-based statism actually 
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entails that strong distributive justice applies to both members and non-members of the 
state and, thus, that the scope of (strong) justice is global rather than statist. 
V. Refut ing rec iproc i ty -based s tat i sm 
Let us begin with an example of Sangiovanni’s involving two textile workers, a 
Slovenian and an Italian. As Sangiovanni himself points out, the interdependence of 
most national economies now means that action affecting the competitiveness of an 
industry in one state is likely to have knock-on effects in other states. If we make 
certain (possibly counterfactual) assumptions about the relative size of the textile 
industries in these two countries it is quite possible that we can show that the continued 
employment of the Italian textile worker depends ‘more on the decisions affecting 
labour costs taken by the Slovenian government and Slovenian textile manufacturers 
than it does on the Italian state’.45 In such a situation – one in which the conditions 
affecting the Italian textile worker’s ability to make money from her textile-
manufacturing skills are decided primarily by elements within the Slovenian state – 
Sangiovanni’s argument would appear to imply the existence of duties of justice 
between the Italian textile worker and elements within the Slovenian state, rather than 
between the Italian textile worker and other Italian citizens. This would, of course, make 
Sangiovanni’s theory a relational justification of cross-border, rather than statist, 
justice.46 But Sangiovanni explicitly denies this implication: 
…liability to influence, even if ‘profound and pervasive’ is not sufficient for equality as 
a demand of justice to apply. Equality applies only in circumstances in which we share 
in the reproduction of a legal-political authority that is ultimately responsible for 
protecting us from physical attack and sustaining a stable system of property rights and 
entitlements.47  
                                                
45 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice’, p.34. 
46 Cf. D. Satz, 'Equality of What among Whom? Thoughts on Cosmopolitanism, Statism and 
Nationalism', in I. Shapiro and L. Brilmayer (eds.) Global Justice, (London: New York University 
Press, 1999), 67-85. 
47 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice’, p.34. 
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 It is certainly true that we do not normally think of people contributing to the 
continuity and stability of states of which they are not members, at least not in a way 
that would entitle them to inclusion in a scheme of fair reciprocity. Take our Italian 
textile worker (call her T); she earns her money (in Italy), she pays her (Italian) taxes 
and she complies with the (Italian) law. It seems obvious here that she is playing her 
part in maintaining the smooth running of the Italian state. What also seems obvious is 
that a Slovenian textile worker (call her S) who pays Slovenian taxes and obeys 
Slovenian laws does not play any part in maintaining the Italian state. 
Pursuing this thought a bit further, however, perhaps we can say that, by 
choosing not to migrate into Italy, S plays some part in maintaining the smooth running 
of the Italian state. Of course, this seems implausible when we consider that, in 
practice, whether she migrates or not will make no difference to the smooth running of 
the Italian state – it could easily accommodate her without losing the ability to function 
effectively. But what is also true is that if T ceases to pay her taxes and stops obeying 
the law more generally, it will have a similarly negligible effect on the smooth running 
of the Italian state. The state could easily absorb T’s non-compliance without losing the 
ability to function effectively. Now it looks like neither S nor T plays a significant role in 
maintaining the functioning of the Italian state, which seems absurd – the Italian state is 
not a living organism that maintains itself. 
The obvious but important point to note here is that, although the 
contributions of one person, or even one hundred people, cannot maintain a (large, 
modern) state, the contributions of much larger groups can and do. T’s contributions 
and compliance can plausibly be interpreted as helping to maintain the Italian state only 
when combined with the similar behaviour of many millions of Italian citizens. Put 
another way, if several million Italians all stopped paying taxes and began generally 
disobeying the law, public order would break down and the conditions necessary for 
wealth creation would disintegrate. Unfortunately, this fact still fails to distinguish T 
from S. To see why, consider the indirect effects of the respect shown by S for the rules 
governing the crossing of the Italian border when this is combined with the similar 
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respect shown for these rules by the millions of other Slovenians and the billions of 
other non-citizens around the world. While some (large) states are able to incorporate 
significant numbers of migrants without any obvious negative effects (and perhaps even 
some positive effects),48 it is generally agreed that there is a limit to how many migrants 
a state can accept before public order breaks down and the state is no longer able to 
guarantee the conditions necessary for wealth creation. A number of writers have 
plausibly claimed that an unprecedented influx of hundreds of millions of migrants into 
any particular state over a short period of time would be enough to cause this effect.49 
In light of this it would appear, once again, that T and S stand in a similar relation to 
the Italian state as far as the doctrine of reciprocity-based statism is concerned, and the 
duties of justice that apply to one, ceteris paribus, apply to the other. 
There is another distinction to be made here that might appear to offer greater 
comfort to the proponent of statism. It is a distinction between the kinds of 
contributions that T and S make to the Italian state. Sangiovanni himself mentions four 
kinds of contribution that individuals can make to the running of the state: compliance, 
trust, resources and participation. The first two of these, compliance and trust, are 
negative contributions. The last two, resources and participation, are positive 
contributions. T and S are only similar insofar as they make negative contributions to 
                                                
48 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is little consensus in the empirical literature over exactly what the 
political, social and economic effect of immigration on developed states is, even at its current, 
relatively modest level. What seems to be true in general is that, if there are any benefits to modest 
levels of immigration, they are distributed unevenly, and tend to be short-term rather than long-term 
benefits (see, e.g., B. Chiswick, 'Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control', The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2 (3) (1988), 101-115; D. Coleman and R. Rowthorn, 'The Economic Effects 
of Immigration into the United Kingdom', Population and Development Review, 30 (4) (2004), 579-
624). 
49 Joseph Carens refers to this as the ‘public order problem’, J. Carens, 'Migration and Morality: A 
Liberal Egalitarian Perspective', in B. Barry and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Free Movement: Ethical Issues 
in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992), 25-47, p.30. Carens’s claims about the public order problem are echoed, 
among others, by, V. Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration', Constellations, 12 (3) (2005), 331-361, 
p.348; A. Abizadeh, 'Liberal Egalitarian Arguments for Closed Borders: Some Preliminary Critical 
Reflections', Ethics and Economics, 4 (1) (2006), 1-8, p.3; M. Weiner, 'Ethics, National Sovereignty, 
and the Control of Immigration', International Migration Review, 30 (1) (1996), 171-197, pp.172-3. It 
is important to distinguish the public order problem raised by the possibility of massive levels of 
immigration from the issue of whether or not high, though not massive, levels of immigration 
necessarily constrain the state’s ability to sustain a welfare state. The latter issue raises distinct 
normative problems which I do not address here (for further discussion see, Abizadeh, 'Liberal 
Egalitarian Arguments’, pp.4-8, and the discussion in, G. Freeman, 'Migration and the Political 
Economy of the Welfare State', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 485 
(1986), 51-63). 
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the running of the state; first, through compliance with the laws of the state (obeying 
civil and criminal laws in T’s case, obeying immigration laws in S’s) and second, being 
trusted not to break these laws in future so that the state and its members can make 
plans on the assumption of long-term stability. T and S also differ, however, because 
only T makes positive contributions to the running of the state in the form of resources 
(e.g. taxes) and participation (e.g. voting, and the numerous quotidian actions and 
gestures that maintain a civic culture). Is it the case, then, that the immigration 
objection can be avoided simply by shortening the list of ‘types of contributions to the 
running of the state’ to include only positive contributions? To see why not, it is 
necessary to introduce an extra bit of complexity into the argument and analyse 
Sangiovanni’s response to the suggestion that reciprocity-based statism might not be 
able to generate duties of justice in a night-watchman state. 
A night-watchman state does not claim responsibility for providing many basic 
goods and services to its citizens (and residents). Under these circumstances, 
individuals, particularly the well-off, will develop their talents and abilities through 
purely private means (private education, health care, transportation and so on).50 Given 
that these people ‘do not depend on other citizens and residents for the basic 
conditions necessary for them to flourish’, it appears we are unable to say that duties of 
egalitarian reciprocity apply to them.51 
Sangiovanni’s rejoinder to this response is that the empirical premise on which 
it relies is false. Duties of egalitarian reciprocity do apply to the well-off members of the 
night-watchman state because their prosperity does depend, to a considerable extent, on 
the actions of other citizens. To emphasise this point Sangiovanni presents us with a 
revised list of three contributions citizens make to the running of the (night-watchman) 
state: compliance with extant private (civil) law; paying tax to finance the military, police 
and legal system; and, in many cases, military service. This ‘thin’ list of contributions is, 
                                                
50 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.35. 
51 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.35. This observation, of course, forms the core of one of Nozick’s 
most powerful objections to Rawls’s conception of a well-ordered society as a ‘cooperative venture 
for mutual advantage’, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (Oxford: Basic Books Ltd., 1974), 
pp.189-197. 
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according to Sangiovanni, still enough to justify the inclusion of the contributors in a 
system of reciprocal justice. 
On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the only relevant 
contribution here is the first one: compliance with extant private law. We can prove this 
by using an important idea I mentioned briefly at the end of the last section; the idea 
that, as Sangiovanni puts it, ‘coercion is not a necessary condition for equality as a 
demand of justice to apply’.52 To illustrate this, Sangiovanni asks us to imagine an 
internally just state where, in the wake of a terrible terrorist attack, ‘all local means of 
law enforcement – police, army, and any potential replacements – are temporarily 
disarmed and disabled’. In the post-attack state: 
Crime rates increase, compliance with the laws decreases, but society does not dissolve 
at a stroke into a war of all against all. Citizens generally feel a sense of solidarity in the 
wake of the attack, and a desire to maintain public order and decency despite the 
private advantages they could gain through disobedience and non-compliance…The 
laws still earn most people’s respect: the state continues to provide the services it 
always has; the legislature meets regularly; laws are debated and passed; contracts and 
wills drawn up; property transferred in accordance with law; disputes settled through 
legal arbitration, and so on.53 
Sangiovanni initially uses this hypothetical scenario to illustrate the superiority 
of the reciprocity-based argument for statism over the coercion-based argument. If 
nothing in our lives changes when the coercive force of the state is removed but (as 
Sangiovanni argues at length) the requirements of justice remain, it seems that the 
autonomy principle, which forms the central plank in the coercion account,54 is not 
doing any work. But notice another implication of the post-attack state scenario: if 
there is no role for the military or police force, then there is no need for citizens to 
contribute to their upkeep. Imagine the state in this example is the night-watchman 
state we were considering earlier. According to Sangiovanni, citizens in the night-
                                                
52 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.10. 
53 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', pp.10-11. 
54 See, Blake, 'Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy'. 
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watchman state were included in the scheme of justice because they complied with the 
law and they contributed to the state’s powers of enforcement. After the attack, this 
second condition is no longer relevant. The only contribution to the running of the 
state that the citizens now make is to comply with the extant private law. Indeed, on 
reflection, it seem obvious that this is the only requirement that matters – after all, the 
only reason for maintaining a capacity for law enforcement is the possibility that 
someone will break the law, a possibility that is, ex hypothesi, no longer of any concern. 
Therefore, if the citizens of the night-watchman state were entitled to a share in the 
wealth of the well-off when the state’s enforcement powers were in place, their 
entitlement should remain when the state’s enforcement powers no longer exists. 
The first part of Sangiovanni’s argument was laid out in steps P1-P5* above. 
We can now replace P5* with the new premise regarding the night-watchman state: 
 
(P5) The citizens of a night-watchman state contribute to the conditions 
necessary for wealth creation through their compliance with the (non-
coercively imposed) law. 
 
From P4 (the original principle of reciprocity) and P5, we get: 
(P6) Willing compliance with the law of the night-watchman state is sufficient 
to entitle citizens of the night-watchman state to a share in the wealth of the 
well-off members of that state. 
 
From P6 we can derive: 
(P7) The modified principle of reciprocity: Willing compliance with rules that are there 
to guarantee the stability and continuity of the conditions necessary for 
wealth-creation is sufficient to qualify individuals for inclusion in a scheme 
of strong distributive justice with the well-off.55 
                                                
55 It may well be that non-compliance with extant laws is sometimes necessary to maintain the 
conditions necessary for wealth creation (since these laws may be unjust, inefficient, or simply 
outdated, and may therefore work contrary to the goal of creating and maintaining the conditions 
necessary for wealth creation). If it is in fact true that non-compliance with extant laws is 
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By combining P7 with P8 and P9: 
(P8) The immigration laws of a state are an important part of the overall system 
of laws which guarantee the stability and continuity of the prerequisites for 
wealth-creation. 
(P9) (Nearly) all individuals who are not citizens of a state willingly comply with 
that state’s immigration laws. 
 
We can ultimately deduce the non-statist conclusion: 
(NSC) Citizens and non-citizens of a particular state qualify for inclusion in a 
scheme of strong distributive justice with the well-off members of the 
state in question. 
 
The argument set out above shows that non-citizens, as well as citizens, play a 
part in maintaining the stable environment for wealth creation that exists within 
particular states and, thus, according to the reciprocity-based conception of justice, non-
citizens, as well as citizens, should be included in the scope of the principles (the 
principles of justice) that determine how the benefits which are consequently accrued 
are to be distributed. 
VI. Ref ining the immigrat ion obje c t ion 
Sangiovanni is sympathetic to the claim that his argument gives us no reason to 
forcibly exclude (all) noncitizens at the border. His response is that his argument ‘is in 
fact most compatible with a prima facie claim in favour of open borders’.56 At first 
glance this implication of the reciprocity-based argument would appear to defeat the 
immigration objection, since, as the modified principle of reciprocity (at P7 above) 
                                                                                                                                    
(sometimes) the best or only way to maintain the conditions for wealth creation then this positively 
supports the immigration objection, since it is obvious that both citizens and non-citizens have the 
power to affect the state through non-compliance. The much more difficult claim to defend, and 
which I have attempted to defend in this section, is the claim that citizens and non-citizens maintain 
the conditions necessary for wealth creation through compliance. 
56 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.37. 
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states, inclusion in the scope of strong distributive justice is only owed to those who 
contribute to the conditions necessary for wealth creation by complying with the 
relevant rules. In a world of open borders there are no relevant rules applying to non-
citizens and, thus, there is no reason to include them in the scope of justice. 
However, Sangiovanni immediately qualifies his initial statement by admitting 
that the ‘prima facie claim in favour of open borders’ is ‘subject to the proviso that an 
open immigration policy not undermine the capability of both the receiving and the 
sending state to provide [the conditions necessary for wealth creation]’.57 The 
introduction of this proviso exposes Sangiovanni’s argument once again to the full 
force of the immigration objection. Fully open borders, as we have seen, remove all the 
rules governing the crossing of a state’s borders and, in doing so, remove any grounds 
we might have had for including non-citizens within the scope of justice. The proviso 
simply puts these rules – albeit in a modified, weaker form – back in place. Indeed, the 
very fact that the proviso is deemed necessary emphasises just how important the role 
of non-citizens is in maintaining the continued stability of the conditions necessary for 
wealth creation within a particular state. Reciprocity-based statism holds that when 
citizens respect domestic laws whose point is to guarantee the stability of the conditions 
necessary for wealth creation then they are entitled to inclusion in a scheme of strong 
distributive justice with other citizens, but when non-citizens respect immigration laws 
whose point is to guarantee the stability of the conditions necessary for wealth creation, 
no such entitlement follows. The immigration objection exposes this fundamental 
inconsistency at the heart of the reciprocity-based argument for statism. 
Before going on to explain, in the next section, how the immigration objection 
raises a challenge that must be faced by all arguments for statism, I want to pre-empt a 
potential confusion that might arise over the way the objection works. Although it may 
seem as though the immigration objection relies on facts about the migratory intentions 
of non-citizens, this is a mistake. It makes no difference to the success of the objection 
whether millions (or billions) of non-citizens want to migrate into a particular state or 
                                                
57 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.37. 
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not.58 This is because, as we have already noted, what triggers the demands of 
reciprocity-based justice is merely the fact that people are complying with rules that are 
there to guarantee the stability and continuity of the conditions necessary for wealth-
creation – there is no reference to the reasons why people comply with these rules.  
In order to see why this is, recall Sangiovanni’s example of the state whose law 
enforcement powers have been disabled by terrorists. The reason Sangiovanni gives for 
why citizens continue to comply with the law in the post terror attack state is that, 
despite the private advantages each could gain through disobedience and 
noncompliance, they share a ‘sense of solidarity’ and a ‘desire to maintain public order 
and decency’.59 There is, however, nothing in his argument which hangs on these 
particular reasons for compliance being operative. The explanation might just as well be 
that most people felt that changing their behaviour was too much effort, or even that it 
just never occurred to them that they might benefit by breaking the rules. As far as 
reciprocity-based justice is concerned, what matters is that individuals comply with the 
rules which are there to guarantee the stability of the conditions necessary for wealth 
creation; the reasons why they comply are irrelevant. Thus, when we turn our attention 
to the billions of individuals who respect the rules governing migration into a particular 
state (e.g. by not attempting to migrate illegally), and we ask whether they qualify for 
inclusion in a scheme of strong distributive justice with the members of that state, we 
can ignore what reasons they have for respecting the rules, and focus purely on the fact 
that they respect them.60 
                                                
58 The immigration objection would obviously be toothless if it did depend on this contingency. For 
while there is widespread agreement in the empirical literature that ‘migration pressure’ – the number 
of people actively seeking to migrate – is not only increasing but will continue to increase for some 
time, there is no suggestion that migration pressure is so great that, were states to fully open their 
borders, we would witness the kind of mass influx of hundreds of millions of migrants referred to by 
the immigration objection. See, R. Brubaker, 'International Migration: A Challenge for Humanity', 
International Migration Review, 25 (4) (1991), 946-957, pp.946-8; R. Appleyard, 'The Future of 
Migration', International Migration Review, 21 (1) (1987), 128-154, p.129. 
59 Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice', p.10. 
60 No doubt the reason many people decide not to migrate is because of the anti-immigration policies 
of potential destination states. This thought is encouraged by the fact that, contrary to popular belief, 
the ability of states to restrict immigration is by no means declining and, indeed, is probably stronger 
than it has been at any time in the past. (see, e.g., C. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.263; G. Freeman, 'Can Liberal States Control Unwanted 
Migration?' Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 534 (1994), 17-30). It 
might be objected that the EU provides an obvious counter-example to this claim, since the EU’s 
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What the immigration objection does depend on, however, is the physical capacity 
of non-citizens to migrate into the state in question (what I called in the introduction 
the ‘fact of migratory potential’). In a world without any migratory potential – i.e. a 
world in which it is physically impossible for people to move between states – the 
immigration objection would fail, because there would be no meaningful sense in which 
noncitizens could ‘respect’ the rules governing the crossing of state borders. We can 
distinguish four different factors which might be thought to have an effect on the 
capacity that individuals have to move between states: (1) Physical factors – how far 
away states are from each other and the type of terrain that separates them; (2) 
Geographical factors – the number of people living in each state and where they are 
located; (3) Technological factors – the means that people have to travel between states; 
(4) Institutional factors – the man-made obstacles to movement between states. 
Migratory potential is a function of the first three factors only. Imagine a world 
populated by a similar number of states as exist today, but in which each state exists on 
its own planet, where the distance between each planet is several million miles, and 
where no state has yet developed the power of flight, let alone space travel. In such a 
world of single-state planets there is clearly no migratory potential.61 Now imagine that 
a new form of quick, cheap, and relatively easy space travel is invented more or less 
simultaneously in each state. Almost immediately, migratory potential is hugely 
increased. Now, the governments of each state might welcome this development and 
do nothing to limit freedom of movement between states. Or they might be terrified by 
the potential consequences of this new technology and place severe restrictions on its 
use. While the latter response would clearly make it much more difficult for the 
                                                                                                                                    
more or less open internal borders have not led to mass migration. However, the EU’s unique 
situation is in fact the exception that proves the rule: ‘Free movement among [EU] countries…is 
possible precisely because the forces generating mass migratory flow among them have been largely 
exhausted. Where the potential for mass flows still persists – as for example between Turkey and the 
[EU] countries – free movement remains out of the question’, Brubaker, 'International Migration’, 
p.950.  
61 The point of this fanciful hypothetical is to emphasise the irrelevance of institutional factors to 
migratory potential; there is ample evidence from real life that physical, geographical, and 
technological factors are relevant: ‘The effectiveness of external policies is highly dependent on the 
physical location of states. Australia has perhaps the least serious border control problem; the United 
States, undeniably the worst’, Freeman, 'Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Migration?' p.23. 
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inhabitants of this hypothetical world to exercise their potential to travel between states, 
it would have no effect on the potential itself. 
VII. The chal l enge for  proponents  o f  s tat i sm 
Having clarified the way in which the immigration objection works I now want 
to suggest how it can be generalised to apply to all versions of statism. Recall that when 
I applied the objection to the reciprocity-based approach I focused initially on a 
comparison between two individuals, one of whom (T) was an Italian citizen, the other 
of whom (S) was not. The aim was to show that there is no relevant difference between 
T and S in terms of their ‘normative standing’ relative to the particular consideration 
thought to qualify an individual for inclusion in the scope of justice (i.e. willing 
compliance with the rules necessary to guarantee the stability of the conditions for 
wealth creation). The conclusion I came to was that, in a world characterised by global 
migratory potential, there is indeed no relevant difference in the normative standing of 
T and S, and, thus, if one should be included in the scope of justice so should the other. 
Now, one response to this argument is to say that all it shows is that the 
reciprocity-based conception is wrong about the relevant normative consideration that 
triggers strong norms of justice; the implication being that, if and when we identify the 
correct normative consideration, the difference between the normative standing of T and 
S will reveal itself. Whatever the merits of this response, what is interesting about it is 
that it accepts the terms of the challenge presented by the immigration objection. The 
challenge is this: in order to demonstrate the coherence of a particular conception of 
statism its proponents must conduct a comparative analysis of the situations of 
individual citizens and non-citizens and show in each case that the normative standing of 
the citizen and the non-citizen is relevantly different so that the latter can be justifiably 
excluded from the scope of justice which includes the former. The challenge to statism 
arises as a direct consequence of the fact of global migratory potential. This can be seen 
from the fact that the challenge does not arise in the world of single-state planets where 
travel between planets is not even a remote possibility. In this hypothetical world 
interaction between citizens and non-citizens is quite clearly not mediated by states in 
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any way and, therefore, the kinds of concerns that motivated the challenge in the first 
place – concerns over the normative standing of citizens and non-citizens vis-à-vis the 
state – do not exist. The force of the challenge presented to conceptions of statism by 
the immigration objection is therefore restricted to worlds like our own that are 
characterised by the fact of global migratory potential. 
The important question is whether the challenge can be met. In order to answer 
this question the obvious strategy is to present the challenge in its strongest form. Let 
us therefore compare a citizen (C) of a modern nation-state (S) with a non-citizen (N) 
and imagine further that C, far from being a model citizen, is an indolent and politically 
apathetic individual, while N is a highly productive and politically engaged individual. 
Let us imagine, further, that N, who resides outside S, nonetheless produces goods and 
services that are consumed by citizens of S, has friends and acquaintances who are 
citizens of S, and would happily live and work within S’s territory if the opportunity 
arose. The challenge for proponents of statism is to demonstrate that only C, and not N, 
has a claim on a share of the wealth generated by other citizens of S. 
What possible argument could justify the conclusion that only C should be 
included in the scope of justice? It cannot be that only C (the citizen), and not N (the 
non-citizen), makes a positive contribution to the running of the state; ex hypothesi, it is 
in fact the other way around, with N indirectly adding value to the economy of S and 
(let us say) contributing to the quality of political debate through cross-border dialogue 
and engagement via the internet and other media. Nor can it be that only C, and not N, 
contributes negatively to the running of the state; the whole of section V was dedicated 
to demonstrating why this is not the case. Nor can it be that only C, and not N, is 
subject to coercion; not only would N be subject to S’s coercive interference in exactly 
the same way as C if either of them tried to break the law in S, but N may well face the 
further interference of not even being allowed entry into S’s territory in order to be a 
position to contemplate such action. Nor can it be, as has been recently suggested, that 
C is more ‘immediately’ subject to the power of the state than N.62 If the notion of 
                                                
62 This notion of the ‘immediacy’ of state coercion comes from M. Risse, 'What to say about the 
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‘immediacy’ is thought to refer to individuals’ physical vulnerability to the power of the 
state, then, if we imagine that S is a large state and that N lives close to its border, it is 
quite conceivable that it would actually be easier for S to find and detain N than C, 
who, although strictly resident in S, may live thousands of miles from S’s centre of 
power. If, on the other hand, ‘immediacy’ is thought to refer to the legitimacy of the 
state’s power, the argument would still fail: either the legitimacy of the state’s power can 
be justified independently of considerations of justice, in which case any statist attempt 
to link the restricted scope of justice to the legitimacy of the state’s power would lack 
an obvious rationale; or the legitimacy of the state’s power cannot be justified 
independently of considerations of justice, in which case any attempt to ground a 
conclusion about the scope of justice on claims about the legitimacy of the state’s 
power would beg the very question at issue, namely, whether the legitimacy of the 
state’s exercise of power over C but not N can justify restricting the scope of justice so 
that it includes only the former and not the latter. 
In listing these various attempts to explain the difference in the normative 
standing of citizens and non-citizens I trust it is obvious that my aim is neither to 
provide a comprehensive enumeration of possible statist conceptions nor to provide 
conclusive proof of the failure of any particular conception. The former is no doubt an 
impossible task, and the latter would require much more detailed arguments in each 
case, akin to the argument I advanced against the reciprocity-based conception above. 
My aim is thus not to prove that no plausible and coherent version of statism exists, but 
simply to indicate how unlikely it is that one will be found. 
The tendency of statist theorists to underestimate the true scale and difficulty of 
the challenge they face is, I think, explained by the ‘institutionalist’ bias which 
underpins their general methodology. For proponents of statism, as I explained in 
section III, what really does the work in restricting the scope of justice is their 
interpretation of the role or function of the state. As a result, the empirical analyses that 
are carried out tend to be focused at a broad, structural level that is insensitive to the 
                                                                                                                                    
state', Social Theory and Practice, 32 (4) (2006), 671-698. 
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ways in which institutions actually affect individuals. By rejecting this institutionalist 
bias, and focusing instead on directly comparing particular individuals, we can better 
appreciate how those people who are not ‘official’ members of a particular institutional 
scheme, can nevertheless enjoy normative standing vis-à-vis that institutional scheme 
that qualifies them for inclusion in the scope of the relevant principles of justice. As we 
have seen, a productive, politically engaged non-citizen who has contacts and interests 
in a particular state is certainly no more free, and is usually less free, to pursue his ends 
within the jurisdiction of that state than a citizen of that state. To exclude the non-
citizen from the scope of a scheme of strong distributive justice that includes the citizen 
is to either arbitrarily ignore the way in which the non-citizen is affected by the state in 
question, or to invoke some pre-institutional right that explains why the non-citizen can 
be excluded. Both of these options clearly violate the idea that lends statism its prima 
facie plausibility, namely, that the scope of strong distributive justice depends only on the 
normative standing of individuals vis-à-vis the state. 
VIII.  Conc lus ion 
Throughout this chapter I have avoided invoking any controversial premises 
that might easily be rejected by proponents of statism. My aim has been to show that 
statist conceptions of justice typically fail on their own terms, largely because they fail to 
attend properly to the fact that residents of the globe all share the same physical space 
and that movement around this space is eminently possible for hundreds of millions, if 
not billions, of people. I have suggested, moreover, that this failure rests largely on 
statist theorists’ tendency to interpret the function and purpose of social phenomena at 
an institutional rather than an individual level. Such an approach is bound to throw up 
historical patterns of inclusion and exclusion which look as though they may have some 
normative significance. When we ‘zoom in’, however, and study the circumstances of 
particular individuals vis-à-vis these institutional structures, the uniformity across 
groups which seemed to point so strongly to normatively significant conclusions 
inevitably turns out to be much harder to detect. 
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The immigration objection challenges proponents of statism to justify their 
view in these more demanding individualist terms. I have argued that the prospects of 
meeting such a challenge are not good; at least, not without either arbitrarily ignoring 
the way in which individual non-citizens are affected by states, or invoking some pre-
institutional notion that explains why non-citizens can justifiably be treated differently 
from citizens. The former option can clearly be ruled out as unviable from the start. 
But the latter option looks more promising. If some way can be found of explaining 
what distinguishes citizens from non-citizens that avoids appealing to their normative 
standing relative to the institutional structures of states, then perhaps we can justify the 
domestic scope restriction – which says that citizens and only citizens should be 
included in the scope of strong distributive justice – without invoking the kind of 
distinctive ‘statist’ argument for that restriction that, I have argued, falls foul of the 
immigration objection. In the next chapter I consider just such an approach; one which 
argues that the citizens of a particular state share a special relationship with each other 
as co-nationals, and that it is this relationship, rather than any institutionally-mediated 
relationship, which justifies the exclusive scope of strong distributive justice. Of course, 
this kind of appeal to the shared national identity of citizens will be of little consolation 
to the statist theorists considered above, for the whole aim of the doctrine of statism is 
to justify the domestic scope restriction by appeal to the normative peculiarity of the 
state itself. In light of the damage inflicted on such theories by the immigration 
objection, however, it is important to see if there is any other way of defending the 
domestic scope restriction. 
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(3) Justifying the Domestic Scope Restriction: The Failure of 
Nationalism 
I .  Introduct ion 
Proponents of the nationalist justification for the domestic scope restriction 
agree with statists both that strong norms of distributive justice apply only between the 
citizens of a particular state and that, if justice is relevant to the interactions of citizens 
and non-citizens at all, it is only weak norms of distributive justice that apply to these 
interactions. But although nationalists and statists tend to agree on the truth of the 
domestic scope restriction, they do not agree for the same reasons. 
According to what I shall call the ‘nationalist justification thesis’ (NJT), the 
domestic scope restriction is justified by the fact that the members of a state do not just 
share a relationship with one another as citizens, they also share another kind of 
relationship with one another as co-nationals.63 This exclusive co-national relationship 
generates special ‘associative’ duties which apply only between citizens and not non-
citizens. The precise content of these co-national associative duties depends on the 
particular character of the co-national relationship that gives rise to them but, in 
general, individuals who are not just co-citizens but also co-nationals have a 
significantly stronger duty to attend to one another’s well-being than they would do if 
they were ‘merely’ co-citizens: they have a stronger duty to care for one another’s 
others needs, to provide one another with public goods, and to participate in public 
life.64 Whatever their precise content, the claim made by proponents of the NJT is that 
citizens’ co-national associative duties form part of the content of justice, and this 
                                                
63 The most prominent proponent of the NJT is David Miller. See, for example, Miller, On 
Nationality, chap.3; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, chap.2; Miller, 'Justice and 
Boundaries'. Another well-known proponent is Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). There are several other writers (many of whom I mention below) who, 
although not explicitly committed to the NJT, nevertheless implicitly endorse its main tenets. One 
such writer whose work I do not directly discuss, but who should be mentioned here, is M. Walzer, 
Spheres of Justice, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983). 
64 For this last claim in particular, see, A. Mason, 'Special Obligations to Compatriots', Ethics, 107 (3) 
(1997), 427-447. 
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explains why the norms of justice that apply between citizens are stronger than those 
that apply between non-citizens. 
My argument in this chapter, like the previous one, is essentially negative. My 
aim is to demonstrate that the nationalist justification thesis is false. Now one obvious 
way of going about this would be to try to show that the co-national relationship is 
incapable of grounding any associative duties between its members. But I shall not 
pursue this strategy. Yet another argument against the very possibility of co-national 
associative duties will no doubt be welcomed by those who already agree with its 
conclusion, but it is unlikely to persuade those who are convinced that co-national 
associative duties can and do exist. 
So I shall not try to deny that people can have associative duties to their co-
nationals. Instead, I shall argue that even if the relationship that holds between co-
nationals is capable of grounding associative duties, the further claim that these duties 
are what explain and justify the restricted scope of strong norms of justice is false. One 
thing that supporters of the domestic scope restriction all agree on, (and this is true 
whether they support it on nationalist grounds, or statist grounds, or some mixture of 
the two), is that if strong norms of justice apply domestically, then they apply universally 
within that restricted domain (i.e. the state). That is, they believe that the strong norms 
of justice that apply to citizens apply without exception: if you are a citizen, then you 
are necessarily subject to the strong norms of justice that apply to all other citizens. The 
problem for proponents of the NJT, as I argue below, is that the associative duties that 
are purportedly owed by co-nationals, and that supposedly justify the applicability of 
strong norms of justice, do not have guaranteed universal applicability within the 
domain of the state. Even if some citizens owe associative duties to each other in virtue 
of their relationship as co-nationals, there is no guarantee that all citizens owe these 
duties. But if co-national associative duties do not apply to all citizens then they cannot 
be appealed to in order to justify the domestic scope restriction, since this restriction 
assumes that strong norms of justice apply without exception across the restricted 
domain. 
 55 
The falsity of the nationalist justification thesis does not entail that there are no 
strong norms of distributive justice, nor does it entail that there are no strong norms of 
distributive justice with restricted scope. Perhaps the existence of strong norms of 
distributive justice can be justified in some other way, and perhaps the restricted scope 
of these norms can also be justified somehow. My claim in this chapter is the purely 
negative one that these justifications cannot plausibly appeal to the associative duties 
that some people may owe in virtue of their nationality. 
The main part of my argument involves setting out what I think is the most 
plausible account of the way in which certain types of relationships can ground 
associative duties between their members. This is the task of sections II-V. The account 
I defend claims that, for an individual to have associative duties in virtue of her 
membership of a particular relationship, two things must be true. First, the particular 
relationship in question must be a token of a potentially duty-grounding relationship-
type. A potentially duty-grounding relationship-type is one that possesses impersonal 
intrinsic value (i.e. value that cannot be reduced to the well-being of those participating 
in the relationship). Examples include the relationship between friends, family 
members, and, more controversially, co-nationals. Only certain relationship-types are 
impersonally valuable, and it is this impersonal value that explains why these 
relationship-types are capable of grounding associative duties whereas other 
relationship-types are not. 
Because impersonally valuable relationships are only potentially duty-grounding, 
there is a second fact we need to know before we can determine whether an individual 
participant in a particular token of one of these potentially duty-grounding relationships 
is actually the bearer of a set of associative duties grounded in that relationship. What 
we need to know is whether a particular individual’s participation in a relationship 
token contributes intrinsically to her well-being. To say that participation in a 
relationship contributes ‘intrinsically’ to a person’s well-being is to say that such 
participation is a constituent element in that person’s well-being, and not merely a 
means, an instrument, for achieving well-being. Of course, participation in impersonally 
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valuable relationships often contributes to our well-being in both an intrinsic and an 
instrumental sense, and so it can often be hard to distinguish the two. But our friends 
and family members would presumably be rather dismayed to find out that the only 
reason we continue to participate in a relationship with them is because of the 
instrumental benefits we gain as a result (e.g. help with baby-sitting or moving house). 
Thus, it is only when participation in an impersonally valuable relationship makes an 
intrinsic, constitutive contribution to a person’s well-being that a person has the right 
kind of reason to continue her participation in the relationship and see herself as the 
bearer of associative duties towards the other participants in that relationship. In this 
situation I shall say that the associative duties grounded in a particular relationship have 
‘normative force’ for the individual in question. 
Since there are two distinct stages in determining the normative force that any 
putative set of associative duties has for a particular individual, I call this the ‘two-stage 
analysis’ of associative duties. After explaining it in more detail in section V, I move on 
in section VI to apply the two-stage analysis to the particular case of the co-national 
relationship. The conditional nature of my argument means that there is no need to 
carry out the first stage of the analysis by demonstrating that the co-national 
relationship is an impersonally valuable (and hence potentially duty-grounding) 
relationship-type. What I am concerned to show instead is that even if the co-national 
relationship is a potentially duty-grounding relationship-type, the associative duties it 
generates do not necessarily apply to every putative member of that relationship. In 
order to successfully show this it is of course necessary to carry out the second stage of 
the analysis. Determining whether a person’s participation in a co-national relationship 
contributes intrinsically to her well-being is no easy task, especially considering all the 
instrumental benefits such participation brings. But I believe there are grounds for 
scepticism regarding the claim that participation in certain kinds of co-national 
relationship always contributes intrinsically to the well-being of the participant. If I am 
right, then we must conclude that there is no way of guaranteeing that the associative 
duties generated by the co-national relationship have normative force for every member 
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of that relationship. And if the universal applicability of co-national associative duties 
cannot be guaranteed, then the ability of these duties to explain the restricted scope of 
strong norms of distributive justice – which do have universal applicability within the 
relevant domain – would seem to be in doubt. 
II .  Three  condi t ions on assoc iat ive  duty-grounding re lat ionships 
Many philosophers agree with the commonly held belief that people owe 
associative duties to others with whom they stand in certain significant relationships.65 
But although there is fairly widespread agreement among philosophers that such duties 
exist, there is a great deal of disagreement over their moral justification. Two questions 
in particular have been the focus of debate: How are relationships able to generate these 
duties? And which types of relationship are able to generate these duties?  
One way of addressing these questions is to try to identify a set of conditions 
that any relationship must satisfy if it is to qualify as an associative duty-grounding 
relationship. If such a set of conditions can be identified then it should help explain 
both how certain types of relationship are capable of generating associative duties, and 
which types of relationship have this capability. In this section I consider three potential 
conditions: the ‘duty condition’, the ‘justice condition’, and the ‘value condition’. Some 
writers explicitly endorse all three conditions.66 In the work of many other writers, 
however, only some of these conditions are endorsed, and even then the endorsement 
is only implicit. By setting out the conditions clearly, and assessing the role played by 
each in the justification of associative duties, we can hopefully shed some light on an 
area of moral and political philosophy that still suffers from a lack of clarity. 
                                                
65 ‘Most of us believe that there are certain people to whom we have special obligations. These are 
the people to whom we stand in certain relations…We believe that we ought to try to save these 
people from certain harm, and ought to try to give them certain kinds of benefit. Common-Sense 
Morality largely consists in such obligations.’ D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p.95. As Samuel Scheffler has explained, the term ‘associative duties’ is 
used to distinguish the special duties a person owes people with whom he stands in some kind of 
significant relationship from the special duties he owes people for other reasons; for example, 
because he formed a contract with them, or because they provided him with certain benefits, or 
because he wronged them in some way. Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice 
and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, pp.49-50. 
66 E.g., Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp.34-7, and, J. Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), chap.2. 
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Turning first, then, to the ‘duty condition’, the idea here is that for a 
relationship to be able to ground associative duties, it must be the case that the 
relationship itself is actually constituted, wholly or partially, by those duties. Consider 
the difference, for instance, between the norms of behaviour that identify a group of 
music fans who share a love of the blues67 and the norms of behaviour that identify a 
group of friends who share a history of mutual concern for one another. In some sense 
it is true that members of the group of blues fans ‘must’ behave in certain ways in order 
to be counted as members of the group. But this is not a moral ‘must’. We do not in 
general think that any particular blues fan has a duty to the other members to continue 
attending concerts of the blues, especially when it is costly for him to do so. The 
situation is very different for the group of friends. In order for the members of this 
group to be counted as genuine friends they ‘must’ be prepared to behave in certain 
ways or else accept justified moral criticism. To be a friend is not simply to act 
according to a well defined pattern of interaction, but to recognise a duty to pay special 
attention to the interests of those whom one counts as friends. 
The precise content of the duties that constitute a particular relationship 
obviously depends on the type of relationship it is. The duties that a university 
professor owes to her colleagues are different to the duties she owes to her brother, 
and both of these are very different to the duties she owes to those with whom she 
shares a national identity. However, the fact that these different kinds of relationship 
are usually understood to give rise to different kinds of duties is not enough on its own 
to justify the normative force of these duties. In order to know whether a person is 
vulnerable to moral criticism for failing to fulfil her duties to her colleagues, sibling, or 
co-nationals, we need to know whether the relationships which give rise to these duties 
satisfy further conditions. 
It has been suggested that one of these further conditions is (what I am calling) 
the ‘justice condition’. The justice condition states that the duties typically thought to 
constitute a particular type of relationship lack normative force for those participating 
                                                
67 I borrow this example from Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 2007, p.40). 
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in the relationship if the relationship itself is inherently premised on injustice.68 Thus, 
even though the members of various types of racist or criminal organisations might well 
experience a very real sense of solidarity as a result of their shared membership of the 
group, and although they often have very demanding expectations of how members in 
good standing of that group should behave, we are not committed to the conclusion 
that these individuals, qua participants in these unjust practices, have a moral duty to 
behave in these ways. There may be, as Miller points out, honour among thieves, but 
the norms that regulate the behaviour of Mafiosi fail to qualify as genuine associative 
duties in virtue of the fact that the very existence of the relationship which generates 
them is inherently premised on injustice.69 
The justice condition, as we can see from the Mafia example just noted, has 
some obvious prima facie plausibility. But we must take care here, for there is reason to 
think that the justice condition, as it stands, might prove too much. The worry is that 
although on some fairly minimal conceptions of what justice demands the justice 
condition will be compatible with a wide range of associative duty-grounding 
relationships, on other more demanding conceptions of what justice demands the 
justice condition might rule out from the start the duty-grounding potential of most if 
not all types of relationships. If, for instance, justice requires the realisation of a 
substantive principle of global equality, then any relationship whose putative demands 
conflict with this requirement will be automatically disqualified from the class of duty-
grounding relationships. Since it is part of the very nature of associative duties that 
some people receive benefits that others do not, it is unlikely that many relationships 
will satisfy the justice condition when it is interpreted in this strongly egalitarian sense. 
Now one possible response to this worry is to stick to one’s guns and insist that 
if the putative demands that arise from most, or perhaps all, of our relationships 
conflict with the demands of global egalitarian justice, then that is just too bad for those 
relationships – justice takes priority. The problem with this uncompromising response 
                                                
68 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p.36. 
69 The relevance of the justice condition is emphasised by M. Hardimon, 'Role Obligations', The 
Journal of Philosophy, 91 (7) (1994), 333-363, p.344. 
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is that it involves taking a very hard line on a deeply controversial issue when there is, at 
least at this stage, no need to do so. Recall that the original motivation for introducing 
the justice condition was to rule out obviously unjust relationships, such as racist and 
criminal gangs, from the class of duty-grounding relationships. The aim was not to 
show that these relationships give rise to duties which are then overridden by justice but 
to show that the duty-grounding potential of these relationships is undermined from the 
start due to their inherent injustice. Now, however, we face the possibility that the duty-
grounding potential of all relationships, including ones that are not ‘obviously’ unjust, 
might be undermined. This is clearly a much more controversial position to hold. We 
are a long way from understanding the way in which associative duties interact with our 
wider duties of justice, and it seems unnecessarily premature to decide this matter at 
this stage of the argument.70 
The solution is to modify the justice condition so that it only implies the 
exclusion of those relationships that are ‘obviously unjust’. I shall not attempt to work 
out the precise content of this ‘minimal justice condition’, but I assume that such a task 
is possible in principle. There will inevitably be hard cases, but for the most part it 
should be clear which relationships satisfy the minimal justice condition and which 
don’t. It is important to note that the minimal justice condition would not rule out in 
principle the possibility of our associative duties to friends and family members being 
overridden by a very demanding ‘full’ conception of justice. The point is that now we can 
at least recognise that there is a genuine conflict here – the problem with the original 
justice condition was that it ruled out this possibility by definition. 
I turn finally to the value condition. The value condition plays a particularly 
important role in the justification of associative duties, because it explains why the 
participants in certain types of relationships have a reason to see themselves as the 
                                                
70 For evidence of how deep the disagreement is among philosophers over the relationship between 
our duties of justice and our associative duties, see the work by, A. Abizadeh and P. Gilabert, 'Is there 
a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities?' Philosophical 
Studies, 138 (3) (2008), 349-365; N. Kolodny, 'Do Associative Duties Matter', The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 10 (3) (2002), 250-266, S. Lazar, 'Debate: Do Associative Duties Really Not 
Matter?' The Journal of Political Philosophy, 17 (1) (2009), 90-101, J. Seglow, 'Associative Duties 
and Global Justice', The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 7 (2010), 54-73; Scheffler, Boundaries and 
Allegiances, esp. chaps.3, 4, 5, and 6. 
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bearers of duties towards their fellow participants in the first place. Very briefly, the 
idea is this: to say that a relationship is valuable is to say that people have a reason to 
participate in it. And if people have a reason to participate in a relationship that is 
constituted in part by a set of associative duties, then people have a reason to carry out 
these duties. Of course, this simple explanation leaves unanswered a number of 
important questions, including how exactly we are to understand the nature of the value 
possessed by relationships, and how we are to understand the precise relation between 
the value of a relationship and the moral significance of the duties that constitute it. 
The literature reveals a wide range of different answers to these questions, and we need 
to make some sense of these answers before we can explain how the normative force of 
our associative duties is justified.71 
III .  Interpre t ing the value condi t ion:  the instrumental  value account 
One way of justifying the normative force of the duties that arise from our 
relationships is to appeal to the instrumental value of these relationships. The claim is 
that the duties grounded in certain types of relationship should be seen as having 
normative force because of the key role they play as a means to some further end (i.e. 
one that lies beyond the specific goal of continuing any particular relationship) that is 
valuable for its own sake.72 A common version of this view starts with the 
uncontroversial claim that it is valuable for us to discharge our general duties (i.e. duties 
we owe to everyone), and then goes on to claim that our relationships with particular 
                                                
71 For discussion of the issues raised by the value condition see, e.g., Miller, National Responsibility 
and Global Justice, pp.34-5; Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, pp.40-3; Scheffler, Boundaries and 
Allegiances, esp. chaps.3 and 6; Abizadeh and Gilabert, 'Is there a genuine tension?'; Mason, 'Special 
Obligations to Compatriots'; P. T. Lenard, and M. R. Moore, 'Ineliminable Tension: A Reply to 
Abizadeh and Gilabert's 'Is There a Genuine Tension Between Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism and 
Special Responsibilities?'', Philosophical Studies, 148 (2009), 399-405. 
72 According to standard usage, the instrumental view does not, strictly speaking, justify the existence 
of ‘associative’ duties proper, since the ‘associative’ label tends to be reserved for duties that arise as 
a direct result of the intrinsic value of relationships. However, it seems to me that both the 
instrumental and intrinsic arguments for the existence of special, relationship-based duties share the 
same basic structure (i.e. they both agree on the three conditions on duty-grounding relationships and 
only disagree about the interpretation of the value condition). If this is right, then it seems to make 
sense to characterise the disagreement they have as being about the correct justification of associative 
duties, and not (as is currently the case) as being about whether the duties we owe to those with 
whom we stand in some kind of significant relationship are associative duties or some other kind of 
duties. 
 62 
people (and the associative duties they entail) are valuable insofar as they contribute to 
this end. Thus, it has been argued that the relationships between parents and their 
children are instrumentally valuable because assigning responsibility to particular adults 
to look after particular children makes it much more likely that we will successfully 
discharge the general duty we all have to ensure that all children are looked after. 
Similarly, it has been claimed that relationships between members of the same nation 
are instrumentally valuable because assigning responsibility to particular groups to 
satisfy their members’ needs makes it much more likely that we will successfully 
discharge our general duty to ensure that everyone’s needs are met.73 
These kinds of instrumental justifications of associative duties have been 
subjected to numerous powerful criticisms, but the central objection usually takes the 
same general form, and comes in two parts.74 The first part highlights the vulnerability 
of associative duties’ normative force, on the instrumental account, to empirical 
circumstances. Take, for example, the argument that the allocation of associative duties 
is a particularly effective way of ensuring that our general duties are discharged. In a 
world where the resource holdings of individuals are more or less equal it may be true 
that the most effective way of discharging our general duty to help the needy is to 
assign people special duties to look after their compatriots. But in a world as unequal as 
ours, if our aim is to help needy people in general, then, as Miller says, ‘to put Swedes, 
with a per capita annual income of $24,000, in charge of their own needy, and Somalis, 
with a per capita annual income of $120, in charge of their needy would seem grossly 
irrational’.75 This example demonstrates the fact that if the normative force of 
associative duties is justified by appeal to the wider goal or value such duties promote, 
then, if it turns out that there is a better way of promoting the goal or value in question, 
the justification will fail. 
                                                
73 For examples of these types of argument, see, R. E. Goodin, 'What is So Special about Our Fellow 
Countrymen?' Ethics, 98 (4) (1988), 663-686; M. C. Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in 
J. Cohen (ed.), For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1996), 2-20. 
74 See, e.g., Miller, On Nationality, pp.58-65; Mason, 'Special Obligations to Compatriots', pp.429-
37. 
75 Miller, On Nationality, p.63. 
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The second part of the objection to the instrumental justification of associative 
duties says quite simply that this contingent account of the normative force of our 
associative duties does not in fact reflect the way we think about their normative force. 
This point is best brought out by an example famously discussed by Bernard Williams.76 
Imagine a person faced with a situation in which he can save either a stranger’s life or 
his wife’s life, but not both. Most people would say that there is no need for the man to 
decide who he should save through some fair decision procedure (say, by flipping a 
coin). Instead, they would say that he is obviously justified in saving his wife’s life, and 
indeed that he is probably required to. When asked why the man is justified in 
eschewing the coin toss and favouring his wife over the stranger, most people will 
answer, ‘because she is his wife’ (while perhaps adding that this is what husbands 
should do for their wives). 
For the proponent of the non-instrumental justification of associative duties, 
however, this answer simply raises a further question, namely, why, in these sorts of 
situations, are people justified in saving their wives instead of strangers? And it is the 
fact that the proponent of the instrumental justification believes this further question 
needs asking that exposes the flaw in this account of associative duties. Such a belief 
reflects a failure to understand that to value my relationship with a particular person 
‘just is, in part, to see that person as a source of special claims in virtue of the 
relationship between us’.77 To look outside the value of the relationship one has with 
one’s friend or sibling or partner in order to explain why one owes associative duties to 
that person is, in Williams’ famous phrase, to have ‘one thought too many’.78 If it turns 
out that the relationship the potential rescuer has with his wife (or, to recall the earlier 
example, the relationship a Swedish person has with his co-national) is an instance of a 
widespread practice that generally contributes to the promotion of some independently 
valuable goal, then this is at most a welcome bonus – it is not the reason why the 
rescuer is justified in favouring his wife over the stranger, or the Swedish man is 
                                                
76 B. Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), pp.17-9. 
77 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, p.100. 
78 Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, p.18. 
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justified in providing benefits to his co-nationals rather than to the more needy citizens 
of Somalia.79 
IV. Interpre t ing the value condi t ion:  the intr ins i c  value account 
The majority of writers on the subject agree that the normative force of our 
associative duties cannot and should not be seen as dependent on the value of the 
independent end(s) that the fulfilment of such duties promotes. Instead, they argue that 
the normative force of our associative duties must be grounding in the intrinsic (i.e. 
non-instrumental) value of the relationships that give rise to them. There are, however, 
a number of different ways of interpreting the idea that certain types of relationship are 
intrinsically valuable, and this in turn generates a number of different answers to the 
question how the intrinsic value of a relationship explains the normative force of the 
associative duties grounded in a particular relationship. 
As a way in to these issues, I begin by introducing a distinction between two 
kinds of intrinsic value: personal and impersonal. Something has ‘personal’ intrinsic 
value insofar as it contributes to the well-being of persons. Thus, if a person derives 
well-being from his participation in a relationship, then this relationship can be 
described as possessing personal intrinsic value. In order to avoid slipping back into an 
instrumental account of the value of relationships it is important to distinguish between 
participation in a relationship as a means to well-being and participation in a relationship 
as a constituent of well-being. The latter idea is nicely expressed by Arash Abizadeh and 
Pablo Gilabert:  
What explains the value of relationships such as those of friendship or family is that 
they are arguably a necessary constituent of human well-being, and perhaps even a 
necessary constituent of a life with moral agency. Their value is ‘‘derivative’’ in the 
sense that the whole institution of friendship or family is justified by reference to the 
value of human well-being of which it is arguably a part. Having such relationships is 
valuable for its own sake, noninstrumentally (since it is not the cause of well-being but 
                                                
79 This point is also made by J. McMahan, 'The Limits of National Partiality', in R. McKim and J. 
McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism, (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 107-138, p.116. 
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a part of it); but its value is nonetheless explained by and so conditional on the ultimate 
value of human wellbeing.80	  
The advantage of the ‘personal view’ of the intrinsic value of relationships is 
that it is much more faithful than the instrumental account to the way in which we 
actually value our relationships. It enables us to recognise the value that is directly 
instantiated by these relationships, something we were unable to do when thinking 
about the value of relationships in purely instrumental terms. As Michael Hardimon 
puts it: ‘Our roles as family members and citizens are the source of some of the deepest 
and most important bonds we have…A life devoid of such attachments would be 
flatter, less full, less human than a life with such attachments’.81 Using the personal view 
we can now explain why people are justified in saving their wives rather than strangers 
by appealing directly to the intrinsic value of marriage, and not to the value of the ends 
which marriage generally serves as a means. It is for this reason that the personal view 
of the intrinsic value of associative duty-grounding relationships is to be preferred to 
the purely instrumental view.82 
However, although the personal view offers a better account of the way in 
which people tend to value their relationships, it is still not clear that it offers a 
plausible explanation of the distinction between those relationships that are able to 
ground associative duties and those that are not. To see why this is, consider the 
following hypothetical example put forward by Diane Jeske. The ‘West Side Reading 
Group’, says Jeske, 
                                                
80 Abizadeh and Gilabert, 'Is there a genuine tension?' p.356. 
81 Hardimon, 'Role Obligations', p.354. 
82 Not everyone agrees that the necessary contribution that our participation in certain relationships 
makes to our well-being entails that such participation has intrinsic value. Consider this quote from 
McMahan: ‘I have argued that many special relations have a profound instrumental significance. 
Nothing could be more obvious than that our relations with one another, and particularly our close 
personal relationship, are vital and indispensable elements of our happiness and well-being’, 
McMahan, 'The Limits of National Partiality', p.118 (emphasis added). It seems that whether or not 
one thinks that the well-being that people derive from their participation in relationships is 
intrinsically or instrumentally valuable depends on whether one thinks that well-being is a distinct 
value in itself or merely the collective label given to all those goods that have personal intrinsic 
value. Abizadeh and Gilabert appear to support the second option whereas McMahan appears to 
favour the first. Nothing important hangs on this disagreement as long as those who take McMahan’s 
view agree with him that (certain of) our relations with one another are ‘vital and indispensable 
elements’ of well-being. 
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will meet once a month at the local coffee house to discuss edifying books, articles, etc. 
Members of the group are obligated to attend a certain number of meetings a year, 
participate in discussions, and recommend books or articles to other members of the 
group. Everyone who lives in a certain sector of the west side of town is a member of 
the group. Given that I live in that part of the west side of town, I am thereby a 
member of the group. Do I have obligations to attend meetings, etc.? The group 
appears to be just and to have good ends. Given that I am well-read, it would be good 
if I were to contribute to the group, and my participating would certainly not be unjust 
or immoral. But why suppose that I have special obligations to other members of the 
reading group simply because those others have decided to describe me in a certain 
way, even if their group is a good group with just and worthy goals in which I could 
participate without violating any requirements of justice or morality?83 
Unlike the duties that arise as a result of my relationship with my friends, family 
members, or even co-nationals, we do not think that the duties which arise as a result 
of my automatic membership of the West Side Reading Group have any normative 
force for me in particular. This is so even though, ex hypothesi, the group not only 
satisfies the duty condition and the minimal justice condition but would also contribute 
to my well-being were I to participate. According to the personal view, the difference in 
the duty-grounding potential of these different types of relationship is to be explained 
by the fact that the former types of relationship are examples of intrinsically valuable 
practices (i.e. ones that are necessarily constitutive of person’s well-being), whereas the 
latter type of relationship is only an instrumentally valuable practice (i.e. one that is a 
contingent means to my well-being). Is this explanation plausible? 
The problem for the proponent of the personal view is that for all the talk 
about the ‘necessary’ constitutive role played by participation in certain types of 
relationship in promoting my well-being, there does not seem to be any substantive 
                                                
83 D. Jeske, ‘Special Obligations’, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/. Richard 
Dagger provides a similar example when he discusses his sense of belonging to the group of 
‘Janeites’ (devoted readers of Jane Austen’s novels). ‘I feel a kinship with my fellow Janeites; I have 
rubbed elbows with some of them at the Austen house in Chawton; I identify with them. But I do not 
see how this identification imposes an obligation, associational or otherwise, upon me’. R. Dagger, 
'Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation', Political Studies, 48 (2000), 104-117. 
 67 
difference, at least insofar as the justification of my moral duties is concerned, between 
the well-being I derive directly from my participation in a friendship and the well-being 
I derive indirectly from my participation in the Reading Group. Imagine two different 
five-person worlds. The only relationship that holds between the five inhabitants of the 
first world is that they are friends. The only relationship that holds between the five 
inhabitants of the second world is that they are members of the West Side Reading 
Group. If both the friendship and the Reading Group are constituted by certain duties 
(different in each case of course) that the participants in each relationship owe to one 
another, and if participation makes an equal contribution to the well-being of the 
participants in both cases, what difference does the fact that this contribution is 
‘intrinsic’ in the case of the friendship and ‘instrumental’ in the case of the Reading 
Group make to the normative force of the associative duties in each case? Why am I 
open to moral criticism if I fail to help my friends but not if I fail to turn up for the 
meeting of the Reading Group? The formal distinction between the constitutive 
intrinsic value of one and the instrumental value of the other does not seem capable of 
explaining this difference. 
If the distinction between relationships that can ground associative duties with 
real normative force and those that can’t is to stand up to critical scrutiny, it seems that 
there must be a more substantive difference between the value created by these two 
types of relationship. The alternative approach I now want to consider rests on the 
claim that the intrinsic value possessed by certain types of relationship is not only 
personal but also impersonal in nature. To the extent that something possesses 
impersonal intrinsic value, its value ‘is not constituted by the value of the experiences of 
those who actually enjoy it. Such enjoyment is also valuable, but the value of the object 
is something distinct’.84 According to the impersonal view, the important distinction 
between the type of relationship that holds between friends, family members, and the 
members of certain types of significant communities, on the one hand, and the type of 
relationship that holds between members of reading groups and music fan clubs, on the 
                                                
84 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.131. 
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other, is that the former types of relationship possess an intrinsic value that cannot be 
reduced to the well-being of its members. 
While the personal value that participation in a relationship has for particular 
people gives those people a self-interested reason to carry out the associative duties that 
constitute the relationship, it is the distinctive impersonal value of the relationship itself 
that explains why these duties have real normative force (i.e. that they are morally 
justified). We recognise that there is a qualitative moral difference between the 
relationships that hold between friends, family, and (more controversially), co-nationals, 
and the relationships that hold between the members of reading groups and fan clubs. 
And one plausible way of explaining this qualitative moral difference is in terms of the 
impersonal intrinsic value that only the former types of relationship possess. For those 
who are not members of such a relationship, the appropriate response to its impersonal 
value is, first, to respect the relationship itself (by not interfering with it and perhaps 
supporting it when it is possible and not too costly to do so) and, second, to respect the 
fact that the duties grounded in the relationship have real normative force for (at least 
some of) those who are members. For those who are members of such a relationship, 
the appropriate response to its impersonal value is to carry out the duties that typically 
apply to members of that relationship (subject to one important condition which I 
discuss below). When an individual fails to discharge his associative duties he may be 
liable to criticism on the grounds that he is acting contrary to his own well-being; but 
our distinctively moral criticism of him results from his failure to respond appropriately 
to the impersonal value of the relationship of which he is a member. 
As well as providing a more plausible justification for the normative force of 
our associative duties, I believe the impersonal intrinsic view is a further improvement 
on the personal intrinsic view as an account of how people tend to think about valuable 
relationships. While the personal view is an improvement on the instrumental view, the 
objection is that it still mischaracterises the unique value of certain types of relationship 
by reducing it entirely to the well-being of its members. The impersonal view avoids 
this objection because it recognises that although friendship or co-nationality often add 
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value to the lives of those participating in these relationships, the existence of such 
relationships is also valuable in itself (i.e. in addition to the well-being the participants 
derive from their participation). In this sense these relationships are like works of art – 
they possess an intrinsic value which cannot be explained entirely in terms of the 
personal benefits derived by the people who interact with them.85 
The combined explanatory power and intuitive plausibility of the impersonal 
view is not enough, however, to save it from a powerful objection. The impersonal 
view works by driving a wedge between the impersonal intrinsic value that inheres in 
certain types of relationships, and the personal intrinsic value which inheres in the well-
being of the individuals who participate in these relationships. The idea is that the 
normative force that the associative duties grounded in certain types of relationship 
have for the individual members of those types of relationship is to be explained by the 
reason these individuals have to respect the impersonal value of the relationship 
through their participation. The problem with this account is that it seems to entail that 
the members of certain types of relationship have a reason to continue participating in 
the relationship even if they do not derive any well-being from such participation. 
Friendships, marriages, and familial relations can make people miserable. And one’s 
membership of these groups, as well as more impersonal groups such as nations, can 
occasionally come into conflict with one’s ‘profound ethical convictions’.86 In these 
circumstances there might well come a point at which a person no longer has a reason 
deriving from his own well-being to continue participating in a particular relationship. 
Yet according to the impersonal view, when a member of a relationship ceases to derive 
any well-being from his or her participation in a certain type of impersonally valuable 
relationship, the relationship itself does not cease to have value. And if the relationship 
                                                
85 For this claim about works of art, see, Nagel, Equality and Partiality, pp.132-3. This analogy 
between valuable relationships and valuable works of art might make it seem as if I am claiming that 
the existence of particular relationships is always impersonally valuable regardless of whether or not 
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86 R. Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', California Law Review, 77 (3) (1989), 479-504, p.486. I say 
more about this important idea in section VI. 
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continues to have value, then the participants continue to have at least a prima facie 
reason to participate and to carry out the duties constitutive of that relationship. The 
implication is that people always have a prima facie reason to carry out the duties that 
constitute certain types of relationship, even when they have no reason to carry on 
participating – and perhaps a positive reason not to participate – deriving from the 
effect that continued participation in the relationship has or will have on their own 
well-being. This is a mistake. Joyless friendships and loveless marriages do not continue 
to provide a reason (even a prima facie reason) for the participants in these 
relationships to continue to carry out duties to one another, even if friendship and 
marriage considered in the abstract are impersonally valuable types of relationship. 
For all the benefits of the shift in emphasis from the personal to the impersonal 
value of relationships, the worry is that the shift to the impersonal view has gone too 
far. By insisting that certain types of relationships generate reasons for the participants 
to carry out the duties that constitute the relationship even when the carrying out of 
such duties adds nothing, and perhaps subtracts, from the well-being of each and every 
participant, the impersonal view is unable to explain why the duties normally entailed 
by, for example, marriage or friendship, do not in fact have any normative force for the 
participants when the marriages are loveless and the friendships are joyless. 
V. Types and tokens :  the ‘ two-s tage ’  analys i s  
I want now to try to remedy the flaws in the impersonal view. I begin by 
making a distinction between relationship-types, and particular tokens of these 
relationship-types. Up to this point I have been talking primarily in terms of abstract 
relationship-types: ‘friendship’, ‘siblinghood’, ‘co-nationality’, etc. But of course the 
associative duties that people actually owe to others are not owed in virtue of the 
abstract concepts of friendship, or siblinghood, or co-nationality; people owe 
associative duties to their friends, their siblings, their co-nationals. Each of these actually 
existing relationships is a token of a particular relationship-type. 
The problem with the personal view was that it focused too much on the well-
being that specific individuals derive from their participation in particular tokens of 
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certain relationship-types (i.e. those which are necessarily constitutive of well-being). In 
doing so it ignored the fact that what is distinctive about duty-grounding relationships 
is that particular tokens of these relationships have value simply in virtue of being a 
token of an impersonally valuable relationship-type. The problem with the impersonal 
view, on the other hand, was that it focused entirely on the impersonal intrinsic value of 
certain relationship-types, thus ignoring the personal reasons that specific individuals 
might have to end their participation in particular tokens of these relationship-types. 
The solution to these problems is to integrate the two views by analysing the 
value of a potentially duty-grounding relationship in two separate stages: first, in terms 
of the intrinsic value of the type of relationship it represents, and second, in terms of the 
well-being that is derived by the individuals participating in any particular token of that 
type. 
When carrying out the first stage of this two-stage analysis what will become 
clear is that there are certain relationship-types that possess a value that cannot be 
reduced to the well-being of the participants in any particular token of that type (say, 
the relationship between friends, family members, and co-nationals), while there are 
other relationship-types that possess a value that can be reduced to the well-being of the 
participants in any particular token of that type (e.g. formal reading groups and music 
fan clubs). Having identified these two distinct categories of relationship-types we are 
then able to point to the substantive difference which explains why certain types of 
relationship are capable of grounding associative duties (those in the former group) 
while others are not (those in the latter group). 
Having drawn up our list of potentially duty-grounding relationship-types in the 
first stage of the analysis, we then turn in the second stage to analyse the well-being that 
specific individuals who are participating in particular tokens of these relationship-types 
derive from their participation. Working out which individuals derive well-being from 
their participation in the relationship will tell us who has a reason to continue 
participating in the relationship and thus who has a reason to carry out the duties that 
constitute the relationship. 
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In order to get clearer about how this second stage of the analysis typically 
works, and to illustrate the implications it will have for the normative force of any 
putative associative duties that might be thought to arise as a result, consider four 
people A, B, C, D, three of whom (A, B, and C) are co-members of a particular token 
of a relationship-type that has already been selected as potentially duty-grounding 
during the first stage of the analysis. (Call this relationship token ‘R’ – it does not 
matter yet exactly which relationship-type R is a token of). Let us say initially that 
participation in R contributes positively to the well-being of each of A, B, and C. In this 
situation we say that each of A, B, and C owes to the others the associative duties that 
are typically attached to the particular roles they play in the relationship-type that R 
represents. Since D is not a member of R his well-being is of course not affected either 
way, and he therefore does not owe any associative duties to A, B, or C. But D 
nevertheless has reason to respect R and the obligations that A, B, and C have to one 
another. Indeed, D has two reasons to respect R: the first deriving from the 
contribution that participation in R makes to the well-being of A, B, and C; and the 
second deriving from the impersonal intrinsic value of the relationship itself. (Notice 
that this second reason for non-members to respect a particular token of a relationship-
type explains why we have more reason to respect the relationship between friends than 
we have to respect the relationship between fellow members of a reading group). 
Now imagine that there is a change in circumstances so that C’s continued 
participation in R no longer contributes positively to his well-being (we do not need to 
worry yet about the reasons for this change in circumstances). Two questions, in 
particular, are raised by this change in circumstances. First, does the change in 
circumstances have any effect on the impersonal intrinsic value, and hence the duty-
grounding potential, of R? Second, does C still owe any associative duties to A and B 
after the change in circumstances? 
The answer to the first question is ‘no’. The change of circumstances has no 
affect on the impersonal intrinsic value of R. As long as R is the type of relationship 
that can logically hold between two people, then the disappearance of the personal 
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reason that C previously had to participate in R does not destroy the relationship, since 
A and B each still have their personal reasons to participate in the relationship. Since R 
continues to exist after the change in circumstances, it continues to possess impersonal 
intrinsic value. Things would be different, of course, if A and B then subsequently lost 
their personal reasons to participate in R. In this case there would be no individual left 
with a personal reason to participate in the relationship, and the impersonal value of R 
would cease to exist along with the relationship itself.87 
The answer to the second question is also ‘no’: C no longer has any associative 
duties to A and B after the change in circumstances. Now, having just denied that the 
change in circumstances affects the intrinsic value, and hence the duty-grounding 
potential, of R, it may seem strange to claim that C no longer owes any associative 
duties to A and B. However, this is where the distinction between type and token 
becomes particularly important. The duty-grounding potential of R derives from R’s 
status as a token of a potentially duty-grounding type. This is an a priori truth, and is thus not 
affected by the changing membership of R. It is a different matter, however, when it 
comes to determining which particular individuals have associative duties as a result of 
their membership of R. Here the relevant question to ask is which members of R have 
a reason deriving from its effect on their own well-being to participate in R? We know 
that although A and B continue to have such a reason, C no longer does, and D never 
did. Thus, A and B continue to have a reason to carry out the duties constitutive of R, 
C no longer has such a reason, and D never had such a reason. 
It might be objected that the justification of associative duties I have just 
outlined is no different to the justification that follows from the personal view since, 
according to my view, whether or not a person actually owes any associative duties in 
virtue of his membership in a particular relationship seems to depend entirely on 
                                                
87 What if B and C no longer have a personal reason to participate in the relationship but A continues 
to have one? I think we have to treat this situation in the same way as we treat the situation in which 
all three of A, B, and C, no longer have a reason to participate. The fact that the former situation is 
much worse for A than the latter is certainly unfortunate, and perhaps gives B and C, as former 
participants, a reason to make the loss of the relationship easier for A, but A’s reason to continue 
participating does not, in itself, generate reasons for B and C to keep the relationship going (see the 
following footnote for more on the duties that ex-members of relationships might have to their former 
co-members). 
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whether or not he derives well-being from his participation in that relationship. This 
objection is mistaken. It is true, on my account, that whether or not a person actually 
owes the duties that constitute a particular relationship depends on whether he has a 
reason grounded in his own well-being to participate in the relationship. But this is only 
one of two necessary conditions that must be in place before a person can be said to 
owe the associative duties grounded by a particular relationship. The other condition is 
that the relationship itself is a token of an intrinsically valuable relationship-type. This 
latter condition is by far the most important in justifying the normative force of the 
duties grounded in a particular relationship. The former condition merely acts as a kind 
of ‘duty trigger’ which activates for a particular individual the duties that constitute a 
particular relationship. 
Returning to the example: when circumstances change, and C no longer has a 
reason based on its intrinsic contribution to his well-being to continue participating in 
R, he effectively ends up in the same position relative to R as D has been all along. The 
impersonally valuable relationship that previously existed between A, B, and C 
generated a reason for D to respect that relationship, but no reason for D to see 
himself as the bearer of associative duties to A, B, and C. Now C finds himself in the 
same situation – he has a reason deriving from the impersonal value of the relationship 
that holds between A and B to respect that relationship, but he has no longer has any 
reason to see himself as the bearer of associative duties to A and B.88 
                                                
88 It is important to note that although C may no longer owe any associative duties to A and B that are 
directly grounded in R, C might still owe some special duties to A and B that D does not. When one 
person falls out of love or friendship with another person, it is more than likely that the former still 
has special duties to the latter to treat her with kindness and respect, particularly with regards to the 
way he ends the relationship. But these duties are not correctly characterised as associative duties. It 
would be strange, after all, to say that we have duties of friendship to people who we have just 
rejected as friends. Rather, a person’s special duties to treat an ex-friend or ex-lover with particular 
kindness and respect is derived from the general duty of respect that we owe, in principle, to 
everyone. The reason why this general duty generates special duties for former-friends or former-
lovers is that, in their role as former-friends or former-lovers, they have a unique capacity to harm or 
benefit the other party (or parties) to the recently ended relationship. An individual in this position 
has a duty to use his or her power carefully. 
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VI. Apply ing the two-s tage analys i s :  the case  o f  nat ions  
Having explained the general form of the two-stage analysis of associative 
duties, it is now time to apply it to the specific case of the relationship that holds 
between co-nationals. Fortunately, because of the conditional nature of my argument, 
this task is less difficult than it might appear. Recall that my aim is to show that even on 
the assumption that the relationship between co-nationals is capable of grounding 
associative duties between its members in principle, the claim that these duties justify 
the strong norms of distributive justice that are typically thought to apply between 
citizens (the nationalist justification thesis) is false, because co-national associative 
duties do not satisfy the condition of guaranteed universal applicability across the 
relevant domain. The nature of this argument allows (indeed, it requires) us to assume 
that the type of relationship that holds between co-nationals is a relationship-type that 
does have impersonal intrinsic value, and that it is therefore one that qualifies as a 
member of the class of potentially duty-grounding relationship-types.89 
With this assumption in place we can now move on to the second stage of the 
analysis. Here we need to do two things. The first thing is to determine whether it is 
even conceivable in principle for a member of a particular co-national relationship to find 
that, even though he is still a citizen of the state which incorporates that particular 
nation, his participation in the thicker, more prescriptive relationship he shares with his 
co-nationals no longer contributes intrinsically (if indeed it ever contributed 
intrinsically) to his well-being. The way to do this is to imagine an objectively undesirable 
co-national relationship90 (though one that is still minimally just) and ask whether it is 
possible that at least one member of this bad co-national relationship might find that 
his participation in the relationship does not contribute intrinsically to his well-being. If 
we conclude that this is indeed a genuine possibility then we have gone some way, 
though not all the way, towards vindicating the rejection of the NJT. In order to go all 
                                                
89 For arguments which support the truth of the assumption, see, T. Hurka, 'The Justification of 
National Partiality', in R. McKim and J. McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 139-157; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp.37-
40; M. Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. chap.2. 
90 I explain what I mean by an ‘objectively undesirable’ co-national relationship below. 
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the way, the second thing we need to do is imagine the most objectively desirable co-
national relationship we can, and ask once again whether it is possible that at least one 
member of this relationship might find that his participation in the relationship does 
not contribute intrinsically to his well-being. If we conclude that this latter situation is 
also a genuine possibility then we will have shown that there is no principled guarantee that 
the associative duties that most citizens owe one another in virtue of their relationship 
as co-nationals will be owed by all citizens. And this in turn places the proponent of the 
NJT in a dilemma: either he maintains his commitment to the NJT and abandons his 
belief in the universal applicability of the strong norms of distributive justice that are 
typically thought to apply to all citizens; or he maintains his belief in the universal 
applicability of strong norms of distributive justice and abandons his commitment to 
the NJT. 
Neither horn of this dilemma offers much comfort to the proponent of the 
NJT, but the first horn is more uncomfortable than the second. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, one thing that unites the views of the various writers who support the 
domestic scope restriction of strong norms of distributive justice is that, within the 
relevant restricted domain (which in this case is the contemporary nation-state), these 
norms are universally applicable. Any argument for the domestic scope restriction 
which entails that the scope restriction might become even more severe, so that 
eventually not only citizens but even some citizens will be excluded from the scope of 
strong norms of justice, can thus effectively be taken as a reductio. Of course, 
proponents of the NJT are not logically committed to its rejection; they might simply 
bite the bullet and concede that the restricted scope of strong norms of justice might 
indeed be so restrictive as to exclude some citizens as well as all non-citizens. But since 
there are few, if any, writers who contemplate such a counter-intuitive position, I shall 
assume from now on that the only plausible response to the dilemma for the proponent 
of the NJT is the grasp the second horn and abandon his commitment to the NJT. 
Returning, then, to the first part of the second stage of the analysis, our 
question is this: Is it possible that at least one member of an objectively undesirable co-
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national relationship might find that his participation in the relationship does not 
contribute intrinsically to his well-being? In order to answer this question we first need 
to know what an ‘objectively undesirable co-national relationship’ looks like. We can 
start by noting that not all (minimally just) nations are equal. Some have long and 
illustrious histories, have contributed a great deal to human knowledge and culture, and 
continue to play a largely positive role in contemporary international affairs. These are 
objectively desirable traits in a nation. Other nations have little or no history, have 
contributed relatively little of value to the world, and play a role in international affairs 
that is at best, ineffective, and at worst, highly disruptive and destabilising. These are 
objectively undesirable traits in a nation. Most actual nations, of course, are a complex 
mix of both desirable and undesirable traits, but at present we are only interested in 
defining a hypothetical archetype of an objectively undesirable (though still minimally 
just) nation. Such a nation possesses the undesirable traits I have just listed to the 
highest possible degree, and we can thus take as our archetype a newly forged nation, 
lacking in heritage, with an unstable, underdeveloped public culture, and an unfriendly 
and mistrustful attitude towards other nations. 
Up to this point I have avoided invoking any particular account of well-being. 
And as far as possible I want to keep it this way in order to maintain the general 
applicability of my argument. I must, however, rule out one possible view of well-being, 
namely, the view that holds that a person’s well-being is only a function of purely 
objective factors. I am insisting, in other words, that a person’s well-being is at least 
partly dependent on subjective factors. I leave open the question of what precisely 
these subjective factors might be: for a person to gain well-being from something it 
might have to satisfy his ideal preferences, it might have to provide him with pleasure, 
or it might have to be consciously endorsed by him. All that matters for my argument is 
that one accepts that the well-being that an individual member gets (or doesn’t get) 
from his participation in such a co-national relationship does not flow directly from the 
objective characteristics of the nation, but rather from the way in which these objective 
characteristics interact with his own personal point of view. 
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Thus in order to answer our question we not only need some idea of the 
objective qualities (or lack thereof) of the particular nation in question, we also need to 
enquire about the specific circumstances of the individual members of this nation. 
When we do this we will surely find that some people do derive well-being from their 
participation in the co-national relationship, despite its numerous undesirable traits. For 
instance, some individuals may have played a leading role in forging the nation’s distinct 
identity and may thus have a special interest in the success of their project. For others, 
the new nation may offer a chance to share in a new collective identity, an opportunity 
that may previously have been unavailable to them. Still others may have a different 
kind of psychological attachment to the nation, one not based on identity but rather on 
feelings of patriotism or ‘love of country’. For each of these people membership in the 
‘objectively undesirable’ nation will still hold a special significance, and it seems 
reasonable to think that their participation in the co-national relationship contributes 
intrinsically to their well-being. 
Not everyone, though, will experience the relationship they share with the other 
members of the undesirable nation as especially significant. Indeed, for some 
individuals, there may be no reason at all to value their participation in the relationship. 
Far from playing a part in the formation of the nation, these individuals may simply 
have found themselves included as members by default. They may experience the 
collective national identity as alienating. And instead of loving their country, they may 
actively dislike it. It is hard to see how, for these people, participation in the co-national 
relationship could be thought to contribute intrinsically to their well-being. I conclude, 
therefore, that the answer to our first question is ‘yes’, it is possible for at least one 
member of an objectively undesirable co-national relationship to find that his 
participation in the relationship does not contribute intrinsically to his well-being. 
I now turn to address our second question, which asks: Is it possible for at least 
one member of an objectively desirable co-national relationship to find that his 
participation in the relationship does not contribute intrinsically to his well-being? If the 
answer to this question is also ‘yes’, then, as I explained above, the proponent of the 
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NJT will find himself caught in the dilemma to which there is only one plausible 
response, and the rejection of the NJT will consequently be vindicated. 
As before, our first task is to specify an archetype of a ‘highly desirable co-
national relationship’. I suggested that such a nation would have a long and illustrious 
history, would have contributed a great deal to human knowledge and culture, and 
would continue to play a positive role in international politics. Thus we can imagine an 
ancient nation that has produced a long line of individuals who have contributed a great 
deal to human knowledge and culture and whose members continue to be engaged in 
various attempts to improve relations and understanding with other nations. This vague 
outline of an ideal nation is a good starting point, but in order to answer our question 
we need to flesh out the ideal in a bit more detail. When we try to do this, however, the 
problem we have is that, even at a fairly low level of specificity, opinion is divided over 
what makes a nation ‘desirable’. 
Consider, for example, the following two contrasting ideals of nationality. On 
one hand is the ideal of a nation as analogous to a kind of extended family. Though 
rather more subtle and sophisticated than the old ideas of ethnic or tribal nationalism 
from which it has developed,91 this ‘communitarian’ ideal still sees nations as offering 
members the chance to share in a powerful common identity with the larger group. 
Shared traditions, language, history and culture are all important aspects of this 
interpretation, and a nation contributes intrinsically to the well-being of its members to 
the extent that it manages to provide them with these goods in a coherent package.92 
Contrasted with this is an entirely different, much thinner ideal of nationality, one 
which sees the nation not as a source of common identity but as providing a framework 
of understanding and an environment of mutual respect within which people who have 
very different identities can live together.93 This ‘liberal’ ideal of nationality does not 
                                                
91 For a discussion of the ‘tribal’ nation as an ideal type see, J. Glover, 'Nations, Identity, and 
Conflict', in R. McKim and J. McMahan, The Morality of Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 11-30. 
92 Miller, On Nationality; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. 
93 B. Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', in I. Shapiro and L. Brilmayer 
(eds.), Global Justice, (London: New York University Press, 1999), 12-66, (although see, B. Yack, 
'The Myth of the Civic Nation', in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Nationalism, (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1999), 103-118, for a critique of Barry’s view). 
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necessarily demand any more or less of individual members in terms of commitment to 
each other and to the nation itself than the communitarian ideal. The point is that the 
very existence of the nation will in each case mean very different things, and be justified 
on different grounds, to its members. 
These two competing ideals of nationality are to a large extent mutually 
exclusive. Although a single nation may well be able to partially fulfil both roles – 
indeed, many contemporary nations can plausibly be seen as attempting to strike the 
balance between the thick, prescriptive content of the communitarian ideal and the 
thinner, permissive framework of the liberal ideal – it is in the nature of these 
competing ideals that increased success along one dimension will, ultimately, come at 
the cost of diminished success in the other. There is nothing to be regretted in this 
fact.94 The reason it is important is because – bearing in mind the subjective element 
that must be present in any judgment of an individual’s well-being – the competing 
national ideals will almost certainly advance the well-being of different individuals to 
different degrees. This means that, from the perspective of the individuals who 
participate in these relationships, there is no such thing as a ‘perfect’ co-national 
relationship. Some people thrive in nations that have a strong communitarian character. 
For these ‘conservative’ individuals, solidarity, stability, commonality, and tradition are 
the key characteristics of a (personally) valuable co-national relationship. They are not 
necessarily antagonistic towards difference, they just prefer not to live with it. Other 
people, however, are much happier living in a nation modelled on the liberal ideal. For 
these ‘cosmopolitan’ individuals the homogeneity of the communitarian nation is not 
reassuring, it is restrictive. They value diversity, dynamism, and disagreement against a 
background of fairness and mutual respect.95 
                                                
94 At least, not insofar as we are focused on the well-being that the individual participants derive from 
their participation in nations that fit these two models. The mutual exclusivity of the two models 
might be regretted on impersonal grounds, since it may turn out that both models represent unique 
and irreducibly valuable ideals that cannot both be realised simultaneously. But this impersonal 
assessment is not our concern here. 
95 For  a much more detailed and extended comparison between these two perspectives, see, J. 
Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform, 25 (1992), 751-793. 
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Assuming that any particular nation will have a membership composed of a 
mixture of individuals, some with a more cosmopolitan outlook, others with a more 
conservative outlook, the way to guarantee that as many people as possible derive well-
being from their participation in the nation – and this seems to be something that most 
modern nations have learnt, as my comment above indicates – is to achieve a balance 
between the communitarian and liberal extremes. Is it possible that a nation built on 
such a compromise will be able to make a guaranteed positive contribution to the well-
being of all participants? 
Clearly it is difficult to answer this question with any certainty. What we can say, 
at least, is this: any nation will have to take a position on a range of fundamental ethical 
questions as it works out how to balance the rights and freedoms of the individual 
against the values and character of the national community. How it goes about doing 
this is one of the most important and controversial issues in political philosophy, and 
this is not the place to discuss it in any detail. But as Michael Sandel has said, ‘for all our 
uncertainties about ultimate questions of political philosophy – of justice and value and 
the nature of the good  life – the one thing we know is that we live some answer all the 
time’.96 Participation in a nation entails duties to uphold whatever ‘answer’ is being lived 
by the members of that nation at any particular time. There may be ostensible 
opportunities to effect a change in that answer, but for any particular individual this 
opportunity is, in reality, little more than a formality.97 And when we recall Dworkin’s 
point that ‘it is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain 
of his most profound ethical convictions than at peace with them’,98 it seems highly 
unlikely that the ‘answer’ that the members of a particular nation collectively live can 
ever be so ‘at peace’ with the profound ethical convictions of each and every participant 
                                                
96 M. Sandel, 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', Political Theory, 12 (1) (1984), 
81-96, p.81, (emphasis in original). 
97 As Miller notes, it is important that members of the nation have a chance to ‘contribute on an equal 
footing’ to the ‘processes of rational reflection’ that shape a nation’s ‘public culture’, Miller, On 
Nationality, p.70. However, while the chance to contribute on an equal footing may be a right that 
people should have, in a nation of millions it is not clear to what extent one’s possession of this right 
can realistically contribute to one’s well-being. 
98 Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', p.486. 
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as to guarantee that everyone will receive a positive well-being contribution from his 
participation. 
A person who finds that his participation in a co-national relationship does not 
make an intrinsic contribution to his well-being need not deny that (some of) his fellow 
citizens find such participation a deeply significant source of well-being. Nor need he 
deny that there is impersonal value inherent in the fact that these other participants are 
participating in a highly complex collective endeavour that endures over time and 
perhaps produces all manner of valuable things. Nor, finally, need he deny that the 
nation which underpins his state is instrumentally valuable in providing him and his 
fellow citizens with access to certain goods (such as, for example, a stable democracy, 
or, as we saw in the last chapter, the conditions necessary for wealth creation). But 
none of these reasons: the well-being of others; the impersonal value of the nation; and 
the instrumental benefits of membership, provides the individual in question with the 
right kind of reason to see himself as the bearer of associative duties towards his co-
nationals. This is because these other types of reasons can be equally appreciated by 
non-citizens as well as citizens. 
For consider: as a citizen of Britain, I can appreciate that there are many French 
people for whom participation in the French nation is intrinsically valuable. I can also 
appreciate that there is something impersonally valuable about the existence of the 
French nation. Finally, I can appreciate that the French nation, by providing the 
cultural underpinnings of the French state, plays an important instrumental role in 
maintaining the stability of the conditions necessary for wealth creation and democracy. 
No one suggests that the first and second of these reasons entails that I owe associative 
duties to the members of the French nation. And, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
the third reason places the burden of proof on the citizens of France, not on me, to 
explain why I am excluded from the strong norms of justice that determine how the 
wealth that is created as a result of the stability provided by the French nation is to be 
distributed. 
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The only situation in which I would have a reason to see myself as the bearer of 
associative duties to the members of the French nation would be if (a) I was accepted 
as a member and (b) my participating in the relationship contributed intrinsically to my 
well-being. What I have essentially argued in this chapter is that we can grant the truth 
of (a) without thereby committing ourselves to the truth of (b), because (b) is not 
necessarily true for people of whom (a) is already true. In general, there is no necessary 
reason why an individual’s participation in a specific token of an impersonally valuable 
relationship-type (such as the relationship between friends, family members, or co-
nationals) must contribute intrinsically to his well-being. I therefore conclude that the 
proponent of the NJT is indeed caught in the dilemma set out earlier: either he maintains 
his commitment to the NJT and abandons his belief in the universal applicability of the 
strong norms of distributive justice that are typically thought to apply to all citizens; or 
he maintains his belief in the universal applicability of strong norms of distributive 
justice and abandons his commitment to the NJT. I claimed that the second horn of 
this dilemma is the least uncomfortable and, therefore, that the putative proponent of 
the NJT is actually committed to its rejection. There is something troubling about the 
idea that a person might be able to withdraw from a significant portion of their duties 
of justice in the same way that a person might withdraw from a group of friends they 
no longer have reason to associate with. Both commonsense morality, and the views of 
the majority of philosophers who work on the topic, support the idea that strong 
norms of distributive justice apply universally across the relevant domain (even, or 
perhaps especially, if this domain is restricted to the boundaries of the contemporary 
nation-state). If my argument in this chapter is correct, then the NJT contradicts this 
widely held belief, and should be rejected as a result. 
VII. Conc lus ion 
In this chapter I have argued that even if the relationship between co-nationals 
can generate associative duties, there is no guarantee that these duties apply to every 
putative member of the nation. And unless those who support the domestic scope 
restriction of strong norms of distributive justice are willing to countenance the 
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possibility that some citizens can claim exemption from (some of) the duties that these 
norms give rise to – on the grounds that their participation in the co-national 
relationship makes no intrinsic contribution to their well-being – then the NJT should 
be rejected. 
What we have seen in the last two chapters, then, is that both the statist and 
nationalist justifications of the domestic scope restriction fail. These are, I believe, the 
most powerful arguments that have been offered in support of the domestic scope 
restriction. But of course, their failure does not prove that the domestic scope 
restriction is unjustifiable. Rather than continue to try to take on potential new 
justifications and knock them down, one by one, however, I am now going to pursue a 
rather different line of enquiry. 
Up to this point I have been employing the concept of ‘distributive justice’ in 
what I take to be a fairly standard way, namely, as referring to a set of norms (or, which 
amount to the same thing, rules or principles) which specifies the scope and content of 
our duties of justice. I have distinguished between strong and weak norms of 
distributive justice and suggested that each might have a different scope of application. 
I have also suggested that the content of these norms might be given by duties that 
arise from a range of different sources, including the duties that arise from the 
application of universal principles such as the principle of reciprocity and the duties 
that arise as a result of the special relationships we have with certain groups of people. 
For many of the theoretical aims that philosophers have, this fairly simplistic ‘standard 
model’ of distributive justice is perfectly adequate. But I believe there are some justice-
related problems that can only be solved – indeed, that can only be recognised as 
problems in the first place – by developing and employing a more nuanced 
understanding of the concept. Working out what our duties of justice are in the face of 
massive global inequality is one such problem. And it is to the development of a 
theoretical model of justice that will help us to understand and deal with this problem 
that I now turn. 
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(4) The Concept of Distributive Justice: Part I 
I .  Introduct ion 
Defining the concept of justice as accurately as possible is not only useful for 
helping us understand certain difficult problems. It is also important for two more 
general reasons. First, as a purely theoretical matter it would be very useful – and would 
save a great deal of time and effort – if we could reach a consensus on how to use the 
word ‘justice’. In the absence of such a consensus it is too easy for theorists of justice 
to mistake what is in fact agreement for disagreement on matters of substance, all 
because they are using the word ‘justice’ in slightly different ways. There is also a 
second, more practical reason why it is important to be particularly careful about how 
we use the word ‘justice’. However it is interpreted, the concept of justice is one of the 
most powerful ideas in the political philosopher’s armoury; by identifying a particular 
social phenomenon as unjust, what we are saying is that the reasons for remedying the 
situation are especially powerful. And of course, the hope is that by identifying a 
phenomenon as unjust and thus highlighting the fact that the reasons for remedying a 
situation are particularly powerful, we make it so that the chances of it actually being 
remedied are much higher than they would have been if we had identified the 
phenomenon in a different way, say, as ‘unfortunate’, or ‘bad’, or even perhaps 
‘immoral’. The inherent power of the idea of justice to influence and potentially 
transform political practice means that how we interpret the concept is not a matter of 
purely intellectual interest: if, on the one hand, our interpretation is too conservative 
and restrictive then we risk leaving very serious cases outside the potentially protective 
and ameliorative scope of justice; on the other hand, if our interpretation is too 
ambitious and we stretch the range of its application too far to include unserious or 
nonessential cases, then we risk devaluing the concept of justice and reducing its 
transformative power in future. 
In this chapter and the next, my aim is to survey what I take to be the four main 
interpretations of the concept of distributive justice. I begin, in the next section, by 
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introducing what I call the ‘basic idea’ of distributive justice, an idea which lies at the 
root of all four of the more substantive interpretations that I go on to consider. In 
section III I then present a brief outline of the four views I shall discuss. In section IV I 
explain why the first view I shall discuss, the ‘currency view’, should be rejected as an 
interpretation of the concept of justice. Sections V and VI then set the stage for the 
critical discussion of the second view I shall discuss, the ‘institutional view’. The 
institutional view is a more promising interpretation of justice than the currency view 
but, after considering several arguments in favour of interpreting justice according to 
the institutional view, I conclude that it too should be rejected as an interpretation of 
justice. 
II .  The basi c  idea o f  d is tr ibut ive  jus t i c e  
Distributive justice is sometimes interpreted as a concept that is concerned only 
with the distribution of income and wealth – and indeed this usage has been implicitly 
attributed to Rawls.99 In fact, though, Rawls himself refers to the distribution of income 
and wealth as ‘distributive justice in the narrower sense’, thus implying that distributive 
justice in the ‘full’ sense includes more than merely a concern for the just distribution 
of income and wealth.100 I think clarity is better served by reserving the name ‘economic 
justice’ for this latter topic and by then viewing economic justice as only one 
(important) part of the wider topic of distributive justice, which is concerned with the 
distribution of things other than income and wealth. 
Distributive justice is also sometimes taken to be synonymous with ‘social 
justice’.101 Social justice is often thought of as characteristically concerned with the 
distribution of certain kinds of goods such as political rights and freedoms, job and 
educational opportunities, and income and wealth. But the real defining feature of 
social justice is its singular concern with a particular context of distribution – the modern 
nation-state – rather than the particular content of the goods being distributed. Since 
                                                
99 See, e.g., S. Freeman, Rawls, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp.86-7. 
100 J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), pp.42-3, 48-9. 
101 See, e.g., B. Barry, Theories of Justice, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.355. 
 87 
more or less everyone in the world lives in a state, and since the policy of the state in 
which a person lives largely determines the share of the good and bad things in life that 
they end up with, social justice is a very important part of distributive justice. But social 
justice is not all there is to distributive justice, because the good things and bad things 
in life are distributed not just within states but across them, and not just by states but by 
various kinds of non-state actors. 
Like all complex concepts it is easier to explain what distributive justice is not 
than to explain what it is. Nevertheless, with regards to the latter task it has often been 
suggested that a good place to start is with the idea that distributive justice is concerned 
with the type and amount of the goods things and bad things in life each person is 
due.102 This basic idea is a useful place to start in any attempt to define the concept of 
justice because it helpfully leaves open several difficult and controversial questions. It 
leaves open, for instance, the question whether all of the good and bad things in life are 
proper subjects of distributive justice or whether only a subset of these things is 
relevant to determining what a person is due. It leaves open the question of why people 
are due these things. And it leaves open the question of how we may go about ensuring 
that people receive these things. The advantage of adopting such a broad notion as a 
starting point in our attempt to define justice is that, as a statement about the basic idea 
underlying the concept, it is capable of gaining the support of theorists who hold very 
different views about the correct answers to these questions. Nevertheless, we have 
good reason for wanting to move beyond this basic idea towards a more precise 
definition of the concept. 
The problem with the basic idea of distributive justice as a concept concerned 
with ‘what people are due’ is that it is simply too permissive. First, it leaves so much 
scope for disagreement that any debate between proponents of different answers to the 
questions listed above is likely to lack any clear direction or coherence. Unless the 
concept is defined more precisely there is a danger that proponents of particular 
conceptions of justice will not really know what they are arguing about or why they are 
                                                
102 See, e.g., D. Miller, Social Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p.20; D. Miller, Principles of 
Social Justice, (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.1. 
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arguing about it.103 Second, there are lots of occasions when it makes perfect sense to 
say that a person is ‘due’ something even though whether or not they actually receive it 
is generally not considered to be a matter of justice. Examples include the honesty and 
attentiveness we are due from friends and lovers, the fidelity we are due from people 
who have made us promises, or the assistance we are due from strangers when we find 
ourselves in trouble. Certainly when a person does not receive what he expects to 
receive from a friend, a promise-maker, or even a total stranger in a time of need, he 
feels let down, perhaps even cheated. But he is unlikely to describe the resulting 
situation as unjust (except, perhaps, metaphorically). It seems clear, therefore, that there 
must be more to the concept of justice than what is implied by the basic idea of 
determining ‘what people are due’. As we refine our definition of the concept of justice 
we need to keep two things in mind: First, what is the point of justice? What are people 
who are arguing over the content of justice arguing about and why does it matter? 
Second, what is it that distinguishes what we are due as a matter of justice from what we 
are due as a result of other values (such as friendship or fidelity or charity)? 
III .  Ref ining the de f in i t ion – four a l t ernat ives  
In this section I briefly outline four possible ways of refining our basic 
definition of justice. The idea at this stage is merely to introduce the four alternatives as 
simply and straightforwardly as possible. More detailed explication and critical 
assessment of the four views follows below (with the rest of this chapter devoted to 
discussing the first two alternatives and the following chapter devoted to discussing the 
final two alternatives). The four views I shall discuss are what I call the ‘currency view’, 
the ‘institutional view’, the ‘coercion-justifying view’, and the ‘ideal-of-fairness view’. 
According to the currency view, claims or demands of justice are to be 
distinguished (in particular from claims or demands grounded in other values) on the 
basis of the kinds of things to which the claims or the demands in question refer. If the 
currency view is correct then there is some good X (or some group of goods, X, Y, Z, 
                                                
103 This seems to me a criticism that could be forcefully made of a great deal of the literature on 
distributive justice. 
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etc.) such that we can tell in advance whether a debate over the distribution of 
something is a debate about distributive justice by looking to see whether or not the 
debate in question concerns the distribution of X (or some members of the group X, Y, 
Z, etc.). It is important to note that the currency view does not include any inherent 
restriction on the type of goods that might define justice. They may be exceedingly 
abstract (e.g. rights, liberties, or well-being) or they may be more concrete (e.g. money, 
food, or housing). The point is that once one type of good or group of goods has been 
picked out as conceptually linked to justice, then any distributive question that does not 
directly or indirectly concern these goods is not a matter of justice but of something 
else. For instance, someone might try and argue, contrary to what I claimed above, that 
the currency of justice is income and wealth, and that this explains why obligations of 
friendship do not, at least not typically, raise questions of justice. Alternatively, 
someone might argue that rights are the currency of justice, and that this explains why 
questions of charity are distinct from questions of justice. The plausibility of these 
claims, and the cogency of the currency view in general are issues I take up in the next 
section. 
The second attempt to define the concept of justice is what I call the 
institutional view. This is a view of justice most famously (though, as we shall see, 
erroneously) associated with Rawls, and subsequently taken up by a number of his 
followers (most notably Thomas Pogge).104 According to the institutional view, justice is 
a quality uniquely possessed by the publicly recognised rules or ‘institutions’ which 
regulate human interaction. Justice, which applies to institutions, is thus to be 
distinguished from other moral values which do not apply to institutions but, instead, 
apply directly to specific actions carried out by particular agents. The cogency of this 
view obviously depends to a large extent on the way in which we interpret the idea of 
an institution. For consider the phenomenon of friendship. On the one hand, the 
practice of friendship is obviously less rigidly rule-guided than more formal social 
structures such as the system of private property and the legal system. On the other 
                                                
104 See, T. Pogge, Realizing Rawls, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp.22-8. 
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hand, the general form of the practices and rituals that constitute friendship is not only 
fairly well-defined but also widely known and understood. Whether or not a coherent 
distinction can be maintained between the institutions to which the concept of justice 
applies and the social practices which fall outside the purview of justice is among the 
questions I take up when I explain and assess the institutional view in more detail in 
section VII. 
The third attempt to define the concept of justice I refer to as the coercion-
justifying view (the ‘coercion view’ for short). Unlike the currency view and the 
institutional view, the coercion view does not interpret justice as simply one moral 
value (albeit one with certain distinguishing features) among others. Instead, according 
to the coercion view, justice is the name given to the subset of moral requirements that 
can be justifiably enforced through the use of coercion. To be clear, the point is not 
that moral demands which are classed as demands of justice are obligatory whereas 
moral demands which are not classed as demands of justice are somehow not. As John 
Stuart Mill points out, both kinds of moral demands, insofar as they are valid, are 
compulsory – if they were not, it would be difficult to explain what is blameworthy 
about a person’s failure to fulfil them.105 The point is rather that, while all moral 
demands are obligatory, only some of them are (justifiably) enforceable through 
coercive means. To see how the coercion view might explain what it is that 
distinguishes considerations of justice from non-justice considerations, contrast the 
moral requirement (or demand, or obligation, or duty – the precise word we use is not 
important at this stage) to respect a person’s property or his bodily integrity with the 
moral requirement to be a good friend or to give money to charity. If the requirement 
to respect a person’s property or bodily integrity is violated, or looks like it might be 
violated, then the person in question (and perhaps also third-parties too) is 
automatically justified in using coercive means in order either to prevent the violation 
from occurring or to restore things to how they were before the violation. Contrast this 
with requirements of friendship or charity. If a person fails to help out a friend when 
                                                
105 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, second edition, (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and 
Green, 1864), p.72. 
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she should, or fails to give assistance to a person in need when she should, then, 
although we are justified in admonishing or rebuking her for her moral failure, we are 
not justified in coercing her into fulfilling her obligations to her friend or to the person 
in need. Notice that the proponents of different conceptions of the coercion view of 
justice, each of whom agrees by definition that justice marks out that subset of our 
moral requirements that are coercively enforceable, may disagree about what it is, 
exactly, that qualifies a moral requirement for coercive enforcement. Some may think 
that it is simply a matter of the seriousness or weightiness of the requirement. Others 
may think it depends on the way in which the requirement was formulated or deduced 
(e.g. through some specific kind of constructivist procedure). Still others may think it 
depends on whether the requirement was issued by a formal body such as a court or a 
legislature. And so on. Clearly the coercion view of justice leaves a great deal of room 
for interpretation. Whether this is a drawback or not is something I discuss when I 
analyse the coercion view in more detail in the next chapter.  
The fourth and final attempt to define the concept of justice that I shall discuss 
is what I call the ideal-of-fairness view (the ‘fairness view’ for short). The fairness view 
of justice also leaves a great deal of room for interpretation, although it is surely a 
narrower and more restrictive interpretation of the concept than that represented by 
the coercion view. According to the fairness view, there is no longer an inherent link 
between justice and justified coercion. Instead, justice is identified as synonymous with 
fairness, or, more specifically, with the conditions that define an ‘ideally fair 
distribution’. In order to adequately distinguish the coercion view from the fairness 
view it is important to note that the constitutive features of an ideally fair distribution 
are to be defined prior to and independently of an all things considered judgement of 
what people would be justified in coercing each other into doing. An important 
implication of the fairness view is that it may not always be justifiable, and indeed it is 
conceivable that it may never be justifiable, to coerce people into producing an ideally 
fair distribution. Precisely how the notion of an ‘ideally fair distribution’ should be 
understood is a matter I discuss in greater detail in the next chapter. What is certain is 
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that proponents of different conceptions of the fairness view will have different ideas 
about what constitutes an ideally fair distribution. Some conceptions of an ideally fair 
distribution will identify fairness with a version of equality, but this will not always be 
the case. Sometimes a fair distribution will be seen as one that allocates goods to people 
in proportion to need, or merit, or desert. What we can say in general is that a 
distribution is unjust, on the fairness view, if and to the extent that it does not mirror 
the ideally fair distribution, whatever this is taken to be. 
These four attempts to define distributive justice – the currency view, the 
institutional view, the coercion view, and the fairness view – represent the most 
common interpretations of the concept. Since it is reasonable to assume that not all 
four views are simultaneously correct, it would appear that in order to start arguing 
positively for a particular conception of justice we first have to make a choice as to which 
interpretation of the concept, or which combination of interpretations, we have most 
reason to adopt. Unfortunately, this is one hugely important question about which the 
vast literature on distributive justice has surprisingly little to say. The reason for this is 
that very few writers who theorise about distributive justice are ever fully explicit about 
which of these four views, or which combination of these four views, they take 
themselves to be employing. Such vagueness would matter little if everyone (or nearly 
everyone) was employing roughly the same view. In this situation it would be relatively 
easy to piece together the core concept from the significant overlap that would exist 
between various conceptions. As things are, however, no such simple solution presents 
itself. For in spite (or perhaps because) of the general lack of clarity that characterises 
many writers’ interpretation of the concept of distributive justice, each of these four 
views of justice is clearly represented in the literature. If we try and indicate which 
writers in particular support which view(s) the problem we face is simply that it is rare 
for any single view to be defended by a particular writer in its pure form. Often a writer 
will combine, more or less consciously and rarely explicitly, different elements of these 
four interpretations of the concept. Attempting to pigeonhole philosophers is always a 
difficult and risky business, and the current discussion is no exception. Nevertheless, I 
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think we can say with some confidence that the currency view is typically employed by 
libertarians of the right and left, such as, respectively, Robert Nozick and Hillel 
Steiner,106 who both interpret the concept of justice as fundamentally concerned with 
the distribution of rights.107 The institutional view, as I mentioned above, is explicit in 
the work of Thomas Pogge.108 The coercion view can be attributed (with some 
important reservations which I shall discuss later) to John Rawls.109 And finally, the 
fairness view is the view taken by G.A.Cohen.110 The unsurprising result of this deep, 
widespread, and yet largely unacknowledged disagreement over the concept of justice 
itself is that contemporary theorists of distributive justice spend a lot of time simply 
talking past one another.111 In the next three chapters my aim is to shed some light on 
this conceptual debate and to suggest a way forward. 
IV. Rejec t ing the currency v iew 
Philosophers and non-philosophers alike are familiar with the standard list of 
goods such as basic liberties, wealth and income, and job and educational opportunities 
around which debates over social justice are often conducted. Indeed it is largely because 
of the familiarity of this list that we need to take care not to jump to the conclusion that 
this particular list of goods, which undoubtedly plays a role in defining social justice, 
                                                
106 See, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, and, Steiner, H., An Essay on Rights, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994). 
107 Although I shall leave this complication to one side it is worth noting Jeremy Waldron’s argument 
that, in fact, Nozick’s theory should be interpreted as a duty-based rather than a right-based theory, 
since the ‘strict deontology of side-constraints’ favoured by Nozick only makes sense as part of a 
duty-based theory focused on the intentions of agents, rather than the interests of victims. See, J. 
Waldron, 'Introduction', in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 1-20, p.16. 
108 See, Pogge, Realizing Rawls, esp. chap.1. 
109 See, Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp.40-1. 
110 See, Cohen, Rescuing, esp. chap.7; G. A. Cohen, 'Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does 
Option Luck Ever Preserve Justice?' in S. de Wijze, M. H. Kramer and I. Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner 
and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 3-21. 
111 One obvious exception to the claim that the deep disagreement over the concept of justice itself is 
‘largely unacknowledged’ is G. A. Cohen’s book, Rescuing Justice and Equality. Most of the second 
half of Cohen’s book is devoted to explaining the difference between the concept of justice as he 
understands it and the concept of justice as understood by Rawls. For further debate over the 
arguments put forward by Cohen see, Williams, 'Justice, Incentives and Constructivism'; R. Arneson, 
'Justice is not Equality', Ratio, 21 (4) (2008), 371-391; T. Pogge, 'Cohen to the Rescue!' Ratio, 21 (4) 
(2008), 454-475; J. Quong, ‘Justice Beyond Equality’, Social Theory and Practice, 32 (2) (2010), 
315-340; P. Tomlin, 'Survey Article: Internal Doubts about Cohen's Rescue of Justice', Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 18 (2) (2010), 228-247. 
 94 
also plays a role in defining distributive justice. As I mentioned in section II, above, the 
concept of distributive justice is much broader than the concept of social justice, and 
addresses many questions in addition to the social justice-specific question of how the 
benefits and burdens of social interaction should be shared between the members of a 
particular state. What theorists of distributive justice who take the currency view are 
looking for is a ‘common currency’ that will explain not only why the familiar list of 
social justice-related goods looks the way it does but also what links this list of goods to 
the other goods that are deemed to be relevant to questions of distributive justice in 
other spheres, from the pressing matter of global distributive justice, to more esoteric 
concerns over, say, the just distribution of resources on (real or hypothetical) desert 
islands. 
If such a common currency does exist then, clearly, in light of the heterogeneity 
of spheres in which questions about ‘what people are due’ can arise, it will have to be 
very general and thus highly abstract in nature. One potential problem with this is that 
when we think about what the common currency might be, the list of possible 
candidates itself is so thoroughly heterogeneous that making a reasoned choice is likely 
to be very difficult.112 But let’s assume that we can overcome this problem. Let’s assume 
that we conclude that the common currency of justice is some kind of resourcist metric. 
It is important to realise just how bold a conclusion this is. We are not saying that the 
resourcist metric we favour represents the most plausible interpretation of the currency 
of justice. What we are saying is that unless one is talking in terms of our favoured 
resource metric one is not saying anything meaningful about justice at all. From such a 
perspective a debate between a capability theorist and a welfarist would look very 
peculiar – it would seem as if both participants, though claiming to be talking about 
justice, were in fact talking about some completely different concept (or perhaps just 
talking nonsense). This does not seem like the right conclusion. It is hard to believe that 
all but one of the parties involved in the currency debate (welfarists, resourcists, 
capability theorists, etc.) have collectively succumbed to some kind of deep conceptual 
                                                
112 Well known options include various types of neutral resource metrics and measures of well-being, 
to opportunity for well-being, access to advantage, and capabilities to function in various ways. 
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confusion – thinking they are talking about justice when they are actually talking about 
something else, or nothing at all. More likely, we might think, is that there simply is no 
single currency that can be linked with the concept of justice by definition. The 
explanation for why all these different conceptions of the currency of justice are 
conceptions of justice, rather than something else, must lie elsewhere. 
Before rushing to this conclusion, however, it is instructive to note that 
whatever the precise details of the views held by resourcists, welfarists, and capability 
theorists, one thing is certain: they share a commitment to the idea that what justice is 
ultimately concerned with is the distribution of goods (and bads) that are of deep and 
perhaps fundamental importance for people’s lives. This is obviously a rather vague 
notion, but the essential idea is that, insofar as justice is concerned with the distribution 
of goods and bads that appear to have only trivial significance for people’s lives, it is 
only because the distribution of these things affects the distribution of a more 
fundamental and hence much more significant thing. This agreement between the 
proponents of various different currencies on the ‘fundamentality’ of the currency of 
justice should give us a clue as to how we might yet be able to identify the concept of 
justice with one currency in particular. What we are looking for is some kind of 
common currency that is capable of representing, on the one hand, the disparate 
content of the goods picked out as basic by the various substantive views already 
mentioned and, on the other hand, the shared characteristics of these disparate goods, 
namely, their fundamental importance to people’s lives. 
With these two criteria in mind, two obvious candidates immediately suggest 
themselves: rights and duties.113 The highly general and abstract nature of rights and 
duties means that these ideas can be plausibly assigned a central role within almost any 
conceivable conception of justice; it is perfectly natural, for instance, to talk about a 
right to a certain share of resources or a certain level of well-being, or a duty to support 
                                                
113 In order to avoid unnecessary complications I shall not differentiate between right-based and duty-
based approaches. The two concepts are obviously very closely related, and whether one thinks that 
rights are basic and that duties are derived from them, or that duties are basic and that rights are 
derivative, what is important is that both concepts satisfy the two desiderata of a common currency 
that I mentioned above. 
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certain kinds of institutions or to provide others with certain capabilities to function. 
Moreover, rights and duties seem particularly well suited to the task of representing the 
fundamental significance of justice-related goods: they (usually) apply to everyone, and, 
as Jeremy Waldron notes about rights in particular, they have ‘often been characterised 
in terms of their strength, their urgency, their peremptory character, even their 
conclusiveness in political argument’.114 
According to right/duty-based interpretation of the concept of justice, then, 
questions concerning the content, scope, and justification of our rights and duties do 
not simply have a bearing on problems of justice, they define these problems as problems 
of justice. Notice, once again, what a bold claim this is. The proponent of the 
right/duty-based version of the currency view is effectively saying that if a putative 
theory of ‘justice’ can conceivably be framed in such a way that it makes no essential 
reference to the concepts of rights and duties, then that theory is not in fact a theory of 
justice at all but a theory of something else (or of nothing in particular). Now of course 
it is true that most, if not all, theories of justice refer at some point to the concepts of 
rights and duties. But on closer inspection it is clear that these concepts rarely play the 
essential, foundational role in these theories that the proponent of the right/duty-based 
version of the currency view claims they must if these theories are to be classed as 
genuine theories of justice. The reason for this is that most theories that invoke the 
concepts of rights and duties distinguish rights and duties of justice from other kinds of 
moral rights and duties, and in order to explain this distinction they typically refer to 
one of the other three views of justice (or some combination of them). What this 
shows is that these theories are not really examples of the currency view after all, since 
what defines the content of justice in these theories is nothing to do with rights and 
duties and all to do with the explanation of what is special about rights and duties of 
justice.115 
It is simple enough to demonstrate the truth of the claim made in the previous 
paragraph. Consider, for example, theories of justice that claim that what determines 
                                                
114 Waldron, 'Introduction', p.14. 
115 There are some important exceptions to this general claim that I deal with below. 
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whether a right is a right of justice as opposed to a non-justice-based moral right is 
whether the interest which generates the putative right is sufficiently strong to warrant 
holding someone else to be under an enforceable duty to satisfy or protect that interest.116 
Such a theory is clearly an example of the coercion view of justice, rather than a 
right/duty-based version of the currency view of justice, because the explanation for 
why the right in question is a right of justice is provided by the fact that something so 
important is at stake that it justifies one or more people exercising coercion over 
another person or group of persons in order to satisfy or protect it. 
Much the same can be said about theories of justice that invoke the concepts of 
rights and duties but which are more accurately described as versions of the 
institutional view. Thus, for example, an institutionalist might say that rights and duties 
of justice can only be created by institutions. This gives rights and duties a central place 
in the theory, but, again, it is only a derivative rather than a foundational role. What is 
really doing the work in the argument – the thing that explains why the rights and 
duties created by institutions are rights and duties of justice – is the power that 
institutions have to create special kinds of entitlements and allocate special kinds of 
requirements; rights and duties are simply useful labels for these things – they play no 
necessary or fundamental role in the theory.117 
Finally, consider the fairness view. It is perfectly open to the proponent of the 
fairness view to stipulate that what each person has a right to is what he or she would 
have under a perfectly fair distribution. It might even be possible to say that other 
people have a duty (though not necessarily an enforceable one) to supply right-holders 
with what they would have under a perfectly fair distribution. But again, it is clear that 
the fundamental concept at work here is the idea of a perfectly fair distribution; the 
existence and normative force of any rights and duties that are created as a result is 
                                                
116 An example of someone who appears to agree with this view is Miller, National Responsibility 
and Global Justice, p.248. 
117 For a argument against the classic, Benthamite version of the institutionalist claim that rights can 
only be created by institutions, see, D. Lyons, 'Utility and Rights', in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of 
Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 110-136.  
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ultimately to be explained by referring back to the thing which defines these rights and 
duties as rights and duties of justice, namely, the ideal of a perfectly fair distribution. 
It seems clear, then, that even though most theories of justice make use of the 
concepts of rights and duties at some point, the normative role these concepts play is a 
derivative rather than a foundational one, and so they cannot be appealed to in order to 
explain what defines these theories as theories of justice. At least, this is usually the case, 
for as I indicated above (see fn.146), there are a few important exceptions to this 
general claim. The exceptions are those theories which purport to tell us what justice is, 
purely through an analysis of the concept of a right. Such theories are genuinely right-
based, because nothing other than the bare concept of a right is appealed to in 
delineating the contours of any particular conception of justice. According to such 
theories, rights are truly foundational. 
The clearest and best-known example of such a genuinely right-based theory of 
justice is Hillel Steiner’s theory of ‘left-libertarianism’. Steiner claims that ‘the 
elementary particles of justice are rights. Rights are the items which are created and 
parcelled out by justice principles’.118 On its own, of course, this claim is merely 
stipulative. But Steiner goes on to justify it through a complex analysis of the nature of 
rights and their exercise. Noting that rights-claims are typically invoked in ‘adversarial 
circumstances’ in which people make conflicting claims to the same piece of ‘action-
space’ (i.e. the physical components of time and space that are necessary for any 
action), Steiner attempts to demonstrate that principled resolutions of these conflicts 
are only available if the rights being invoked are ‘compossible’ (i.e. jointly possible). 
This powerful compossibility constraint, combined with several other constraints 
grounded directly in the formal features of rights themselves, generates a lexically-prime 
rule (one which trumps all other moral considerations) for the distribution of rights, 
which in turn determines the allocation of spheres of negative liberty within which 
individuals are left to pursue their (possibly immoral) ends free from the interference of 
                                                
118 Steiner, An Essay on Rights, p.2. 
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other.119 This is not the place to explain the complexities of Steiner’s view in more detail 
or to assess its overall plausibility. But, as this very brief summary makes clear, Steiner’s 
theory represents an ingenious attempt to generate a substantive theory of justice from 
the pure concept of a right. And, as such, it presents a serious challenge to my rejection 
of the currency view of justice. For that rejection, up to now, has been based on the 
claim that most theories of justice that include claims about rights and duties only 
invoke these concepts in a derivative rather than a foundational sense, and that they 
therefore presuppose one of the other three views of justice. Steiner’s theory, in contrast, 
allocates an explicitly foundational role to rights, and in doing so it clearly escapes my 
general objection. 
Ideally I would like to be able to respond to Steiner’s argument by showing that, 
ultimately, his right-based theory also presupposes one of the other three views of 
justice. Unfortunately I do not have such a response – and I’m not sure there is one. 
Fortunately, however, this lack of a strong response to the challenge posed by Steiner’s 
theory does not preclude a somewhat weaker one – one that, I believe, will rescue (at 
least temporarily) my attempt to reject the rights-based view as a distinct view of justice. 
The weaker response is this: while Steiner’s view may not, strictly speaking, presuppose 
one of the other three views of justice, it is nevertheless possible to redescribe it in terms 
of one of the other three views (namely, the coercion view), thus vindicating the general 
rejection of the currency view as a distinct interpretation of the concept of justice. 
My grounds for making this weaker response are a number of quotes in which 
Steiner makes it clear that his theory of rights-based justice is extensionally equivalent 
to a justified-coercion theory of justice. Consider, for example, Steiner’s claim that: ‘one 
freedom which my rights do assign to me (or my agents) is the freedom to do acts 
enforcing the correlatively dutiful conduct of others…My right assigns to me the pure 
negative freedom to curtail your pure negative freedom’.120 Alternatively, consider 
Steiner’s argument (expressed in agreement with Kant) that: 
                                                
119 This summary of Steiner’s view is largely borrowed from the summary Steiner himself gives. 
Steiner, An Essay on Rights, pp.1-5. 
120 Steiner, An Essay on Rights, p.74. 
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…a set of rights is a prescribed interpersonal distribution of freedom…[and] a rights-
violator, by engrossing some of his victim’s allotted freedom and therefore (in a 
compossible set of rights) exceeding his own, alters that distribution…[and] one is thus 
licensed by that same prescription to use force against the violator, i.e. to diminish his 
freedom, in order to restore that distribution.121 
In these quotes, and at numerous other points in his work, Steiner makes it 
clear that the implication, if not the intention, of his theory of justice is to tell us when 
the exercise of coercion is justified and when it is unjustified. And this means that 
Steiner’s view does not in fact create a barrier to my goal of rejecting the currency view 
as a distinct view of justice.  
I have argued that insofar as the currency view of justice has any plausibility at 
all, the only credible candidate currencies are rights and duties. However, most theories 
that invoke the concepts of rights and duties distinguish rights and duties of justice from 
other kinds of rights and duties, and in order to explain this distinction they typically 
refer to one of the other three views of justice (or some combination of them). This 
shows that they are not really examples of the currency view after all. Hillel Steiner’s 
theory demonstrates that not all right/duty-based versions of the currency view 
presuppose one of the other three views. But Steiner’s view nevertheless entails one of 
these three views, and such entailment is all that is required in order to vindicate the 
proposed rejection of the currency view as a distinct view of justice. Ideally I would like 
to rule out in principle the possibility of a right/duty-based version of the currency 
view that neither presupposes nor entails the coercion, institutional, or fairness view of 
justice. But since this would be a task of infinite duration I shall have to settle for the 
contingent conclusion offered here. 
V. The pr imary subjec t  o f  jus t i c e   
I now want to go on and show that the institutional view of justice should also 
be rejected as a distinct view of justice. Before doing so, however, I need to introduce 
and explain a distinction which was not important for the discussion in the previous 
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section but which is of central importance to understanding the institutional view. The 
distinction captures the difference between two different categories of ‘subject’ to 
which judgements of justice apply. The first kind of subject is what I call a ‘derivative’ 
subject of justice. When we ask what makes an act, or an institution, or a state of affairs 
just or unjust, the answer is often that it contributes to or results from something else 
that is antecedently recognised as just or unjust. So, we might describe an act as just 
because it is required by or permissible according to a just institution, or because it 
helps contribute to a more just distribution. An institution might be described as just 
because it requires or encourages certain kinds of just action or because it helps 
maintain a just distribution. A state of affairs might be described as just because it 
results from just acts or from just institutions or both. When a possible subject of the 
predicate ‘just’ is just in this sense (i.e. because of its relation to something else that is 
antecedently recognised as just) I shall say it is derivatively just. 
The existence of such derivative subjects of justice implies the existence of (at 
least one) kind of subject that is non-derivative. This second kind of subject I refer to 
as a ‘primary’ subject of justice.122 A primary subject can be defined negatively by saying 
that, for any potential subject of justice X, X is a primary subject of justice when the 
answer to the question ‘what makes X just or unjust?’ does not refer to a further subject. 
If, for example, we ask whether a particular action is just or unjust and the answer 
refers to the justice or injustice of the institutional structure against which the action 
was carried out, then we know that in this instance actions are being taken as derivative 
subjects of justice. If, on the other hand, the answer does not refer to the justice or 
injustice of a different subject, but refers to some inherent quality of the action itself, 
then we know that in this instance actions are being taken as primary subjects of justice. 
                                                
122 The phrase ‘primary subject of justice’ was famously used by Rawls to describe the basic structure 
of a well-ordered society. Rawls’s use of this idea, however, is different to mine. When Rawls says 
that ‘the basic structure is the primary subject of justice’ he means it is the most important of our 
justice-relevant concerns. He thus leaves open the possibility that there are other fundamental 
principles of justice that apply to subjects other than the basic structure. On my interpretation, in 
contrast, to describe the basic structure as the primary subject of justice is to implicitly reject the 
possibility that there are other fundamental principles of justice applying to other subjects. 
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Different theorists of justice have argued for a variety of primary subjects (in 
my sense of ‘primary’).123 Below I have listed the four main candidates for the role of 
‘primary subject of justice’ and I have suggested a label for the type of theorist who 
defends the primacy of a certain type of subject in each case:124 
 
1) Distributions (states of affairs) - Distributivists 
2) Institutions (and institutional schemes) - Institutionalists 
3) Actions - Interactionalists 
4) Individuals – Virtue ethicists125 
 
By choosing one (or more) of these subjects as the primary subject(s) of justice, 
the theorist is not denying that the remaining subjects can also meaningfully be 
described as just or unjust, they are merely pointing to the logically subordinate status 
of the latter. Thus distributivists such as G.A.Cohen, Brian Barry or Liam Murphy who 
take distributions to be the primary subject of justice determine the justice of 
institutions, actions, and individuals, by referring to the role they play in maintaining the 
justice of a distribution. Institutionalists such as Thomas Pogge determine the justice of 
distributions, actions, and individuals, by referring to their relation to institutions. And 
interactionalists such as Robert Nozick determine the justice of distributions, 
institutions, and people, by referring to their relation to actions. 
The fact that a commitment to a particular primary subject of justice does not 
preclude a discussion of the justice or injustice of derivative (i.e. non-primary) subjects 
might seem to call into question the point of making the distinction in the first place. If 
                                                
123 For a good early discussion of this idea, see, H. A. Bedau, 'Social Justice and Social Institutions', 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 3 (1) (1978), 159-175. 
124 ‘Institutionalist’, ‘interactionalist’ and, of course, ‘virtue ethicist’ are all more or less well-known 
terms in the literature. ‘Distributivist’ is, as far as I know, a new term. It might be thought that there 
is no need for a new term here when the much more conventional ‘consequentialist’ would do just as 
nicely. The reason I do not use the term ‘consequentialism’ to describe a distribution-focused view of 
justice will become clear later on. 
125 Someone might argue that there exists a fifth type of subject: ‘natural events’. Such a person might 
describe an earthquake that either kills people or damages their property as, itself, fundamentally 
unjust. Since I know of no writer who actually argues that justice is fundamentally a property of 
natural events I shall not discuss this idea further. It is worth noting, however, that distributivists in 
particular leave open the possibility of describing a natural event as derivatively unjust if its 
occurrence causes an injustice to arise in the distribution. 
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Rawlsians can still talk meaningfully about just or unjust distributions, and Nozickians 
can still talk meaningfully about just or unjust institutions, why do we care whether 
these possible subjects of the predicate ‘just’ are primary subjects or not? The short 
answer is that the choice of primary subject(s) makes a big difference to the way in 
which we theorise about justice. As we shall see, it not only affects the scope and 
content of our theory of justice, it also affects how directly action-guiding our theory of 
justice aims to be and the way in which judgements of justice and injustice influence 
our practical reasoning more generally. 
VI. Inst i tut ions ,  d is tr ibut ions and act ions 
My main aim in the rest of this chapter is to consider various substantive 
arguments for and against adopting the institutional view of justice, which holds that 
the primary subjects of justice are institutions. Before discussing these arguments, 
however, it will be helpful, as a final preliminary step, to get a clearer idea of what 
exactly I mean when I talk about an institution, an action, and a distribution. I shall not 
discuss the virtue-ethicist’s view, according to which the primary subjects of justice are 
individuals. The reason for this is simply that, compared to the institutional, 
interactional, and distributive approaches, the virtue-based approach to justice 
represents a fairly radical departure from the way in which justice is typically conceived 
by contemporary (Anglophone) writers on the topic of distributive justice. Indeed, 
simply to discuss the virtue-based approach on its own terms, never mind compare and 
contrast it to the alternatives, would require the development and exposition of an 
entirely new theoretical framework, and I simply do not have the space to carry out 
such a task in sufficient detail.126 The discussion to follow is complicated enough as it 
stands, and I hope it is enough to note that it would be an interesting exercise to take 
the results of the present study and apply them in a comparative manner to the virtue-
ethicist approach.  
                                                
126 For an attempt to develop such a framework, see, O. O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A 
Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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With this restriction on the scope of my enquiry duly noted I now turn to the 
three possible subjects of justice that remain. Beginning with institutions, then, we can 
follow Rawls in defining an institution as a ‘public system of rules which defines offices 
and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These 
rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they 
provide for certain penalties and defences, and so on, when violations occur’. 
Furthermore, ‘an institution exists at a certain time and place when the actions specified 
by it are regularly carried out in accordance with a public understanding that the system 
of rules defining the institution is to be followed’.127 It is important to stress that 
institutions in the Rawlsian sense do not possess agency. To think that they do is to 
mistakenly confuse them with what is actually the more common meaning of the word 
institution, namely, collective bodies that do display purposeful agency, such as the 
various organisations, corporations, and associations that constitute the civil and 
political spheres. Pogge gives the non-political example of an institution of higher 
learning, but various types of government ‘institutions’ would also fit into this 
category.128 Clearly, the only reason why many of these kinds of ‘institutional-agents’ 
exist is in order to coordinate and/or enforce the practices constitutive of the 
‘institutional-rules’ that form the focus of institutionalist justice, but one should not 
confuse this relationship of facilitation for one of identity. 
Institutions as ‘public systems of rules’ are clearly distinct from actions. Of 
course, actions are often influenced by institutions; as Rawls says, when considering the 
design of an institutional structure ‘one must, of course, examine the schemes and 
tactics it allows and the forms of behaviour which it tends to encourage’.129 But I take it 
to be self-evident that actions – whether the actions of individuals or groups – can be 
carried out in the absence of institutions. There has inevitably been a great deal of 
philosophical debate over the precise definition of an action, but its finer details need 
not concern us here. It will suffice for our present purposes if we take an action to refer 
                                                
127 Rawls A Theory of Justice, pp.47-8. 
128 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.21. 
129 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.49. 
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to any ‘event’130 directly caused by individual or collective human behaviour that brings 
about a state of affairs for which the agent(s) in question can be held ‘outcome 
responsible’.131 
Finally, I shall take distributions to refer to particular allocations of justice-
relevant goods measurable (in principle) at any point in time or over a specified period 
of time. Talk of the ‘allocation’ of goods should not be taken to imply that the shape of 
any particular distribution can be traced back to purposeful agency (although in many 
cases this will provide at least a partial explanation). And not all goods (or bads) are 
‘justice-relevant’ (relevant for the purposes of determining the justice or injustice of 
distributions). The important point is that goods which are justice-relevant do not 
depend for their relevance on the core idea of ‘a distribution’ (rather, their relevance 
will be decided by the content of the particular conception of justice in hand). 
VII. Reje c t ing the inst i tut ional  v i ew 
With a clearer idea of the concepts underlying the three possible subjects of 
justice in hand, I now turn my attention to the arguments for and against the 
institutional view of justice, and thus for taking institutions as the primary subjects of 
justice. I shall argue that the institutional view of justice is mistaken because institutions 
are not primary subjects of justice. Institutions are certainly relevant to justice, but we 
can only make sense of this if we think of them as derivative subjects.132 My aim in this 
                                                
130 According to Hillel Steiner, ‘all actions are events. As such, they consist in the occupation of a set 
of contiguous temporal locations and (sometimes) a set of contiguous spatial locations by a set of 
physical objects’. Steiner, An Essay on Rights, p.35. 
131 The notion of ‘outcome responsibility’ is due to Miller, National Responsibility and Global 
Justice, pp.81-97. According to Miller, an agent is outcome responsible for a state of affairs when 
there is a ‘foreseeable connection between [her] action and the result’, and the gains or losses 
experienced either by the agent herself or other parties as a result of her action can be credited or 
debited to the agent, (pp.87-8). ‘Crediting’ gains or ‘debiting’ losses to an agent does not imply the 
attribution of moral praise or blame, since there are many actions that agents purposefully do which it 
does not make sense to hold them morally responsible for. Miller gives the examples of running a 
record-breaking race, producing an artistic masterpiece, or making a poor attempt to grow some 
crops, (pp.89-90). 
132 The importance of institutions for both the theory and practice of justice is something on which 
the critics, as well as the supporters, of the institutional view of justice are agreed. For the views of 
the critics, see, G. A. Cohen, 'Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice', Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 26 (1) (1997), 3-30; L. Murphy, 'Institutions and the Demands of Justice', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (4) (1999), 251-291; B. Barry, Why Social Justice Matters, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp.16-8; A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 
esp. Introduction and Chap.3. For a reply to Cohen see, A. Williams, 'Incentives, Inequality, and 
 106 
section is to defend this claim by showing that the main arguments in favour of taking 
institutions as the primary subject of justice are flawed. 
I begin with two arguments that are often taken to be the main supporting 
arguments in favour of taking institutions as the primary subject of justice (in my sense 
of ‘primary subject’). Because both arguments were originally put forward by Rawls, he 
is often erroneously interpreted as an institutionalist in my sense of the term. And this 
mistake is encouraged by Rawls’s famous claim that ‘the primary subject of justice is the 
basic structure of society’.133 However, Rawls’s sense of ‘primary subject’ is different to 
the one I am employing here. And, indeed, Rawls explicitly rejects the idea that 
institutions are the primary subject of justice in my sense of the phrase. Nevertheless, it 
is instructive to see what is wrong with the two arguments when they are interpreted in 
the way not intended by Rawls, that is, as arguments in support of the conclusion that 
institutions are the primary subject of justice in my sense of the term. 
The first argument Rawls gives for why we should focus primarily on the justice 
of institutions is the need to maintain what he calls ‘background justice’.134 Background 
justice refers to the underlying conditions of equality which are necessary to guarantee 
that agreements reached between individuals are genuinely free and fair, conditions 
which, in a large, complex society it would be impossible to maintain even if everyone 
was trying their best to keep it that way. It seems clear that the primacy of institutions is 
being justified here on instrumental grounds; we should (for practical reasons) set them 
up in order to help us do something that we should (for moral reasons) be doing 
anyway. The implication is that, in a smaller, less complex society, or in a society 
populated by beings identical to humans in every way except for their improved ability 
to work out the consequences of their actions, justice would be achievable without 
institutions. Indeed, if we take seriously Rawls’s definition of background justice as the 
                                                                                                                                    
Publicity', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (3) (1998), 225-247; and for a joint reply to Cohen to 
Murphy see, T. Pogge, 'On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29 (2) (2000), 137-169. 
133 The basic structure of society refers to ‘the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation’, 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.6. 
134 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp.52-5. 
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conditions necessary to guarantee that agreements reached between people are free and 
fair, then it would appear that what justice is actually concerned with at a fundamental 
level is that the agreements that people reach between themselves are free and fair. In 
other words, the conditions of ‘background justice’ that institutions maintain are 
important because they facilitate just transactions between individuals. Judgements about 
the justice or injustice of the basic institutional structure of a society therefore depend 
on, indeed are derived from, the more fundamental question of the justice of the 
transactions that occur between individuals in that society. Rawls’s appeal to 
background justice suggests an underlying interactional approach, rather than an 
institutional approach, to justice. 
The second argument Rawls offers for taking institutions as the primary subject 
of justice refers to the profound and pervasive effects they have on those who are 
subject to them.135 Rawls points out that institutions not only affect the kind of persons 
we are but also the kind of persons we want to be. The institutional contours of the 
basic structure of society determine how existing wants are satisfied and contribute to 
fashioning desires and aspirations in the future; indeed they shape the societal culture 
itself and hence the individual conceptions of the good encouraged and made possible 
by this culture, and they even affect people’s realisation of their natural abilities: ‘not 
only our final ends and hopes for ourselves but also our realised abilities and talents 
reflect, to a large degree, our personal history, opportunities, and social position’.136 
While much of this is no doubt true, the problem is that it is hard to see what these 
ideas add to the previous argument from background justice in support of the 
conclusion that institutions are the primary subject of justice. According to the 
background justice argument, the profound and pervasive effects that institutions have 
is precisely why we need them. Rawls is certainly right to stress how important it 
therefore is to ensure that institutions do their job properly and do not have any further 
unwanted effects. But the fact that this warning is being given in the first place suggests 
                                                
135 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp.55-7. 
136 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.270. 
 108 
that we already know what the ‘proper’ job of institutions is, namely, to ensure that 
agreements reached between people are free and fair. 
When Rawls’s arguments are taken as arguments in support of ‘institutionalism’ 
in my sense of the term, they are clearly flawed. And this fact alone should be enough 
to demonstrate that Rawls wasn’t trying to defend institutionalism in this sense. In fact, 
Rawls himself was explicit that he was only concerned with what he called the ‘special 
problem’ of justice: the justice of the basic structure of a well-ordered society. Under 
the relevant assumptions, the existence of the basic structure is a given – there is no 
question of any ‘pre-institutional’ situation – and it seems perfectly reasonable to focus 
one’s theory of distributive justice on the way this basic structure is designed. There can 
be no doubt, therefore, that Rawls was not attempting to defend institutionalism as a 
general approach to justice. 
In order to find someone who does try to defend institutionalism as a general 
approach to justice, we have to turn to the work of Thomas Pogge. Pogge has argued 
that if institutionalism is to have any hope of retaining its attractiveness as an approach 
to the general problem of distributive justice (the problem of how goods are distributed 
between people in contexts including, but not restricted to, self-sufficient nation-states), we 
need a more expansive understanding of ‘institutions’ that covers more than just the 
major social institutions of a well-ordered society. Pogge himself proposes that we hold 
on to the core definition of an institution as a public system of rules that I pointed to 
above, but expand this to include not only those public rules that regulate the core 
elements of complex societies, but any such rules that regulate in a publicly recognised 
and systematic way interaction between individuals (or groups).137 This wider sense of 
‘institution’ corresponds to a broadening of Rawls’s notion of the basic structure of a 
social system to include all and any publicly recognised terms of interaction that affect 
the distribution of benefits and burdens among the members of any kind of social 
system. Understood in this general way, says Pogge, ‘Rawls’s criterion of justice is 
applicable, in the limit, to the design of ground rules regulating the cooperation of two 
                                                
137 Pogge’s phrase ‘terms of social interaction’ is a fitting description for this interpretation of 
institutions, Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.22. 
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persons stranded together on an isolated island or to the assessment of ground rules 
that may have emerged between them’.138 
In making his case for why we should support (the wide interpretation of) the 
institutionalist approach to justice, Pogge’s first move is, effectively, to recapitulate the 
two Rawlsian arguments we have just dismissed.139 However, he then goes on to 
present a third argument which adds something new to the justification for 
institutionalism. ‘Institutional reform’ says Pogge, ‘is [not] being recommended for its 
effectiveness alone’. It is not ‘merely a different (and better) way of doing something 
moral by making the world a little better’.140 Someone who employs this instrumental 
argument as the sole justification for institutional reform is, according to Pogge, making 
a mistake – and potentially a very costly mistake – about the nature of justice itself. 
There is an inherent danger, argues Pogge, in conceiving of the impartial value of 
justice as an especially important goal, perhaps an overriding goal, to which all other 
practical reasoning must be subordinated. The danger is that our subsequent duties of 
justice, both in terms of their number and their stringency, have the potential to spiral 
out of control, as anything we choose to do on prudential grounds for ourselves or 
those close to us becomes vulnerable to criticism on grounds of justice. Pogge never 
says explicitly why he thinks this is such a bad thing, but presumably he thinks that in 
such a situation the special urgency of duties of justice combined with an expansive 
interpretation of their scope would leave little room to pursue not only our own 
projects but also other moral values. 
Now, it might be responded that whether or not our duties of justice do in fact 
have the kind of expansive scope of application that Pogge worries about depends on 
how demanding a conception of the content of justice we happen to hold in the first 
place. But this is precisely the kind of contingent response that Pogge is keen to rule 
out. A much more satisfying alternative, implies Pogge, is to see the value of justice as 
reflecting a special kind of moral responsibility: the shared responsibility of participants 
                                                
138 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.25. 
139 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, pp.33-4. 
140 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.34. 
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in an institutional scheme to avoid wronging one another through the political, legal, 
economic, and social contours of that scheme.141 Justice is an ideal that grounds each 
and every person’s duty not to support the continued existence of unjustifiable 
institutions. Further support for this claim can be drawn from the fact that this general 
negative duty coheres with ‘Anglo-American moral and legal tradition, in which it is often 
denied that persons have duties to protect and aid other persons in distress: it’s a good 
thing to help those who might otherwise drown or starve or be murdered, but it isn’t 
very wrong not to, especially if the trouble, expense, or risks involved aren’t 
negligible’.142 
We can now see that Pogge’s third argument for institutionalism really consists 
of two separate arguments. The first argument is that for the sake of our ability to 
pursue our own projects, as well as other moral values, the concept of justice should be 
limited in application to institutions (and the derivative duty not to support certain 
kinds of institutions). The second argument is that this institutional restriction adheres 
to moral and legal tradition. I take it that this second argument is unconvincing. Since 
‘moral and legal tradition’ up to now may simply have been mistaken, it is not clear (at 
least, not without much more detailed argument) why we should accord it much weight 
when deciding how to conceptualise justice. The first argument is not quite as 
unconvincing, though it is still not particularly strong. The fact that the correct 
conception of justice might not undermine our ability to pursue other values after all 
means that Pogge’s concern about the demands of justice spiralling out of control may 
turn out to be completely unfounded. Still, the fact that the impartial demands of 
justice may encroach unacceptably on our ability to pursue our own projects as well as 
other moral values is a valid concern. The relevant question is whether Pogge’s 
institutional view is the correct response to this concern. I do not think it is, and in later 
chapters I develop what I believe to be a superior alternative. In the rest of this section, 
however, rather than argue directly against Pogge’s argument, I shall present some 
independent reasons for rejecting the institutional view. 
                                                
141 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.34. 
142 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.34. 
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My plan is to discuss two examples which highlight the counterintuitive 
implications of Pogge’s institutional view. Before introducing my first example, it will 
be helpful to recall two key aspects of Pogge’s position. First, although Pogge believes 
that justice applies primarily to institutions, he is perfectly happy to say that actions can 
be just or unjust. The point is that such actions are only derivatively just or unjust, since 
our judgements about the justice or injustice of actions necessarily refers to the justice 
or injustice of the institutional scheme to which our actions are related: we act justly if 
we support just institutions or refuse to support unjust institutions, we act unjustly if 
we support unjust institutions or fail to support just institutions.143 Second, Pogge 
believes that institutionalist criteria of justice apply not only to major social institutions, 
but that they are applicable, in the limit, to the design of ground rules regulating the 
cooperation of two persons stranded together on an isolated island. 
Now for my first example. Imagine that two people, A and B, who are identical 
in all relevant respects, are washed up on an isolated island which happens to be blessed 
with a good supply, though by no means a super-abundance, of resources. There are 
enough resources, let us say, for each individual to live comfortably for the rest of their 
lives, provided they are shared more or less equally between the two throughout this 
time. What does justice demand in this situation? Since there are no institutional ground 
rules in place to regulate the castaways’ cooperation on the island it is not clear, on 
Pogge’s view, what justice could demand in this situation. If A collects up the majority of 
the available resources and places them out of B’s reach he clearly acts immorally, but 
he is not violating any duty of justice. Justice refers to our negative duty not to support 
unjust institutions, and one cannot support or refuse to support institutions that do not 
exist. 
My claim is that this conclusion is counterintuitive because A clearly is acting 
unjustly in not sharing the resources equally with B. If I am right, then Pogge must 
                                                
143 Sometimes our fundamental negative duty of justice may give rise to derivative positive duties of 
justice. As Pogge points out, ‘the negative duty not to abuse just practices may demand positive 
action, as when one must act to keep a promise or contract one has made’, Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 
p.32. For the worry that what Pogge’s view actually implies is that people have positive duties to set 
up institutions when they don’t already exist, see, M. Reitberger, 'Poverty, negative duties and the 
global institutional order', Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 7 (4) (2008), 379-402, p.388. 
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somehow explain this injustice. But in trying to do so he faces a dilemma. On one 
hand, Pogge might claim that A simply had a direct duty to share the resources equally. 
But this obviously risks undermining his claim that institutions are the sole primary 
subject of justice; if what justice demands is an equal distribution in the island scenario, 
it doesn’t seem to matter whether this is brought about by institutions or not. On the 
other hand, Pogge might try to maintain the institutional claim by insisting that what A 
is doing when he collects up the majority of the resources is precisely to set up an 
unjust institution of unjustified inequality between A and B, thereby violating his 
negative duty not to support unjust institutions. This response seems more promising for 
Pogge, but the problem now is that the definition of an ‘institution’ is being stretched 
so far it is beginning to become indistinguishable from the definition of an action. 
To see this, consider what Pogge would have to say if, immediately after A 
collects up the resources and places them where he thinks they are out of B’s reach, B 
works out how to get hold of the resources and himself collects them up and places 
them where he thinks they are out of A’s reach, and then immediately afterwards A 
works out how to get hold of the resources again, and so on, etc. Employing the new 
‘stretched’ definition of an institution, Pogge would have to describe this situation as 
one in which A and B alternate in quick succession at being the one to set up an unjust 
institution. This description of the situation is more than merely awkward; the 
definition of ‘institution’ that is now being employed is barely recognisable. More to the 
point, perhaps, the new definition no longer appears to fit with Pogge’s original view. 
Recall Pogge’s claim (quoted above) that ‘Rawls’s criterion of justice is applicable, in the 
limit, to the design of ground rules regulating the cooperation of two persons stranded 
together on an isolated island or to the assessment of ground rules that may have 
emerged between them’. The defining characteristic of the situation described above is 
the conspicuous absence of any ground rules whatsoever. There is simply no way of 
describing the series of smash and grab raids perpetrated by A and B as unjust in 
institutional terms. 
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The second example I shall consider again shows how institutionalism fails to 
fully account for our justice-related intuitions and further emphasises the point made at 
the end of the last paragraph. Pogge says that in a society in which slaveholding has 
been institutionalised ‘we cannot combat [the injustice caused by the institution of 
slavery] by stealing and protecting slaves or through attempts to reform slaveholders 
(perhaps by urging them to release their slaves or at least give them better treatment).144 
The reason, according to Pogge’s interpretation of the institutionalist approach, is that 
such ‘action would not make the structure of the slaveholding society any more just 
(even [an] escapee is still legally unfree, may be recaptured, etc.)’.145 Now, Pogge may or 
may not be right about this. In his favour, it is certainly true that an isolated attempt to 
help a slave to escape his owner’s clutches does not in itself eradicate the institutional 
practice of slavery in the society in question. On the other hand, though, it might be the 
case that such an isolated emancipatory act has the effect of marginally increasing the 
power of those who oppose slavery while diminishing the power of those who favour 
it, thus making it more likely that structural change will occur in the future. In any case, 
regardless of whether Pogge is right or wrong with regards to the justice of the 
institutional structure, it seems much harder to deny that uncoordinated but effective 
acts of emancipation do not make the state of affairs in the world as a whole slightly more 
just. Imagine that I am not the only free citizen who, disgusted at the thought of living 
in a society that refuses to formally ban slavery, decides to unilaterally assist a slave in 
escaping from his master. Let us say that, of the ten thousand slaves being kept under 
lock and key throughout our society, I and my fellow emancipators work successfully to 
effectively (if not formally) free nine thousand of them. At all times the formal (i.e. 
legal) institution of slavery remains in place, (but perhaps, let us say, informal and illegal 
emancipation is made easier by lax enforcement). Is the world in which the nine 
thousand are effectively free still no more just? Pogge would have to say no. The only 
way that this massive increase in effective freedom would count as an increase in the 
                                                
144 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.27. 
145 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.41. 
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justice of the world for Pogge is if the formal institution of slavery was also abolished. 
This seems unnecessarily and implausibly restrictive. 
Now imagine a slight variation on this example. Imagine that the formal 
institution of slavery is abolished but the informal practice of slavery continues, not 
because the slaveholders are coercing their slaves into staying, let’s say, but because of 
some kind of collective false consciousness among former slaves, carried over from the 
abuse they suffered in the past, that makes them think that they are better off as slaves 
– a false consciousness the former slaveholders are only too happy to take advantage 
of. This is clearly a very strange situation, and perhaps intuition (and language) fails us 
at this point. But I’m tempted to say that this informal slave-holding society is less just 
than one in which no one stands in any slave-like relationship with any other person, 
even though in both societies there is no formal institution of slavery. 
Perhaps Pogge might claim that, in either situation (either the widespread 
informal emancipatory society or the widespread informal slave-holding society) what 
had occurred was the creation of a new institution. He might claim, in other words, that 
what really counted as the institution was what people effectively did, not what was 
called for by the law. Now, Pogge’s own definition of an institution stipulated that it 
must be publicly acknowledged, so one obvious rejoinder to this imagined Poggean 
response is to deny that the actions of the individual emancipators are public 
knowledge. But even if the force of this rejoinder can be avoided, the imagined 
response simply shows how artificial the purported distinction between institutions and 
individual actions ultimately is. It seems churlish to deny that the uncoordinated but 
genuinely freedom-enhancing actions of a small number of people bring about no gain 
in justice but that, once the number of instances of these actions passes a certain 
society-wide threshold, then there is an increase in justice. 
The failure of Pogge’s defence of the institutional view strongly suggests that 
such an approach to defining the concept of justice (according to which institutions are 
the only primary subject of justice) is mistaken. It also, I believe, gives us a reason to 
think that institutions are never correctly thought of as primary subjects of justice – even 
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as part of a mixed conception according to which actions and/or distribution are also 
considered to be primary subjects of justice – although clearly what I have said so far is 
insufficient to support this stronger claim. I know of no general argument which proves 
that institutions can never be thought of as primary subjects of justice. The challenge is 
for those who think institutions can be genuinely classed as a primary subject of justice 
to support this claim. If I am right, however, and institutions are only a derivative 
subject of justice, then we are left with actions and distributions as possible primary 
subjects. 
VIII.  Conc lus ion 
I began this chapter by introducing four different interpretations of the concept 
of distributive justice: the currency view; the institutional view; the coercion view; and 
the fairness view. I then argued that the currency view should be rejected on the 
grounds that theories of justice that purport to be versions of the currency view either 
presuppose or entail one of the three remaining views (or some combination of these 
views). 
Next I moved on to discuss the institutional view. I began by introducing the 
distinction between primary and derivative subjects of justice. Primary subjects of 
justice are things which are just or unjust in themselves, derivative subjects of justice are 
things which are just or unjust only in virtue of their relation to some other (primary or 
derivative) subject whose justness has already been determined. I explained that the 
defining feature of institutionalism is its claim that institutions are the only primary 
subject of justice. After considering a number of different arguments for this claim, and 
after testing it by applying it to a number of different examples, I came to the 
conclusion that the claim should be rejected. If institutions are not the only primary 
subject of justice it means that either actions, or distributions, or perhaps both actions 
and distributions, must be primary subjects of justice.146 
                                                
146 Assuming, of course, that the virtue ethicist position – which takes persons to be the primary 
subject of justice – is not the only correct position. I explained my reasons for making this 
assumption in the first paragraph of section III. 
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In the next chapter I consider the two interpretations of justice that I have not 
discussed in this chapter: the coercion view and the fairness view. The coercion view 
takes actions to be the primary subject of justice. The fairness view takes distributions 
to be the primary subject of justice. If the arguments in this chapter are correct we 
know that at least one of these views is right. 
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(5) The Concept of Distributive Justice: Part II 
I .  Introduct ion 
In the previous chapter I distinguished four alternative definitions of the 
concept of distributive justice: the currency view, the institutional view, the justified-
coercion view, and the idea-of-fairness view. I then argued that the currency view and 
the institutional view fail to provide a particularly compelling interpretation of justice 
and should therefore be rejected. In this chapter I turn my attention to the two 
remaining views. I argue that although both the coercion view and the fairness view 
pick out important aspects of the concept of justice, neither view, when taken in its 
‘pure’ form (i.e. on its own), provides a complete account of justice. Since the coercion 
view and the fairness view together capture what is important about the concept of 
justice the obvious thing to do is to somehow try and combine the two views. I 
consider one attempt to do this by adapting the coercion view so as to incorporate the 
important aspects of the fairness view without incorporating the latter view in its 
wholesale form. I argue that this attempt to maintain allegiance to the ‘pure’ coercion 
view while incorporating the insights of the fairness view fails to produce a compelling 
interpretation of justice. The only way to generate a plausible interpretation of justice 
that reflects the insights of the coercion and fairness views is to incorporate both views 
in their wholesale form within a single conceptual framework. The result – dual-
component model of distributive justice – is explained and developed in chapter 6. 
II .  The coerc ion- just i fy ing v i ew 
The coercion view of justice is clearly visible in the work of a large number of 
influential theorists, including Rawls, Nagel, and Miller.147 What these theorists are 
                                                
147 See, in particular, Rawls, Justice as Fairnes, pp.40-1; Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice'; 
Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p.248. Further support for the claim that Rawls’s 
understanding of justice, in particular, incorporates the coercion view, see, L. Valentini, 'On the 
Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory', Journal of Political Philosophy, 17 (3) (2009), 332-355, pp.334-
7. It is important to note that when I say that the coercion view is ‘clearly visible’ in the work of 
Rawls, Nagel, and Miller, I am not suggesting that all three writers think the coercion view is all there 
is to justice. Miller, for one, explicitly states that he thinks there is more justice than the coercion 
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typically looking for is a principle or set of principles which tells us when and why we 
can (and when and why we can’t) justifiably coerce people into acting or not acting in 
certain ways. Since the state is often held to be the primary – and sometimes the only – 
agent with the capability or the legitimacy or the authority to exercise justified coercion, 
it is unsurprising that proponents of the coercion view typically focus on formulating 
and justifying principles of justice that apply to state policy (e.g. by guiding the writing 
of the constitution and the formulation of specific laws) rather than individual conduct. 
As I argued in the previous chapter, however, there is no good reason for restricting the 
application of principles of justice to institutions, and we should be careful not to let 
the de facto focus on the institutional structures of states, which is a natural consequence 
of the coercion view’s interest in loci of power, blind us to the fact that questions of 
justice – questions about the justified exercise of coercion – can be raised just as easily 
and with just as much relevance about coercive individual conduct as they can about 
the design of coercive institutions. 
In order to explain and elaborate the coercion view I shall use the rest of this 
section to make four key points. First, it is important to distinguish between two 
different ways in which proponents of the coercion view might go about formulating 
principles of justified coercion. According to the first, consequentialist version of the 
coercion view, the aim is to work out a principle or set of principles which tell us when 
and why it is justifiable to coerce people in order to produce or bring about certain 
desirable consequences. The kinds of desirable consequences a theorist who takes the 
consequentialist approach is likely to be concerned to bring about are well-known, and 
include things such as individual well-being, political stability, the efficient allocation of 
goods, and democracy. Now if people could be trusted to bring these consequences 
about by themselves then there would be no need to formulate principles which specify 
when coercion is and is not justified in order to promote them. Under such 
circumstances a theory of justice of this sort would be unnecessary. But of course, people 
can’t usually be trusted to bring these consequences about by themselves. The question 
                                                                                                                                    
view entails, Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp.277-8. 
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therefore arises what we can justifiably do in order to force people into doing what is 
necessary, and this is the question to which the principles of justice formulated by 
proponents of the consequentialist version of the coercion view are the answer. 
In contrast, the aim according to the second, deontological version of the coercion 
view, is to work out a principle or set of principles which tells us when and why it is 
justifiable to coerce people in ways that respect their distinctive moral status. People are 
not tools to be used in order to achieve valuable ends. Nor are they simply passive 
beings waiting to have good things done to them or given to them. People are 
purposeful beings. They lead their own lives, they make choices, form plans, and take 
responsibility for their mistakes. Now, partly in spite of these qualities and partly 
because of them, people have the ability and the tendency, whether acting individually 
or through a mediating body such as the state, to interfere with one another in 
numerous ways. As moral beings we want to ensure that these various ways of 
interfering with one another are consistent with the respect that each person is due. 
Thus it becomes a pressing and important question what limits we set on this potential 
for interference. The principles that are formulated in response to this question are the 
principles of justice according to the deontological version of the coercion view. Their 
role is to specify the point at which X’s failure to treat Y in a way that is consistent with 
respecting Y’s distinctive moral status leaves X vulnerable to justified coercive 
interference (either from Y himself, or from a third party, Z). Typically, Z is the state, 
and X and Y are citizens of that state. In this case the role of the principle(s) of justice 
is to specify the point at which the state is justified in exercising coercion over X in 
order to ensure that he treats Y with the respect that he is due. At other times, though, 
the relevant coercive power may not be a state but one of a variety of non-state actors. 
Having explained what distinguishes the consequentialist version from the 
deontological version of the coercion view, it is important to note that most actual 
conceptions of the coercion view adopt a mixed approach. That is, according to most 
(and the most plausible) conceptions of the coercion view, the role of the principles of 
justice is to specify (a) when we are justified in coercing people in order to promote 
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desirable consequences and (b) the point at which people become vulnerable to 
coercive interference for failing to treat others with the respect that they deserve. The 
best (and best-known) example of such a ‘mixed’ approach is of course Rawls’s theory 
of ‘Justice as Fairness’. When Rawls’s theory is interpreted as a conception of the 
coercion view it is easy to see that it contains both consequentialist and deontological 
aspects.148 On the one hand the state is entitled, indeed required, to employ the coercive 
power and authority of the law in order to facilitate the redistribution of resources so 
that the worst-off group in the society is as well off as possible. On the other hand, 
such justified coercive interference is limited by the deontological requirement to only 
coercively interfere with people in ways that are consistent with respecting their 
distinctive moral status. 
The second point I want to raise about the coercion view relates to the 
distinction I introduced in the previous chapter between institutionalist, interactionalist, 
and distributivist approaches to justice. In terms of this distinction the coercion view – 
in either its consequentialist, deontological, or mixed versions – is an example of an 
interactionalist approach. This means that the principles which form the content of the 
coercion view are principles that refer directly to the justice or injustice of actions. 
Distributions, on this view, may of course be described as ‘derivatively’ just or unjust, 
depending on whether or not they have arisen from just or unjust actions. Similarly, 
institutions may be described as ‘derivatively’ just or unjust depending on whether or 
not they permit/prohibit or encourage/discourage just or unjust actions. The 
significance of the fact that the coercion view of justice is an example of an 
interactionalist approach to justice will become clear later when I discuss the possibility 
of combining the coercion view and the fairness view of justice together within a single 
conceptual framework. 
The third point I want to mention about the coercion view of justice concerns 
an issue raised by John Stuart Mill. Mill pointed out that there is a problem with any 
                                                
148 Though it would require too much work to explain the point in detail, it is worth noting that the 
way I describe Rawls’s theory here does not reflect the same way of understanding Rawls’s theory as 
that reflected by Pogge’s labelling of Justice as Fairness as a ‘semi-consequentialist’ theory of justice. 
See, Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.47. 
 121 
attempt to distinguish demands of justice from other moral demands by pointing to the 
justifiability of enforcing – primarily through the threat of punishment for failure to 
comply – the former but not the latter: 
For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not 
only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not 
call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in 
some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if 
not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.149 
Mill is certainly right to emphasise that if the notion of a ‘moral wrong’ is to 
mean anything at all it must be that some kind of penalty attaches to it. Mill is also right 
to say that the relevant penalties can take a number of different forms, presumably 
ranging from punishments of torture and death, down through custodial-sentences and 
fines, to displays of social disapprobation and, finally, self-censure. In one sense these 
various forms of influence which people exert over one another (and themselves) 
through the apparatus of the state or via less centralised and official methods can all be 
seen as points on the same continuum, differing only in the degree of 
pain/discomfort/inconvenience which attaches to them. On the other hand, the fact 
that the concept of coercion not only exists but is widely employed by political theorists 
in various contexts is powerful evidence that there is not just a difference of degree but 
a difference of kind between some of these types of influence. Although a precise 
definition of coercion is notoriously difficult to provide,150 the vast majority of cases are 
such that most people can agree whether or not the exercise of coercion is at issue. In 
any case, since any attempt on my part to deal with hard cases here would not only take 
us a long way off topic but would no doubt leave many participants in this complex and 
ongoing debate unconvinced, I shall not try to offer a precise definition of coercion 
here. As a rough guide what we can say is this: a person or group of persons coerces 
                                                
149 Mill, Utilitarianism, p.72. 
150 For a classic early treatment of some of these difficulties, see, R. Nozick, 'Coercion', in I. Carter, 
M. H. Kramer and H. Steiner (eds.), Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), 261-278. 
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another person or group of persons when the coercer(s) succeeds in making the 
coercee(s) act otherwise to how he or they would have acted in the absence of coercion 
by carrying out or threatening to carry out a course of action that causes or will cause 
harm to someone’s interests.151 Tightening up this rough definition would obviously 
require discussion of a range of background issues, as well as more detailed 
explanations of what is meant by the notion of ‘harm’ and by the notion of someone’s 
‘interests’. Having explained why I shall not be attempting to tighten up the definition 
in these ways, however, I trust that the rough version I have provided is enough for our 
current purposes. 
The fourth and final point I need to mention concerns what we might call the 
logical priority of the concept of coercion over the concept of justice. According to the 
coercion view, we know when a moral requirement is a requirement of justice when we 
know that we are justified in enforcing that requirement. This is what it means to say 
that coercion is ‘logically prior’ to justice. If justice was logically prior to coercion, then 
we would have to know when a requirement was a requirement of justice in order to 
know whether its coercive enforcement was justified; but of course, in that case, justice 
would have to be defined independently of any link with coercion, and the question 
whether we are justified in coercing people into fulfilling these independently defined 
requirements of justice would then be a separate question (this is, in fact, an accurate 
description of the ideal-of-fairness view of justice which I discuss below). 
III .  The l ink between just i c e  and fa irness 
The coercion view undoubtedly captures an important aspect of the concept of 
justice. Part of what it means to say something is unjust is that it is somehow worse, 
more wrong, than if it was simply immoral. It is plausible to suggest, moreover, that 
what this extra degree of wrongness entails in practice is that the appropriate response 
to the act or omission in question is one of active coercion rather than one of ‘mere’ 
disapproval, opprobrium, or contempt. However, having explained in greater detail 
                                                
151 The likely recipient of the ‘serious harm’ is ‘someone’ rather than the coercee in particular, 
because a coercer can coerce a coercee without necessarily threatening the coercee himself (perhaps 
the coercer threatens to kill a stranger unless the coercee does X). 
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what the coercion view of justice entails and why it should be taken seriously, I want to 
argue that it is a mistake to see the coercion view as representing the whole story about 
justice. 
My argument is based on the claim that the coercion view of justice offers an 
incomplete interpretation of the concept, because it fails to adequately reflect the close 
conceptual link between justice and fairness. In order to defend this claim I shall consider 
two different ways in which concerns of fairness might be incorporated into the 
coercion view of justice. The problem with both approaches is that it is possible to 
criticise as unfair the distributions that both approaches endorse as fully just. This is 
unacceptable because, as I shall argue in the course of discussing the two views, there is 
a strong intuitive pull to an idea which I refer to as the ‘fairness constraint’ on 
acceptable conceptions of justice: 
 
The fairness constraint: A distribution is not fully just unless it is also fair. 
 
The two different versions of the coercion view that I shall consider can be 
distinguished according to two features: First, by the role that each approach allocates to 
the concept of fairness; Second, by the interpretation that each approach takes of the 
concept of fairness itself. I shall label the two versions of the coercion view the ‘Basic 
Distributive Fairness Approach’ and the ‘Constructivist Fairness Approach’. 
 
The Basic Distributive Fairness Approach 
The first version of the coercion view that I shall consider interprets fairness as 
an ideal and substantive property of distributions that can be specified prior to and 
independently of any considerations about the moral permissibility, practical feasibility, 
or all-things-considered desirability of realising it. I call this kind of fairness ‘basic 
distributive fairness’. 
The concept of basic distributive fairness is perhaps best explained by analogy. 
Imagine we have to decide how to fairly divide up a cake (which is yet to be made) 
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between several people. Before we know how big the cake is, and before we know how 
accurately we will be able to divide it up, there are likely to be several different 
suggestions about what a fair division might look like. The most obvious, perhaps, is 
that a fair division is an equal division. But there may also be alternative proposals, say, 
to distribute the cake in proportion to the popularity of each person within the group, 
or to distribute the cake so that as few people as possible don’t need to eat anything 
else for the rest of the day, and so on. Now, even if everyone agrees on a particular 
proposal, there is no guarantee that this way of dividing the cake will actually be 
realised. It may turn out, for instance, that when the cake is finally made it is simply not 
big enough to satisfy some of the proposed fair divisions (e.g. the last of the three 
proposals just mentioned). Alternatively, it may turn out that the cake is made in such a 
way that there is no way of dividing it (cutting it) in a way that satisfies some of the 
proposed divisions (or at least no way of doing so without spoiling the cake itself). 
Finally, when the person who said he was going to make the cake realises how the cake 
will be divided once it is made (and we can imagine that he is the only member of the 
group capable of making one), it is conceivable that he might decide that it is not worth 
bothering to make it in the first place. (We can imagine in this final scenario that the 
would-be cake-maker agrees with everyone else what a fair division of cake would be if 
someone were to make one, but that he personally is only willing to make a cake if he ends 
up with, say, half of it). The point of these various scenarios is that, although there may 
be all sorts of reasons why a fair division of cake is not possible, the fact that such a 
division is not possible does not impugn the ideal of fair division itself; a fair division 
does not cease to be a fair division just because it is not all-thing-considered possible or 
desirable or reasonable to (attempt to) realise it. 
The concept of ‘basic distributive fairness’ is analogous to the notion of a fair 
division of cake. Since what I am particularly interested in is the precise role that basic 
distributive fairness plays in a typical ‘mixed’ (i.e. part-consequentialist, part-
deontological) version of the coercion view, I shall now explain how a proponent of 
this view might go about incorporating the concept. The theorist’s first job is to assign 
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some content to the ideal of basic distributive fairness. It might be argued, for instance, 
that basic distributive fairness is achieved when deeply significant and universally valued 
goods (and ‘bads’) are distributed according to some version of the principle of desert, 
or some version of the principle of equality, or some version of the principle of need, 
etc..152 Once the ideal of basic distributive fairness has some determinate content, a 
value can then be assigned to realising (or getting closer to realising) the ideal. Then, in 
order to work out what justice requires or permits (i.e. the content of the principles of 
justified coercion), the proponent of the mixed coercion view has two tasks (or only 
one task if he favours either a pure-consequentialist or pure-deontological version of 
the coercion view). 
First, assuming a consequentialist perspective, he must weigh the value of 
realising (or getting closer to realising) the ideal of basic distributive fairness against the 
cost of such an attempt in terms of the other valuable consequences that might 
otherwise have been realised. If it turns out that any attempt to realise the ideal will 
result in huge losses to aggregate well-being or massive political instability or some 
other highly undesirable consequence, then it may well be that the principles of justified 
coercion that result from this decision will ultimately reflect very little concern for basic 
distributive fairness. 
The second task that the proponent of the coercion view must carry out, this 
time assuming a deontological perspective, is to take the principles of justified coercion 
worked out in the previous consequentialist stage and determine whether or not, and if 
so how, acting according to these principles will entail interfering people in a way that 
fails to treat them with the necessary respect. If the original consequence-sensitive 
principles do not entail disrespectful interference, then there is no problem. If they do 
entail disrespectful interference, however, then side-constraints must be put in place 
which limit the exercise of coercion in ways necessary to ensure that such exercise is 
consistent with respecting people’s distinctive moral status (regardless of the 
consequences). 
                                                
152 For further discussion of the idea that the principle of desert and the principle of need might form 
the content of ‘ideal justice’, see, Miller, Social Justice, pp.24-31. 
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Ultimately, after following this procedure, what the theorist ends up with is a 
principle or set of principles of justified coercion which supposedly reflects a 
satisfactory degree of sensitivity to considerations of fairness. The procedure itself 
represents a fairly common method for incorporating considerations of fairness into 
the coercion view. Common though it may be, however, I believe it should be rejected 
as an approach to working out the content of a conception of justice because it clearly 
violates the fairness constraint (which, to recall, says that a fully just distribution must 
always be a fair distribution). In order to see more clearly how the Basic Distributive 
Fairness Approach violates the fairness constraint, consider the following example. 
Imagine for the sake of argument that a proponent of the coercion view agrees 
that under conditions of basic distributive fairness each person in our society would get 
the same standard of education. Imagine further that, as a matter fact, some people in 
our society get a much better education than others even though those who are 
advantaged by this inequality have done nothing to deserve it. Imagine further that the 
proponent of the coercion view also thinks that for some reason we are not justified in 
forcing the better-off members of the society in question to do the necessary jobs or 
hand over to the state the necessary resources in order to remedy this unfairness by 
providing every child with an equally good education. Finally, imagine that, were the 
better-off members of the society to voluntarily do the necessary jobs or hand over the 
necessary resources to provide every child with an equally good education, this goal 
would in fact be achievable. Now, let’s say that the better-off members of the society do 
voluntarily decide to hand over the necessary resources, thereby eradicating the 
unfairness in educational opportunity that our interlocutor himself identified at the 
start. The question we need to ask is: Has the voluntary eradication of this unfairness 
resulted in an increase in justice? The proponent of the coercion view, who has so far 
agreed with the way the example has been set up, is committed to answering ‘no’ to this 
question. According to his interpretation of justice, the justness of a distribution is only 
affected when (a) people act or don’t act in ways in which they could justifiably be 
coerced to act or not act, or (b) people are coerced to act in ways in which they could 
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not justifiably be coerced to act. In our example people have chosen to distribute 
resources in a way in which they could not have been justifiably forced to distribute 
them. And while such voluntary action can affect the fairness of a distribution, it 
cannot, on the coercion view, affect its justness. 
Strictly speaking, of course, there is nothing incoherent about this view of 
justice. There is no proof available which says that a situation in which people choose 
to eradicate unfair educational opportunities is more just than one in which they don’t. 
But I would argue that anyone who denies this – anyone who denies the truth of the 
fairness constraint – is using the concept of justice in a linguistically counter-intuitive 
way. If we agree that the distribution of educational opportunities is in one sense 
genuinely unfair, then what we agree on is that there is a sense in which some people 
have not got what they should have. Moreover, the thing that some-people-should-
have-got-but-have-not-got is not something trivial like a slice of cake equal in size to 
that given to others at a party or a fair coin toss to decide who serves first in a game of 
tennis – these are plausibly described as cases of unfairness but not injustice. Instead, 
what we are talking about is the unfair distribution of a good that surely has what I 
described in the previous chapter as deep and perhaps fundamental importance for 
people’s lives. My claim is that when people who are in a position to remedy such 
unfairness freely choose to do so, there is a consequent gain in justice, even if we would 
not have been justified in coercing them to do so. 
The failure of this attempt to explain the link between fairness and justice from 
within the coercion view, and thus abide by the fairness constraint, might tempt us to 
abandon the coercion view altogether. Before endorsing this conclusion however, we 
must consider a second attempt to explain the link between fairness and justice from 
within the coercion view. 
 
The Constructivist Fairness Approach 
Proponents of the Constructivist Fairness Approach are aware of the close 
conceptual link between justice and fairness, and of the intuitive pull of the fairness 
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constraint itself. In order to respond to this intuitive pull, however, proponents of this 
version of the coercion view no longer allocate a role to the concept of fairness as a 
substantive input to the decision-making process during which different values are 
weighed against each other and the principles of justified coercion are subsequently 
formulated. Instead, fairness on this second approach plays a procedural role as a 
regulative ideal governing the initial choice situation during which the principles of 
justified coercion are selected. It is the use of this special device of an initial choice 
situation which allegedly allows this second version of the coercion view to abide by the 
fairness constraint. In order to fully understand this approach it is vital to see that the 
new, procedural role assigned to fairness only makes sense when it is combined with a 
distinctive method of deducing the principles of justice themselves. 
The method in question is known as ‘constructivism’. A constructivist 
conception of justice is defined by Brian Barry as a hypothetical instance of pure 
procedural justice which is constructed (i.e. set up and worked through) by a theorist. A 
constructivist conception of justice is thus defined by two characteristics: first, it is an 
example of pure procedural justice; second, the procedure in question is hypothetical. 
To elaborate these two conditions I quote Barry at length:  
I should like to define a constructivist conception of justice in the following way. 
First…I want to keep the link with the notion of pure procedural justice by stipulating 
that there must be a theory to the effect that what comes out of a certain kind of 
situation is to count as just. “What comes out” might be a principle, a rule, or a 
particular outcome. Justice can be predicated of any of these, and the point is that we 
can derive its justice from its having emerged from the situation. A “situation” is 
specified by a description of the actors in it (including their knowledge and objectives) 
and the norms governing their pursuit of their objectives: what moves are to be 
legitimate. And the “emergence” is to be a particular kind of emergence, namely, the 
result of actors in the situation pursuing their given objectives within the given 
constraints….The second requirement is that the constructing is to be done by a 
theorist and not by the people in the situation themselves. Suppose, in other words, 
that in some instance a situation of the kind described actually exists and the people in 
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it actually produce a result – a principle, rule, or outcome, as the case may be. Then 
pure procedural justice is satisfied but there is no construction.153 
Notice that it is not part of the definition of constructivism that the ‘situation’ 
in which the principles of justice are chosen is characterised by fairness. As Barry 
himself emphasises, ‘we should certainly not insist that the situation within which 
agreement defines the content of justice must itself pass some ethical test. Hobbes, to 
give the obvious example, would have denied vehemently that the justice of keeping 
covenants reflected any fairness in the situation giving rise to the agreement’.154 This 
means that while the principles of justified coercion that ‘emerge from the situation’ set 
up by the theorist will always, if respected by the people to whom they apply, produce a 
distribution that is just, according to those principles, there is no guarantee that this 
distribution will also be fair, according to anyone’s (even the theorist who set up the 
construction)’s principles. This in turn means that some constructivist theories of justice 
will inevitably fall foul of the fairness constraint (i.e. the claim that a fully just 
distribution must also be a fair one). 
Of course, the fact that some constructivist conceptions of the coercion view of 
justice inevitably violate the fairness constraint does not mean they all do. And in fact 
the hypothetical choice situation can be constructed so as to satisfy some criterion of 
fairness. Indeed, this is precisely the reason why the constructivist conception of the 
coercion view is thought to be able to satisfy the fairness constraint.155 So, let us say that 
our coercion view theorist constructs the hypothetical choice situation so that it does 
satisfy some criterion of fairness. In this case, the principles of justified coercion that 
are chosen by the parties in the hypothetical choice situation are not only supposedly 
guaranteed to define justice, they will also supposedly guarantee that whatever state of 
affairs results from following them will be fair. If this is correct, then the fairness 
constraint is satisfied. 
                                                
153 Barry, Theories of Justice, p.266. 
154 Barry, Theories of Justice, p.268. 
155 It is also, of course, the reason why Rawls called his theory ‘Justice as Fairness’. See, Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, p.11. 
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But is the fairness constraint satisfied in the right way? The way I originally 
formulated it, the fairness constraint merely stated that a distribution is not fully just 
unless it also fair. But now there are two different notions of fairness floating around: 
first, the substantive notion of basic distributive fairness that played a role in the first 
coercion view; second, the procedural notion of constructivist fairness that played a 
role in the second coercion view. To which notion of fairness does the fairness 
constraint refer? To which notion of fairness should it refer? 
Let’s consider the Constructivist Approach in more detail. We know that when 
the principle-selectors are deciding how we can justifiably coerce each other, they are 
doing so (we are now imagining) from a situation characterised by constructivist fairness. 
Now there are many different ways of achieving constructivist fairness – ranging from 
the Rawlsian method of restricting the information available to the principle-selectors 
to the Scanlonian method of imputing ‘reasonable’ motives to the principle-selectors – 
but these details need not concern us here.156 What we do need to be concerned with is 
the fact that, however the conditions of constructivist fairness are set up, the 
choices/decisions that the principle-selectors ultimately make are only likely to be 
acceptable to the theorist who is carrying out the construction if they are sensitive to 
certain considerations such as, for example, certain important individual freedoms (e.g. 
freedom of occupation). This is not a necessary truth about constructivism of course; 
there is no sense in which freedom of occupation and other important freedoms must 
be respected by any principles arrived at through the constructivist method. But as a 
contingent matter it is highly unlikely that any liberal theorist will be happy with the 
results of a construction that leave no room for important freedoms such as freedom of 
occupation. So, assuming that these important freedoms will be taken into account by 
the principle-selectors, it seems likely that the principles that are ultimately selected will 
leave open the possibility of people choosing to act in ways that result in a distribution 
                                                
156 The classic statement of the ‘Rawlsian’ method is of course Rawls’s own in A Theory of Justice. 
The best application of the ‘Scanlonian’ method to theories of justice is presented in, B. Barry, 
Justice as Impartiality, (Oxford: OUP, 1995). Scanlon himself applies his own method to a domain of 
morality that includes justice but is wider than it (though not as wide as the whole of morality). 
Scanlon refers to this as the domain of ‘what we owe to each other’. See, T. Scanlon, What We Owe 
To Each Other, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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that is not entirely fair according to the second type of fairness, namely, the ideal of 
basic distributive fairness. 
Now of course, from the point of view of the constructivist theorist, the fact 
that the distribution that results from the implementation of his recommended 
principles is not fair in the ‘basic distributive fairness’ sense is neither here nor there. 
For the constructivist, the whole point is that fairness has already been adequately taken 
care of at the stage of designing the initial choice situation. As we saw, this is why the 
constructivist feels justified in saying that the distribution that arises from the 
implementation of the principles that are chosen in this situation satisfy the fairness 
constraint. But the fact that the constructivist theorist denies that the criticism from 
basic distributive fairness has any force from within the terms of his theory does not 
show that the criticism itself is not valid.157 
The question for the constructivist theorist is whether it is reasonable to assume 
in advance that the distribution that can be produced through the exercise of justifiable 
coercion will always be equivalent to the fairest distribution that can be produced 
through a combination of coerced and non-coerced action. Put another way, is it 
reasonable to assume that the reasons which prohibit the exercise of coercion in certain 
instances will never conflict with the reasons in favour of creating a more fair 
distribution? If the answers to both of these questions are ‘no’, as I believe they are, 
                                                
157 My argument in this section owes a great deal to Cohen’s (by now) well-known argument against 
constructivism. I have set the argument up in my own terms, however, to avoid a major weakness in 
Cohen’s own discussion. Consider the following extended quote from Cohen: ‘…constructivism’s 
misidentification of principles of justice with optimal principles of regulation is dictated by the 
question that it puts to its privileged selectors of principles. They are not asked to say what justice is: 
it is we who ask that question, and the constructivist doctrine is that the answer to our question is the 
answer to the different question that is put to constructivism’s specially designed selectors, which is, 
what are the optimal rules of social regulation? My generative criticism of constructivism is that the 
answer to that question need not, and could not, be the same as the answer to the question: what is 
justice?’ Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.275. What Cohen argues here has clear affinities 
with what I argue in this section (I ignore for now the slight difference in extension between Cohen’s 
‘rules of regulation’ and my ‘principles of justified coercion’). The problem with Cohen’s ‘generative 
criticism’ is that it assumes the correctness of the view of justice which he (Cohen) already favours. 
This is bound to be unconvincing to the constructivist theorist, for the latter can simply reply that he 
denies Cohen’s view of justice. Cohen is right that the answer given by the principle-selectors to the 
question asked by the constructivist will not tell us what basic distributive fairness is. But it is a 
further, distinct step to claim that basic distributive fairness is a necessary (and for Cohen, sufficient) 
condition of a just distribution. By explaining what is involved in making this further step, and 
adducing some considerations in its favour, I have tried to provide some further support for Cohen’s 
argument against constructivism (though, as we shall see, I do not fully endorse Cohen’s conclusion).  
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then there arises the possibility of a gap opening up between the distribution that the 
constructivist theorist will describe as perfectly fair (because produced consistently with 
the principles of justified coercion chosen under conditions of constructivist fairness) 
and the distribution that displays the quality of basic distributive fairness (because 
produced not only consistently with the principles of justified coercion but also 
through the non-coerced choices of individuals concerned to ensure that people get a 
genuinely fair share of goods). 
I believe that the notion of fairness that we should take the fairness constraint 
to refer to is the substantive ideal of basic distributive fairness. I therefore believe that 
the constructivist theorist’s claim: that the fairness constraint is satisfied by the 
distribution that results from the successful implementation of principles of justified 
coercion chosen under conditions of constructivist fairness, is (likely to be) false. Recall 
the example introduced earlier in which, even though the well-off members of a society 
have it within their power to equalise the currently unequal distribution of educational 
opportunities, the state would not be justified in coercing them to do so. The terms of 
the constructivist theorist’s view mean that he is not able to recognise either the initial 
unfairness in this situation or the subsequent gain in fairness that accompanies the 
voluntary acts of the well-off to equalise the distribution. In this sense, at least, the 
Constructivist version of the coercion view is even less plausible than the Basic 
Distributive Fairness version of the coercion view. Faced with this example I think 
what we want is a theory of justice that enables us to do three things: (1) endorse the 
limits on justified coercion which entail that the well-off cannot be forced to equalise 
opportunities, but nevertheless (2) deny that the unequal distribution as it originally 
stands is fully just, and (3) celebrate the voluntary actions of the well-off which move us 
in the direction of a more equal distribution as bringing about a gain in justice. The 
problem with either version of the coercion view is that it doesn’t allow us to do (2) or 
(3), and this suggests we need to look elsewhere for an alternative.
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IV. The ideal-o f - fa irness  v i ew 
In this section and the next I consider whether we might find such an 
alternative in what I call the ‘ideal-of-fairness view’ of justice. According to the fairness 
view, justice simply is basic distributive fairness. As we have already seen, basic 
distributive fairness describes the state of affairs that would obtain if there were no 
moral, prudential, or practical constraints on what we could do to make the world 
conform to what an impartial observer would describe as the perfectly fair distribution 
(I explain what I mean by a ‘moral, prudential, or practical constraint’ below). We have 
also seen that there are many different conceptions of what the ideal of basic 
distributive fairness might look like. The point to bear in mind is that, whatever the 
precise content of the ideal, unless people actually have what the ideal of basic 
distributive fairness says they should have, then there is something unjust about the 
state of affairs in question. Indeed, the further away the actual distribution is from the 
distribution specified by a particular conception of basic distributive fairness, the less 
just the actual distribution is, according to that conception. 
Perhaps the best know proponent of the fairness view of justice is G.A.Cohen, 
who sums up his particular conception of that view like so: 
…my own animating conviction in political philosophy with respect to justice is a 
conviction about distributive justice in particular. It is that an unequal distribution 
whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of 
(some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust, and that 
nothing can remove that particular injustice.158 
                                                
158 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.7. Further support for my interpretation of Cohen as a 
proponent of the fairness view is provided by Andrew Williams: ‘Many of us have convictions about 
how to rank different distributions of benefits and burdens between individuals abstracting from any 
practical limitations whatsoever, including the extent to which those distributions fall within any 
agent’s control. We might, for example, endorse a telic egalitarian distributive principle that implies a 
world in which some are sighted and some blind is less than fully just even if such inequality was 
undetectable and unavoidable. It is conceivable that it is this type of distribution-sensitive axiological 
principle that Cohen has in mind when referring to first principles of justice’. Williams, 'Justice, 
Incentives and Constructivism', p.492. See also, Tomlin, ‘Internal Doubts about Cohen's Rescue of 
Justice', p.244. 
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Two key aspects of Cohen’s position indicate that it is indeed an example of the 
fairness view of justice. First, Cohen rejects the idea, central to the coercion view, that 
justice is a regulative ideal whose aim is to achieve a balance between different values. 
Instead, he embraces the idea that justice is simply one value among others to be taken 
into consideration when deliberating over how to act (or, more pertinently, over how 
we may justifiably exercise coercion over others). So although Cohen clearly believes it 
is highly desirable to achieve (what he thinks is) a just distribution (i.e. one in which any 
relevant inequality can be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert of the affected 
agents), he also thinks that caring only about achieving this kind of just distribution, no 
matter what the cost in terms of other values, would be ‘crazy, a piece of [justice-
]fetishism’.159 One can only make sense of this charge of ‘justice-fetishism’ if one 
interprets justice according to the fairness view. If justice is only one value among 
others which we could conceivably promote or respect then clearly it would be 
fetishistic to promote or respect it single-mindedly, but if justice is the result of an all 
things considered judgement relating to the balance of reasons in favour of coercion 
then acting according to this judgement is clearly not fetishistic, merely sensible. 
The second aspect of Cohen’s position which indicates that it is an example of 
the fairness view of justice is the fact that the content of his view – what we may 
loosely describe as the ‘principle’ he endorses – applies in the first place to distributions 
rather than actions. Note that this does not mean that Cohen is claiming that we are 
able to simply read off from any particular distribution whether it is just or unjust 
without knowing anything about how that distribution came about. On the contrary, 
Cohen is explicit that the way in which inequalities are generated is what determines 
whether those inequalities are just or unjust. The point, therefore, is not that theorists 
who favour the fairness view of justice are uninterested in actions. Rather, it is that they 
are uninterested, except indirectly or ‘derivatively’, in the justice of actions. Theorists 
who favour the fairness view thus take distributions to be the primary subject of justice. 
In terms of the distinction I made in the previous chapter, this means that whereas the 
                                                
159 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.307. 
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coercion view is an example of an interactional approach to justice, the fairness view is 
an example of a ‘distributive’ approach to justice because it takes distributions and not 
actions (or institutions) to be the primary subject of justice. Because the content of the 
fairness view applies in the first place to distributions, it becomes a separate question 
what we may permissibly do in order to realise whatever is defined as the ideally fair 
distribution. And while, as we have seen, it may be desirable – perhaps very desirable – 
to achieve the ideally fair distribution, there may be all sorts of moral and/or prudential 
and/or practical reasons why this is not possible. In this case, we must admit that 
achieving a just distribution requires actions that are impermissible, or irrational, or 
simply impossible. 
What does it mean to say that there are moral, prudential, or practical 
constraints on what may be done in pursuit of basic distributive fairness? Well, to say 
that there are moral constraints on what may be done in the pursuit of basic distributive 
fairness is to say that there are certain things we cannot justifiably do to others in order 
to bring about a perfectly just distribution. Imagine, for example, that advances in 
technology now mean that if the most talented people worked at certain key jobs at a 
certain level of intensity for a certain amount of time, productivity would increase to 
such a level that, if the material gains from this extra production were distributed in a 
certain way, everyone’s basic needs would be easily satisfied. If we think that basic 
distributive fairness will only be achieved when everyone’s basic needs are satisfied, 
then the goal of achieving basic distributive fairness would seem to require the most 
talented people to work at the necessary jobs at the necessary level of intensity for the 
necessary length of time. And if the talented people in question choose to meet this 
requirement by taking the necessary jobs, etc., then everyone’s basic needs will be 
satisfied and there will be an increase in basic distributive fairness. If they choose not to 
meet this requirement, however, the question is raised whether we may justifiably 
coerce them into doing so. Those who think that coercion in this instance is unjustified 
must believe that the value of, say, freedom of occupation, generates a moral constraint 
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on what we may do to people in order to realise basic distributive fairness. They must 
think it would be wrong to forcibly bring about an increase in justice. 
Although there might seem to be something rather paradoxical about this idea 
that it might be wrong to bring about an increase in justice, it is in fact a fairly common 
idea in the literature. This quote from Hayek illustrates the point nicely: 
If one objects to the use of coercion in order to bring about a more even or a more just 
distribution, this does not mean that one does not regard these as desirable. But if we 
wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognise that the desirability of a 
particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion.160 
We do not need to know what conception of an ideally fair distribution Hayek has 
in mind here – or indeed whether he actually endorses such a view – to know that the 
concept of justice he is employing is the fairness view rather than the coercion view of 
justice. According to the fairness view, and unlike the coercion view, it makes perfect 
sense to talk about the justice or injustice of a distribution independently of the 
question whether we are justified in coercing people into bringing that distribution 
about. Determining when coercion is justified does not, therefore, tell us anything 
about justice. Instead, determining when coercion is justified requires us to balance 
what we already know to be justice against other values that might be promoted or 
affected by such coercion. 
The constraints of morality are not the only reason why we might not be able to 
bring about basic distributive fairness; there are also prudential and practical constraints 
to consider. To say that there are prudential constraints on what we may do in pursuit 
of basic distributive fairness is to say that although it would not be morally wrong to 
attempt to force people to do what is necessary to produce basic distributive fairness, it 
would nevertheless be counterproductive in terms of achieving our all-things-
considered aims. Referring back to our example, we can plausibly imagine that the gain 
in productivity that we hope will result from the talented taking on certain jobs will 
                                                
160 Hayek, F., ‘The Constitution of Liberty’ (extract), in M. Sandel (ed.), Justice: A Reader, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p.75, (emphasis added). 
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only actually come to pass if the talented chose to take on those jobs willingly. Indeed, 
we can imagine that by forcing them to do these jobs we actually bring about a loss of 
productivity compared to the level it was at before we intervened. Under these 
circumstances, even if we decided that there was nothing morally wrong with forcing 
the talented to take on the necessary jobs, we might well decide not to intervene, since 
doing so would actually take the distribution further away from the ideal of fairness 
according to which everyone’s basic needs are satisfied. 
Finally, to say that there are practical constraints on what may be done in 
pursuit of basic distributive fairness is to say that even if there are no moral or 
prudential constraints on our pursuit of the ideal, it may simply be impossible to realise 
the ideal. To once again illustrate this in terms of our example, we can now imagine that 
even if forcing the talented to work at certain jobs was not morally unacceptable, and 
even if this would as a matter of fact be the most productive course of action, it may 
still turn out that the resulting productivity gains are not in fact sufficient to produce 
the goods required to satisfy everyone’s basic needs. Under these circumstances forcing 
the talented to work at certain jobs might be the best way to minimise the injustice 
resulting from the absence of basic distributive fairness, but it would, ex hypothesi, be 
insufficient to achieve full justice in the form of perfect distributive fairness. 
V. The problem with the ‘pure ’  fa irness  v i ew 
Having outlined the fairness view in a bit more detail, I now want to apply it to 
the example I set out earlier when discussing the coercion view. The example asked us 
to imagine a situation in which the fact that an unequal distribution of educational 
opportunities represented a violation of the ideal of basic distributive fairness was not 
enough, in and of itself, to justify coercing people into doing what was necessary to 
remove the inequality. It was implicit in the example (and I now want to make this 
explicit) that the reason why coercion is unjustified in this case is because such coercion 
would be inconsistent with treating people in a way that respects their distinctive moral 
status. Faced with this example, what Cohen and other proponents of the fairness view 
would presumably say (assuming they accepted the way I have set it up), is that it would 
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be a piece of justice-fetishism to insist that we nevertheless go ahead with coercing 
people into removing the injustice and restoring basic distributive fairness. But what 
really interests me is what Cohen would say if, notwithstanding his accusations of 
justice-fetishism, we161 nevertheless went ahead and coerced people into doing what 
was necessary to remove the injustice (perhaps initially by redistributing resources and 
then, if more drastic measures were needed, by prohibiting people from taking up 
certain jobs and forcing them to teach in deprived areas). What would Cohen (and 
other proponents of the fairness view) say about the resulting distribution? 
At least on the evidence presented here, it seems that what Cohen would say is 
that the distribution that results from such an exercise of unjustified coercion is 
perfectly distributively just. Indeed this must be the verdict of anyone who thinks that 
an ideal of fairness is all there is to distributive justice. And I believe it is precisely this 
verdict that exposes the central flaw in the fairness view of justice itself. The problem is 
that it seems obviously incorrect to describe the distribution which has been produced 
through the unjustified (because respect-violating) use of coercion as perfectly just. We 
know from the basic definition of distributive justice given in chapter 4 that it is a value 
or an ideal concerned with what people are due. It is explicit in the example under 
discussion that what people are due is respect for their distinctive moral status (which 
in this case implies the right to hold on to their resources and/or choose what 
occupations to pursue). Granted, it is also explicit in the example that people are due 
equal educational opportunities. But these two conditions are not strictly speaking 
incompatible, for, as we saw earlier, it is open to the relevant parties (before any 
coercive intervention) to voluntarily act so as to equalise educational opportunities. As 
soon as we intervene, however, and coerce these people into equalising educational 
opportunities, we guarantee that we are not going to achieve a result in which everyone 
gets what they are due. 
The fairness view offers an incomplete answer to the problem of defining 
justice because it only attends to one aspect of what people are due and ignores the 
                                                
161 By ‘we’ I mean you and I and other members of society forcing our fellow citizens to act in 
certain ways through the coercive apparatus of the state. 
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other. Particular conceptions of the fairness view will always highlight the aspect of 
what people are due that refers to what they would get under a distribution of basic 
distributive fairness. As I argued in section III, this is a very important aspect, indeed a 
necessary aspect, of justice. But there will also always be an aspect of what people are 
due which is not captured by a conception of the fairness view, namely, that which 
refers to the respectful treatment they are due from others when those others are 
contemplating the exercise of coercion. 
How might proponents of the ‘pure’ fairness view respond to the objection that 
their view necessarily fails to attend to this second important aspect of justice? Well, 
one way in which I think we can safely say they will not respond is by denying the 
importance of having limits on the exercise of coercion, even when this coercion is 
being exercised in the name of ‘justice’ (i.e. basic distributive fairness). As we saw 
above, even Cohen thinks that it would be a ‘crazy’ piece of justice-fetishism to think 
that the value of achieving an ideally fair distribution will always override the pursuit of 
other values. 
But if the need to have limits on the exercise of coercion is not in dispute, then 
it starts to look as though the problem may just be one of nomenclature. Proponents of 
the pure fairness view want to resist including the principles of justified coercion within 
the scope of application of the concept of distributive justice. But why? What grounds 
have we got for denying (why would we want to deny?) that the question concerning 
the permissibility of exercising coercion over people in order to achieve a distribution 
that mirrors the ideal of basic distributive fairness is itself a question of justice? Here I 
can only repeat what I said above about the fact that distributive justice is a concept 
concerned with what people are due. There is nothing in this basic idea – an idea which, as 
we have seen, underpins all the different interpretations of the concept of distributive 
justice – that rules out the possibility that ‘what people are due’ is certain kinds of 
treatment by others. Indeed there are many theorists who think this is all justice is 
concerned about. 
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I suspect that the vigour of Cohen’s attempts to retain the concept of 
‘distributive justice’ for use in referring to the ideal of basic distributive fairness is 
ultimately motivated by his desire to highlight its importance, to keep people focused 
on analysing and refining our understanding of it, and to ‘rescue’ it from being lost 
among all the other distinct values that typically, and necessarily, get thrown into the 
constructivist machine. If so, then I share his desire, but I reject his solution. Justice is 
more than simply basic distributive fairness, and it is a mistake to try to deny this.162 But 
to say that justice is more than simply basic distributive fairness is not to say that the 
concept of basic distributive fairness need no longer be allocated a distinct role within a 
theory of justice. Cohen’s concern that the distinct concept of basic distributive fairness 
will be lost if we try and adopt a broader concept of justice that is sensitive to all sorts 
of different considerations can, I think, be assuaged if, instead of thinking of justice as a 
single, unified concept, we think about it in terms of a conceptual framework within which 
two distinct components interact with one another. The task of the next chapter is to 
set out this conceptual framework in more detail. 
VI. Conclus ion 
The difference between the ‘pure’ fairness view and the ‘pure’ coercion view 
can be put like this. On the fairness view, justice is an ideal that has to be weighed 
against or – if this sounds too purely consequentialist – considered in the light of, other 
ideals (such as freedom, efficiency, and respect for persons) in order for us to work out 
whether and how we are justified in coercing people. The principles of justified 
                                                
162 Evidence from a recent article suggests that Cohen no longer straightforwardly denies that 
distributive justice is more than basic distributive fairness. His more recent view is that there are 
‘different kinds of justice’, (see, Cohen, 'Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does Option Luck 
Ever Preserve Justice?', p.6). The two different kinds of justice he mentions are ‘fairness justice’ and 
‘legitimacy justice’ (p.17). By ‘fairness justice’ Cohen appears to be more or less the same thing I 
mean by ‘basic distributive fairness’. What Cohen takes ‘legitimacy justice’ to refer to is harder to 
pin down. It seems that, for Cohen, a distribution is correctly said to be characterised by ‘legitimacy 
justice’ when ‘no one has the right to complain about it’ and ‘no one has a just grievance against it’ 
(p.7). This is obviously a slightly different idea to my identification of the second aspect of justice 
with the principles of justified coercion. But whatever the details of Cohen’s view, what is 
noteworthy is his realisation that distributive justice could not be adequately theorised only in terms 
of basic distributive fairness (or ‘fairness justice’). I hope he would agree that the ‘dual-component 
model of justice’ that I set out in the next chapter is a useful way of incorporating this insight into our 
understanding of justice. 
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coercion that result from this process are not principles of justice, since they do not tell 
us what justice is but, rather, how best to balance justice against other values. On the 
coercion view, in contrast, justice is the result of this process of balancing different 
values and ideals (such as fairness, freedom, efficiency) against one another. The 
principles which result from this balancing process tell us whether and how we are 
justified in coercing people, and these principles are principles of justice. 
We have seen that, taken individually, both the coercion view and the fairness 
view provide accounts of justice that are incomplete in important respects. The 
problem with the ‘pure’ coercion is that even if the rules stipulating when coercion is 
justified are followed to the letter, there is no guarantee that the distribution that results 
will be fair. And since a just distribution must also be a fair distribution (the fairness 
constraint) this is deeply problematic for the coercion view. The problem with the 
‘pure’ fairness view is that there are a number of ways to bring about a fair distribution, 
and not all of them treat people justly. Since a distribution that arises as a consequence 
of people being treated unjustly is not a fully just distribution, this is deeply problematic 
for the pure fairness view. What I have argued, in other words, is that each of these two 
approaches to justice is lacking what the other approach provides. The obvious 
response to the individual failure of both approaches is to combine them in a single 
view. It is to this task that I now turn. 
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(6) The Dual-Component Model of Distributive Justice 
I .  Introduct ion 
I have argued that the coercion view and the fairness view both capture 
important aspects of the concept of distributive justice. I have also argued that neither 
view, taken on its own, offers a complete account of the concept of distributive justice. 
In this chapter I explain how the coercion view and the fairness view can be combined 
within a single conceptual framework in order to provide a genuinely complete account 
of distributive justice. I call this conceptual framework the ‘dual-component model of 
distributive justice’. In section II I explain in more detail how the dual-component 
model works. In section III I briefly set out in more formal terms the implications of 
the dual-component model for our judgements of the justice of actions and 
distributions (states of affairs). In section IV I explain how a rationale for the dual-
component model can be found in Nagel’s distinction between the personal and 
impersonal moral standpoints. And in section V I consider and, ultimately, reject an 
objection to the dual-component model based on the claim that it is unnecessarily 
complex, and that a simpler approach would be to maintain a single-component 
approach to justice while incorporating some kind of personal prerogative into that 
approach. 
II .  Outl ine o f  the dual- component model  
The central claim of the dual-component model of justice can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
The dual-component claim: There are two necessary163 conditions of a fully 
just distribution. First, it must mirror the ideal of basic distributive fairness. 
                                                
163 But not, strictly speaking, sufficient, since we might still be doubtful about the justice of a 
distribution even if it satisfies both necessary conditions. Call a distribution that satisfies both 
conditions a ‘prima facie just distribution’. It is possible that a prima facie just distribution might 
have been brought about through some form of manipulation, rather than coercion. Since such 
manipulation, by definition, does not violate the principles of justified coercion, are we thereby 
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Second, it must have been brought about without any violation of the principles 
of justified coercion. 
 
The dual-component claim implies the further claim that any sound (i.e. 
plausible, coherent and complete) conception of justice will necessarily contain two 
components. First, it must contain a distributive component the role of which is to 
specify what the ideal of basic distributive fairness looks like. Second, it must contain 
an interactional component, the role of which is to specify the content of the principles 
of justified coercion. In order to work out the content of the distributive component of 
justice one must adopt a fairness view of justice. In order to work out the content of 
the interactional component of justice one switches to adopting a coercion view of 
justice. By combining the fairness view and the coercion view of justice within the same 
conceptual framework the dual-component model avoids the problems that, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, beset both views when interpreted in their ‘pure’ form. Of 
course, claiming that the dual-component model manages to successfully combine the 
fairness and coercion views of justice within a single framework is one thing. Justifying 
that claim is another. How, then, does the dual-component model of justice work?  
The first step is to formulate the content of the ideal of basic distributive 
fairness. Since the ideal of basic distributive fairness invokes a standard that applies in 
the first instance to states of affairs, rather than directly to actions, there is no need at 
this stage to worry about whether the actions (both coercive and non-coercive) 
necessary to realise and maintain the ideal would be permissible, desirable, or indeed 
even possible if they were attempted in the real world. Issues concerning the 
                                                                                                                                    
committed to thinking that it does not taint the resulting distribution with injustice? Or consider a 
bizarre situation in which a prima facie just distribution has been brought about by some random 
natural process that would have violated the principles of justified coercion if it had been controlled 
and implemented by people. Is such a distribution perfectly just? Do the people who have been 
‘treated’ by the natural process in a way that would have been unjustified if it had been controlled by 
people have a just complaint with regards to their resulting situation? Does it make a difference if the 
people who ended up benefitting from the effects of the natural process could have prevented it from 
occurring? These are difficult questions that I do not yet know how to answer. The way to go, I think, 
is to expand the scope of the interactional component so that it sets limits not only on justified 
coercion, but also on manipulation, and on various other objectionable ways in which distributions 
that mirror the ideal of basic distributive fairness might come about. To defend this view, however, 
would obviously require a lot more work, and I am content for now merely to defend the narrower 
version of the interactional component that is only concerned with the limits on justified coercion. 
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permissibility and the desirability of attempts to realise the ideal can be dealt with when 
the content of the interactional component is formulated. And if the ideal is impossible 
to realise then this does not impugn its status as an ideal, it merely means that a fully 
just distribution is, perhaps for the foreseeable future, unachievable. Bearing all this in 
mind, our aim is to work out what an impartially fair distribution looks like once we 
abstract away from any moral, prudential, or practical constraints that might apply to 
any proposed attempts to realise the ideal in practice. As I explained in the previous 
chapter there is likely to be deep disagreement over what, exactly, an impartially fair 
distribution looks like, though as I argue in the next chapter, the number of possible 
alternatives will be limited by the fact that the ideal is a distributive (rather than 
interactional or institutional) ideal. (This is because there are certain formal constraints 
that apply to the type of ‘principle’ that specifies the distributive ideal that do not apply 
to other kinds of principle). In any case, once we have the content of the ideal in hand 
we are then in a position to say in principle what each person would have under a 
perfectly just distribution. 
The next step involves switching the focus of the inquiry from the content of 
the distributive component of justice to the content of the interactional component of 
justice. Here we adopt the perspective on justice taken by the proponent of the 
coercion view in order to work out the content of the principles of justified coercion. 
One way of approaching this task is to imagine that we are now addressing the issues of 
the permissibility and desirability of possible attempts to realise the ideal that we put to 
one side when formulating the content of the distributive component. Initially we are 
to imagine various ways of pursuing the ideal of basic distributive fairness in practice. 
Our focus here should not be directly on what people should be obliged to do in order 
to realise and maintain the ideal – this would turn our inquiry into one about morality 
in general rather than the more specific inquiry into justice. Instead, our focus should 
be on what people could justifiably be coerced into doing by third parties. We then 
have two questions to address. First, assessing these alternatives from a consequentialist 
perspective, which alternatives achieve the most acceptable balance between the value 
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of realising the ideal of basic distributive fairness and the value of realising other 
important ideals (such as economic efficiency, political stability, collective self-
determination, individual privacy, etc.)? Second, assessing the alternatives from a 
deontological perspective, which of them require as part of their implementation an 
unacceptable violation of the respect that is due to persons in virtue of their distinctive 
moral status? Attempting to answer these questions will reveal to us (or will force us to 
construct) the set of fundamental principles which specify the limits of justified 
coercion. These principles form the content of the interactional component of justice. 
It is important to notice that while the principles of the interactional 
component ostensibly articulate the point at which a third party may justifiably exercise 
coercive interference over an individual or group in order to get them to act or not act 
in a particular way, what they effectively specify is the minimum that can be expected of 
a particular individual if he is to act within the bounds of justice. For instance, imagine 
it is decided (implausibly) that basic distributive fairness is achieved when the 
distribution of wealth is perfectly equal. Imagine also that in order to realise and 
maintain this ideal it is, for some strange reason, necessary for me not only to work as a 
doctor but also to work a twelve hour shift, every day, seven days a week. Now imagine 
it is decided that, although the twelve hour shift requirement is an unacceptable 
imposition on my personal freedom (or perhaps that it is inconsistent with the respect I 
am due in virtue of my moral status), it is nevertheless justifiable to force me to work as 
a doctor for a maximum of eight hours a day. In this case, the interactional component 
of justice stipulates that I act unjustly if I do not work as a doctor for a maximum of 
eight hours a day. That is, even if I am not coerced into working as a doctor for at least 
eight hours a day, I nevertheless fail to act even minimally justly if I do not voluntarily 
work as a doctor for at least eight hours a day. The interactional component’s focus on 
the limits of justified coercion is not meant to imply the implausible view that the 
interactional component of justice can only be satisfied if people act justly because they 
are coerced. It is possible for the interactional component of justice to be satisfied in a 
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world in which there is no coercion whatsoever, so long as everyone acts in ways in 
which they could justifiably be coerced to act.  
The doctoring example in the last paragraph also highlights another attractive 
feature of the dual-component model, the need for which I tried to emphasise in the 
previous chapter. Although I can avoid acting unjustly if I choose or am coerced to 
work as a doctor for the specified minimum eight hours per day, I could act more justly 
if I worked extra hours as a doctor (in the example it was stipulated that twelve hours 
would be enough to achieve perfect distributive justice but we would need to know 
how much others were doing before we could say that working this amount of hours is 
the most just I could possibly be – if others were slacking then I might need to 
voluntarily work more than twelve hours per day in order to be considered as just as 
possible). The example itself is obviously a rather unlikely one, but it amply 
demonstrates the unique way in which the dual-component model creates some 
conceptual space within which people are free to act in ways that may increase the 
amount of justice of the world. 
To explain this point further, note that the model is used to determine two 
‘levels of sacrifice’ that the well-off might make. The first level represents both the 
minimum level of sacrifice we can expect of people and the maximum level of sacrifice 
that we can force people to make. The second level represents the level of sacrifice that 
people would need to make in order to achieve full justice (or as much justice as it is 
physically possible for them to achieve). The difference between the first level and the 
second level represents the space within which people can exercise choice about how 
much they are willing to sacrifice in the name of justice. Unless we have this ‘remainder 
of injustice’ after everyone has been forced to do as much as they reasonably can, then 
we will find it difficult to describe why, when people act in a morally praiseworthy way 
against their own self-interest, such action can lead to a more just world.164 
                                                
164 Recall the example I raised in chapter 4 (while criticising Pogge’s institutionalist view) of the 
individuals who decide to break the law by freeing slaves in a slave-holding society. I discuss this 
point (though not this specific example) in greater detail in section V when I consider the possibility 
of incorporating a personal prerogative into a single-component model of justice. 
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The aim of outlining the dual-component model in this section was to explain 
not only how the two components of justice interact with one another but how we 
might go about determining their content. Many questions are left open of course, not 
least those that concern the precise content of the two components. In chapter 7 I 
hope to answer at least some of the questions concerning the content of the distributive 
component of justice. And although I shall not directly address questions concerning 
the content of the interactional component, I shall discuss two examples in chapter 8 
which further explain the motivation for separating the interactional component from 
the distributive component.  
III .  Formal impl i cat ions o f  the dual- component model  
According to the dual-component model, a conception of distributive justice is 
necessarily incomplete unless its fundamental principles refer both to the justice of states 
of affairs as such, and the justice of the actions that bring states of affairs about. The 
dual-component model thus includes a principle or set of principles which takes 
distributions to be the primary subject of justice and a principle or set of principles 
which takes actions to be the primary subject of justice. Of course, the fact that the 
principles of the distributive component and the interactional component apply to 
distinct primary subjects does not mean that they do not have derivative implications 
for other subjects of justice. Below I list all the implications, both primary and 
derivative, that the dual-component has for the justice of the three main subjects of 
justice that I have so far considered: distributions, actions and institutions. 
 
A distribution is fully just when: 
(a) it mirrors the ideal of basic distributive fairness 
and 
(b) it was realised without any violation of the principles of justified coercion. 
A distribution is unjust to the extent that: 
(c) it does not mirror the ideal of basic distributive fairness 
and/or 
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(d) it is the result of exercises of coercion that violate the principle(s) which 
specify the limits on justified coercion 
and/or 
(e) it is the result of the failure to perform/not perform actions whose 
performance/non-performance could have been justifiably coerced. 
 
An act is unjust to the extent that: 
(f) it violates the principles of justified coercion 
and/or 
(g) its performance/non-performance could have been justifiably coerced. 
An act which is not un just is more just or l e ss  just depending on: 
(h) whether its performance/non-performance moves us closer to or further 
away from the ideal of basic distributive fairness than the alternative actions 
available to the person in question. 
 
An institution is unjust to the extent that: 
(i) its existence plays a causal role in the violation of the principles of justified 
coercion. 
An institution which is not un just is more just or l e ss  just depending on: 
(j) the extent to which its existence engenders basic distributive fairness. 
 
IV. Nagel ’ s  two s tandpoints 
A natural response to the dual-component model, at least as I have outlined it 
so far, is to worry about its coherence. The dual-component model asks us, first, to 
work out what an intrinsically just state of affairs looks like and then, second, to work 
out what we can justly coerce people to do in order to achieve this. The worry is this: if 
the first claim about what an intrinsically just state of affairs looks like is correct, it is 
hard to see how it could possibly be unjust to coerce people to act in order to achieve it. 
Alternatively, if the second claim about what it is intrinsically just to coerce people to 
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do is correct, it is hard to see how the outcome of such coercion could coherently be 
criticised as unjust. 
I think the best response to the incoherence objection is not to deny it but to 
try to show how the purported incoherence of the dual-component model is simply a 
reflection of a well-known tension implicit in all moral theorising (of which the theory 
of justice is only a part). The tension in question is the one that exists between what 
have been referred to as the ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral standpoints: 
The hardest problems of political theory are conflicts within the individual, and no 
external solution will be adequate which does not deal with them at its source. The 
impersonal standpoint in each of us produces…a powerful demand for universal 
impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to individualistic 
motives and requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and realisation of 
such ideals.165 
I know of no systematic application of Nagel’s distinction between the personal 
and impersonal standpoints to the study of distributive justice and, unfortunately, 
Nagel’s own comments on the matter are little more than cursory. Discussing the 
current, severe level of global inequality, Nagel concludes that, when we combine the 
personal and impersonal standpoints we will find that: 
The degree of sacrifice by the rich that it would be reasonable for the poor countries to 
insist on in some hypothetical collective arrangement is one which it would not be 
unreasonable for the rich to refuse…Specifically, the poor may recognise that the rich 
are not unreasonable to resist more than a certain level of sacrifice, in light of their 
constellation of motives, while at the same time the poor may reasonably refuse to 
accept the resulting degree of benefit as sufficient, even in light of the recognition that 
the rich can reasonably refuse more.166  
What Nagel has identified here is very similar to the ‘justice gap’ which, as we 
saw in the introduction, Miller claims exists between the global rich and the global 
                                                
165 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.4. 
166 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.172. 
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poor. Whether or not Miller endorses the tension that Nagel claims to have identified 
between the personal and impersonal standpoints, both he and Nagel appear willing to 
accept that it is possible to define what a just distribution would look like without being 
committed to the conclusion that it is just to force people to do whatever it takes to 
achieve this distribution. In our world at least, Nagel and Miller seem to think that we 
cannot enforce justice for the poor without committing an injustice against the rich. 
Since this conclusion is precisely what the incoherence objection to the dual-
component model was criticising, we can at least say that the latter is in good company. 
I want to say more than this, however. First, the possibility that it might be 
impermissible to coerce the rich to give up everything that would be required in order 
to realise justice for the poor is not incoherent but, rather, tragic. Insofar as this is true, 
the problem is with the world, not the theory. If the impartial ideal represented by the 
distributive component of justice does not dovetail neatly with the restrictions that limit 
how we may (coercively) treat individuals in the name of that (or any other) ideal, then 
the correct response is to feel regret, not to look for some way to theorise it away. 
Having said that, however, it would be a mistake to think that once we have identified 
the tragedy of the justice-gap there is nothing that we can do, from a theoretical 
perspective, to suggest a way forward. Compare Nagel: 
If there is no solution that no one could reasonably reject, neither party to the conflict 
can be reproached for trying to impose a solution acceptable to him but unacceptable 
to his opponent. Both the status quo and a revolutionary alternative may meet this 
condition. The fact that the status quo is the status quo usually means that those whom 
it favours have the power to impose it; but if in such circumstances others acquire the 
power to overthrow it, they cannot be reproached for using it.167 
If I understand him correctly, what Nagel is suggesting here is that once a 
justice gap emerges there is no principled way of responding to it that will be acceptable 
to everyone, and so there is no way in principle of ruling out a power struggle between 
the well-off and the badly-off as each group tries to impose the alternative from the list 
                                                
167 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.173. 
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of equally unjust alternatives that suits it best. This is not a particularly optimistic vision, 
but it may well be an accurate description of the most likely scenario. Nevertheless, 
there is still reason to hope that a better solution can be found in theory. The dual-
component model represents my attempt to do this. 
One way of interpreting the dual-component model of justice is thus to see its 
two components as responding to the distinctive concerns that arise from the two 
moral standpoints. The distributive component, on the one hand, can be understood as 
a response to the claims of justice that arise from the impersonal moral standpoint. 
From this perspective, a perspective that we all share, each person’s life is of great 
importance, and no one’s life is more important than any other’s.168 In order, as it were, 
to ‘do justice’ to this fact, the aim of the distributive component is to work out what a 
fair distribution looks like judged purely from this perspective. The question Nagel 
suggests we ask when considering things from the impersonal standpoint is, ‘What can 
we all agree would be best, impersonally considered?’169 This is close to what we want, 
but Nagel’s question is too broadly ethical to adequately capture our more specific 
concern with justice. For the purposes of a theory of justice our question should instead 
be, ‘What can we all agree would be fairest, impersonally considered?’ The answer to this 
question is provided by a conception of the ideal of basic distributive fairness. Now of 
course, there are bound to be many rival conceptions of basic distributive fairness, and 
thus many rival conceptions of the content of the distributive component of justice. In 
the next chapter I shall argue for my preferred conception of the distributive 
component, which I believe consists of a single principle: the principle of equality of 
opportunity for well-being. But it is important to ensure that questions concerning the 
correct conception of the distributive component are separated from questions about 
the validity of the distributive component of justice itself. If the principle of equality of 
                                                
168 Compare Christiano, ‘The principle of equality stands out as a fundamental principle when we 
take the impersonal point of view toward persons. When we step back from our particular interests, 
roles, and special relationships and we take a perspective on persons and their lives generally, we see 
that it is important that their well-being is advanced and that that well-being be advanced in a way 
that accords with justice’, T. Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its 
Limits, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.30. 
169 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.15. 
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opportunity for well-being is an implausible or unviable candidate for the content of 
the distributive component then this should obviously not be taken to imply that the 
distinct role of the distributive component itself must be rejected. 
The other component of justice, the interactional component, can be 
understood as a response to the claims of justice that arise from the personal moral 
standpoint. From this perspective, a perspective that, again, we all share, but whose 
content is now unique to each person, the importance of our own life looms large, and 
the relative strength of the claims that others have is diminished. Although the view 
from the personal standpoint is different for each of us, the fact that there is such a 
standpoint, and the fact that it is of great importance to each person, is something that 
we can all recognise. And because the validity of the personal standpoint is something 
that we can all agree on, this standpoint also grounds principles of justice. Here, again, 
the question Nagel suggests we ask is almost the right one. According to Nagel, the 
question we should ask when considering things from the personal standpoint is, 
‘What, if anything, can we all agree that we should do, given that our motives are not 
merely impersonal?’170 But again, Nagel’s question is too broadly ethical to adequately 
capture our more specific concern with justice. For the purposes of a theory of justice 
our question should instead be, ‘What, if anything, can we all agree that we can coerce 
others to do, given that out motives are not merely impersonal?’ The answer to this 
question is given by the principles that set limits on how we may coercively interfere 
with others in the name of impersonal goals, including the goal of basic distributive 
fairness. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, determining the content of these principles is much 
more difficult than determining the content of the distributive component (though as 
we shall see in the next chapter, working out the content of the distributive component 
is no easy task either). Whereas the distributive component is concerned with 
articulating a single value: fairness (or, more accurately, basic distributive fairness), the 
interactional component must, due to its inherently practical (i.e. action-guiding) nature, 
                                                
170 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.15. 
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respond to a much wider range of relevant considerations. The fact that we each have 
our own lives to lead and our own projects to pursue is a fact that is relevant from both 
moral standpoints. But it is also a fact that looks very different when viewed from the 
different perspectives. When viewed from the impersonal standpoint the huge 
individual variety of people’s lives and the various projects they are engaged more or 
less disappears from view. Instead, what we see is a mass of claims, all hugely complex 
in their own right, but all ultimately equal in their prima facie validity and normative 
significance. From the personal standpoint the view is very different. From this 
perspective each person encounters their own ‘strong personal allegiance to particular 
communities of interest or conviction or emotional identification’.171 Some of these 
allegiances are consciously chosen, many of them are not, and both chosen and 
unchosen allegiances are of great importance to the individual whose allegiances they 
are. We love particular people, we identify with particular projects, we care about 
particular ends. The diversity of these relationships, projects, and ends means that 
constructing principles of justice that respect them – and, more to the point, the 
individuals whose relationships, projects, and ends they are – is a hugely complex task. 
In chapter 8 I shall therefore attempt to do no more than gesture at the way in which 
one might approach this task. Rather than try to work out the substantive content of 
any principles of justified coercion, I consider some detailed examples in order to 
further motivate the interactional component of justice and to indicate its usefulness in 
helping us solve the problem of global justice. 
V. The dual- component model  and the personal  prerogat ive 
The dual-component model, as outlined above, obviously lacks the virtue of 
theoretical simplicity. As a result of this it is vulnerable to the objection that the 
intuitions it attempts to respond to can be more efficiently, and perhaps more 
adequately, explained by some simpler conceptual model. In this section I consider a 
version of this objection which says that the dual-component model should be rejected 
                                                
171 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p.14. 
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in favour of incorporating an ‘agent-centred’ or ‘personal’ prerogative into a ‘single-
component’ model of justice. 
A claim I have made numerous times now is that, when it comes to distributive 
justice, we intuitively feel as though particular persons should not constantly be 
expected to sacrifice their freedom for the sake of achieving the impersonal ideal of 
basic distributive fairness. I have also claimed that we should nevertheless continue to 
characterise a fully just distribution as one that reflects basic distributive fairness, since 
if people choose to exercise their freedom in a way that helps realise this ideal then it is 
important for us to be able to recognise the resulting increase in justice. I argued that 
the way to respond to these two claims is to conceptualise justice as consisting of two 
distinct components, one specifying what a fair distribution looks like from an 
impersonal standpoint, the other specifying the limits on what people can be forced to 
do in order to realise this distribution (thereby indirectly limiting what it would be 
unjust for them to choose to do/not do of their own volition). What the proponent of 
the ‘personal prerogative objection’ claims is that the dual-component model represents 
an unnecessarily complex response to the original pair of claims. Instead, we should 
consider the possibility that a better response might be to start with a more 
straightforward single-component model of justice and simply incorporate the idea of a 
personal prerogative into it. 
Personal prerogatives have been defined as protected spheres of agent-relative 
freedom which make it ‘permissible, within limits, for an agent to pursue his own 
projects even when they would not produce the best overall outcome impersonally 
judged’.172 Personal prerogatives are thus clearly intended as a direct response to the 
intuition I referred to above, namely, that particular persons should not constantly be 
expected to sacrifice their freedom for the sake of achieving the impersonal ideal of 
basic distributive fairness.173 In order to test the claim put forward by the personal 
prerogative objection – i.e. that the dual-component model is unnecessarily complex 
                                                
172 S. Samuel, The Rejection of Consequentialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.22. 
173 They may also perform other roles which I shall not worry about here. See, D. Estlund, 'Debate: 
Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen's Critique of Rawls', Journal of Political Philosophy, 6 
(1) (1998), 99-112. 
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and that a simpler approach would be to incorporate a personal prerogative into a 
single-component model – I want to compare and contrast two such attempts to 
implement this allegedly simpler approach, one of which attempts to incorporate a 
personal prerogative into a pure coercion view of justice, the other of which attempts 
to incorporate a personal prerogative into a pure fairness view of justice. 
Let us begin, then, by positing a pure consequentialist version of the coercion 
view. It holds that the only important value from the point of view of justice (i.e. at the 
stage of principle-formation) is basic distributive fairness and that, therefore, the goal of 
achieving basic distributive fairness always justifies coercion no matter what such 
coercion involves (for simplicity’s sake let’s once again stipulate that the content of the 
ideal of basic distributive fairness in this case is an equal distribution of wealth). The 
conception of the coercion view I am imagining here thus consists of a single principle 
which says that coercion is always (and only) justified if it helps to realise and/or 
maintain an equal distribution of wealth. 
Turning now to posit a conception of the fairness view, we can say that this 
conception also holds that the content of the ideal of basic distributive fairness is given 
by an equal distribution of wealth. Of course, it goes without saying that on this view 
the ideal of basic distributive fairness is the only value relevant to justice, since the 
identification of justice with the ideal of basic distributive fairness is the defining 
characteristic of the fairness view. In order to generate practical recommendations 
similar to those generated by the coercion view, however, we need to know whether 
and how to combine the value of justice with other values that might be relevant to the 
principles of justified coercion. Clearly, if the conception of the fairness view I am 
imagining here is to generate similar practical recommendations to the conception of 
the coercion view outlined above, then we must stipulate that there are no other relevant 
values when it comes to formulating the principles of justified coercion. In this way the 
conception of the fairness view I am imagining says that coercion is always (and only) 
justified if it helps realise/maintain an equal distribution of wealth. 
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With these two conceptions in hand, let us now see what happens when we 
incorporate a personal prerogative into each conception. Beginning with the coercion 
view, we can see that the point at which the personal prerogative must be introduced is 
at the stage of principle-formation. In this case what this entails is that the value of 
basic distributive fairness is no longer the only relevant value at the stage of principle-
formation; when the theorist sits down to work out the principles of justice (i.e. the 
principles of justified coercion) he now has to consider how to appropriately combine 
the ideal of basic distributive fairness with the demands of the personal prerogative. 
Strictly speaking it is open to the coercion view theorist to interpret the personal 
prerogative in either a consequentialist way (i.e. as a value whose maximal realisation is 
in direct competition with the maximal realisation of basic distributive fairness) or a 
deontological way (i.e. as a value which generates side-constraints on the maximal 
realisation of basic distributive fairness). To keep things simple, however, I shall assume 
that the personal prerogative is to be interpreted in the (more plausible, I think) 
deontological sense. The principle of justice that emerges from this process will now 
say that coercion is justified if it helps to realise/maintain an equal distribution of 
wealth unless such coercion threatens to violate the sphere of personal freedom 
protected by each person’s prerogative. 
Turning now to the fairness view, we can see that the point at which the 
personal prerogative must be introduced is not at the stage of working out the content 
of justice – the solution to that problem is already given by the ideal of basic distributive 
fairness. Instead, the point at which the personal prerogative must be introduced is at 
the stage of formulating the principles of justified coercion. The theorist’s task here is 
thus to work out how to balance the pursuit of justice against respect for the personal 
prerogative. The principles that emerge from this process will presumably say that 
coercion is justified if it helps realise/maintain an equal distribution of wealth unless 
such coercion threatens to violate the sphere of personal freedom protected by each 
person’s prerogative. 
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We can now see that when the personal prerogative is incorporated into both 
the coercion view and the fairness view, the practical recommendations of both views 
are modified in exactly the same way. Whatever difference there is between the two views 
after the incorporation of the personal prerogative is not to be found in their practical 
recommendations, but in the content of each view’s conception of justice. On the 
prerogative-modified coercion view, justice is clearly less demanding than it was before 
the incorporation of the prerogative, since people may now choose to devote time and 
energy to their own projects even when this conflicts with the goal of maintaining an 
equal distribution of wealth. Thus, when we make derivative judgements about the 
justice of the distribution that results from the application of this less demanding 
standard of justice, we now find that we are indifferent between the justice of the 
distribution that results when no one exercises his personal prerogative and the justice 
of the distribution that results when everyone exercise his personal prerogative (and 
indeed the justice of any distribution in between these two extremes). Our indifference 
between the relative justness of these two distributions follows straightforwardly from 
the fact that justice itself is now partly constituted by the personal prerogative; we still 
think an equal distribution of wealth is a fair distribution, but we are no longer able to 
say that such a distribution is more just than the less equal distribution that results when 
people pursue their own projects. 
The implications of the prerogative-modified fairness view are rather different. 
According to this view, while the principles of justified coercion are less demanding than they 
were before the incorporation of the prerogative, the content of justice remains unchanged. 
Thus, unlike on the prerogative-modified coercion view, we are not indifferent, on the 
prerogative-modified fairness view, between the justice of the distribution that results 
when no one exercises his personal prerogative and the justice of the distribution that 
results when everyone exercises his personal prerogative. It continues to be the case 
that a fully just distribution is an equal distribution of wealth, even if the fact that some 
or all people have chosen to exercise their prerogatives means that justice in the form 
of an equal distribution of wealth is not realised or maintained. 
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What we have here, then, are two alternative ways of incorporating the notion 
of a personal prerogative into a single-component model of justice. The question we 
need to answer is whether either approach is superior, all things considered, to the dual-
component model. I shall argue that neither approach is superior to the dual-
component model. 
The problem with the prerogative-modified coercion view is the same problem 
that afflicts all conceptions of the coercion view, namely, their violation of the ‘fairness 
constraint’ (which says that a fully just distribution must by characterised by the quality 
of basic distributive fairness). In fact, the process of incorporating the personal-
prerogative into the coercion view nicely illustrates precisely what is objectionable 
about the violation of the fairness constraint. We started for the sake of argument with 
the idea that an ideally fair distribution was one in which wealth was distributed equally. 
Having noted that any attempt to realise and maintain such an ideal distribution would 
likely require us to coercively prevent people from pursuing their personal projects to 
an unacceptable degree, we then suggested that justice should be made sensitive to a 
personal prerogative that limited what we could coerce people to do in the name of 
basic distributive fairness. The point of incorporating the personal prerogative was thus 
to give people the choice whether to act so as to realise and maintain basic distributive 
fairness or whether instead to devote their time and energy to the pursuit of their own 
projects. Now imagine two scenarios: in the first scenario people unanimously choose 
the former option and basic distributive fairness is realised after all; in the second 
scenario people unanimously choose the latter option and basic distributive fairness is 
not realised. Since we believed that justice required basic distributive fairness before we 
incorporated the personal prerogative, it seems odd that we would now think that there 
is no difference in the (derivative) justness of the final distributions in these two 
scenarios. But this latter conclusion is precisely the conclusion that the prerogative-
modified coercion view commits us to. When we are restricted to identifying justice 
with principles of justified coercion we are forced to acknowledge as equally just any 
distribution that arises through action that is consistent with these principles, no matter 
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how unfair the result when judged from the impersonal standpoint. For much the same 
reason that I rejected the coercion view simpliciter, I therefore conclude that, far from 
being an improvement, the prerogative-modified coercion view merely highlights the 
flaws in this approach compared to the dual-component model. 
There is reason to think that the prerogative-modified fairness view offers a 
more promising alternative. Since, on this view, the ideal of basic distributive fairness 
continues to be identified with justice, we retain our ability to criticise as unjust an 
unequal distribution of wealth that nevertheless arises consistently with the principles 
of justified coercion which allow people to pursue their own projects if they wish. 
However, this scenario raises a distinct problem of its own. If allowing people to 
pursue their own projects will inevitably lead to an increase in injustice, what justification 
can we give for allowing people to pursue their own projects free from coercive 
interference? It seems that those who do not receive what they are due as a matter of 
justice (according to the ideal of basic distributive fairness) have a pretty powerful 
complaint against those who choose not to act so as to realise a just distribution and 
instead pursue their personal projects. As I have already explained (in section V of 
chapter 5), one way of explaining what is going on here is to recognise that the claims 
that people have to pursue their own projects free (to some extent) from coercive 
interference are themselves claims about what people are due as a matter of justice. By 
labelling these claims as claims of justice we can make sense of the decision to respect 
them, even when they conflict with the claims of justice that others have in virtue of 
the ideal of basic distributive fairness. Of course, this move is unavailable to the 
prerogative-modified fairness view, since on this view ‘justice’ only refers to basic 
distributive fairness. This makes it much harder to explain how claims to freedom from 
interference could have priority (a priority that the prerogative-modified fairness view 
endorses) over the genuine claims of justice made on behalf of those who have not 
received what they should according to the ideal of basic distributive fairness. 
 The solution to the problems that beset both attempts to incorporate the 
personal prerogative into a single-component view of justice lies in a return to the dual-
 160 
component model. Because the dual-component model retains the ideal of basic 
distributive fairness as a distinct component, it is capable of criticising as less than fully 
just a distribution that arises through the not unjust exercise of people’s non-optimal 
(from the impersonal point of view) choices. And because the dual-component model 
also retains the principles of justified coercion as a distinct component, it is capable of 
explaining why the claims of some to the freedom to make non-optimal choices 
plausibly override (or at least have equal weight to) the claims of others to receive what 
they are due from the impersonal point of view. The superiority of the dual-component 
model of justice over the single-component models is clear. Even when we try to make 
the latter views more plausible by building a personal prerogative into them, they are 
still vulnerable to the same problems that the dual-component model is specifically 
designed to avoid. 
VI. Conclus ion 
The aim of this chapter has been to set out the formal features of the dual-
component model in more detail and to provide a preliminary rationale for why these 
features look the way they do. The two separate components of the model – the 
distributive component and the interactional component – each consist of a principle 
or a set of principles that apply, respectively, to distributions and actions. Ultimately, a 
distribution can only be considered fully just when the principles of both components 
are satisfied. As well as its ability to explain our intuitive sense that an unjust 
distribution does not necessarily imply remedial duties on everyone to eradicate the 
injustice, the dual-component model is also recommended by its ability to provide a 
plausible theoretical framework in which to incorporate the distinction between the 
personal and the impersonal moral standpoint, at least when this distinction is applied 
to matters of justice. I argued that the distributive component can be understood as a 
response to the claims of justice that arise from the impersonal moral standpoint, and 
that the interactional component can be understood as a response to the claims of 
justice that arise from the personal moral standpoint. In chapter 8 I discuss two detailed 
examples with the aim of highlighting some of the considerations to which, I argue, the 
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interactional component should be sensitive. In the next chapter I offer a more detailed 
defence a particular conception of the distributive component. 
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(7) The Distributive Component of Justice 
I .  Introduct ion 
The task of the present chapter is to defend a particular conception of the 
distributive component of justice. I argue that the distributive component consists of a 
single principle: the principle of equality of opportunity for well-being.174 Thus a distribution is 
just according to the distributive component of justice when each person has an 
effective opportunity to achieve a level of well-being equal to the level of well-being 
that is effectively achievable by others. A distribution is unjust either when people 
currently face unequal opportunities for well-being, or when the unequal well-being 
they have actually achieved reflects the unequal opportunities they faced in the past. 
The principle of equality of opportunity for well-being has two distinct aspects. 
The first aspect states how the thing to be distributed should be distributed (i.e. 
equally), the second aspect states what the thing-to-be-distributed actually is (i.e. 
opportunity for well-being). I shall refer to the former as the criterion of distribution and 
the latter as the currency of distribution. In elaborating and defending the principle of 
equality of opportunity for well-being I shall deal with these two aspects of the 
principle separately.  
To begin with I make a few preliminary remarks in section II about the scope 
of the principle that constitutes the distributive component. Then, in sections III and 
IV I turn to the distribution question. In section III I argue that ‘maximising’ principles 
(as opposed to, say, egalitarian or sufficientarian principles) are unsuited to the 
distributive component because these principles cannot usefully be interpreted in a 
teleological sense. In section IV I raise some objections to the general approach known 
as ‘sufficientarianism’, with the aim being to bolster the case for adopting an egalitarian 
principle instead. I then turn in sections V and VI to the currency question. In section 
V I argue for the superiority of welfarism over resourcism, but concede that welfarists 
must focus on opportunities rather than outcomes if their view is to escape the so-
                                                
174 Throughout the chapter I use the term ‘well-being’ rather than ‘welfare’ simply to avoid any 
hedonic connotations the latter phrase might be thought to have. 
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called ‘expensive tastes objection’. In section VI I outline the theory of well-being I 
endorse, namely, a version of preference-satisfaction theory, and I then explain that, for 
the sake of the theory of justice, at least, the precise version of well-being we should be 
concerned with is not bare preference-satisfaction, but rather the successful execution 
of a rational life plan. Thinking of people’s preferences in this way – as harmoniously 
combined within a rational life plan – not only solves the problem of how to combine 
preferences and avoid conflicts between incompatible preferences, it also helps us to 
explain how the principle of equality of opportunity for well-being avoids the so-called 
‘fair shares objection’ to welfarism. My solution to the fair shares objection is explained 
in section VII.  
II .  The scope o f  the dis tr ibut ive  component 
In chapters 2 and 3 I demonstrated that the most promising attempts to defend 
the domestic scope restriction (the restriction of the scope of strong norms of justice to 
contemporary nation-states) do not succeed on their own terms. Of course, since these 
were essentially negative arguments, they provided no positive support for the claim 
that the scope of justice is unbounded (i.e. universal or global in scope). In order to 
provide some justification for this latter idea, my strategy was to start putting in place 
the foundations for a very different way of interpreting the concept of distributive 
justice. Now these foundations are in place we should be able to see what was not 
obvious before, namely, that the scope of the principle which constitutes the 
distributive component of justice is inherently universal in scope. The reason for this 
lies in the direct association of the distributive component of justice with the 
impersonal moral standpoint. From the personal standpoint the individual, familial, 
cultural, social, political, and geographical differences between us loom large. But from 
the impersonal moral standpoint the things which distinguish us from each other are 
far less obvious or important than the things we share in common. When we ask what 
justice demands from a combined personal-impersonal perspective, as most single-
component theories of justice try to do, then it is natural that the differences that loom 
large from the personal perspective should affect the answer we come up with. But 
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when the question of justice is considered from the impersonal perspective on its own, 
it is much harder to see why the contingencies of the country we were born into, or the 
family we were brought up in, or the individual talents and abilities which make us who 
are we, should affect what we are entitled to. 
The distinction between the impersonal and the personal moral standpoints 
should not be confused with a different distinction, emphasised by Miller, between, on 
the one hand, our status as ‘needy and vulnerable creatures’, and on the other hand, as 
‘choosing agents who must take responsibility for their own lives’.175 Miller uses this 
distinction to generate a sophisticated theory of global justice which combines into one 
theory our dual role as recipients and agents of justice. As recipients of justice we have a 
right to certain things simply in virtue of our nature as needy and vulnerable creatures. 
As agents of justice, on the other hand, we have a duty to take responsibility for our 
mistakes and to respond to injustice when we perceive it. Miller’s recipient/agent 
distinction has played a vital role in helping me to see how to develop the dual-
component model. But the recipient/agent distinction and the impersonal/personal 
distinction are clearly different. Our neediness and vulnerability may be among the 
most prominent of our characteristics visible from the impersonal standpoint, but they 
are not the only aspects of our nature that are relevant from that perspective. Although 
in formulating the distributive component of justice we abstract away from questions 
about how we might realise the ideal of basic distributive fairness, this should not be 
taken to imply that the ideal itself must be constructed on the assumption that human 
beings are helpless creatures, unable to do anything for themselves. Even the 
distributive component taken on its own (i.e. independently of the interactional 
component) must, if it is to remain plausible, reflect the fact that people are capable of 
taking at least partial responsibility for their own lives. 
As I flesh out the content of the distributive component below, I shall be 
guided by the thought that, when a person has less (of the currency of distribution) 
than he should (according to the criterion of distribution), this constitutes an unfair 
                                                
175 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp.5-6. 
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situation, and hence an injustice, no matter where on earth the person in question 
resides. It should be clear from this that the justification for, and subsequent 
contentiousness of, the claim about the universal scope of the distributive component 
depends to a large extent on how convincing an account is offered of the currency and 
criterion of distribution that form the content of the distributive component. It is to 
this task that I now turn. 
III .  The dis tr ibut ion quest ion:  narrowing the f i e ld 
The ‘distribution’ question and the ‘currency’ question are obviously closely 
linked. Indeed, it might be thought that there is a problem of circularity here, since it 
seems likely that the plausibility of the answer we give to either one of these questions 
will depend to a considerable extent on the answer we give to the other. How do we 
know that a just distribution is an equal distribution until we know what the currency of 
justice is? Yet how can we be confident that we know what the currency of justice is 
until we know how it should be distributed? While this justificatory circularity is a 
problem, I do not think it is an intractable one. One way in which we can begin to 
address it is by using the form of the dual-component model to narrow down the field 
of possible answers to the distribution question. In order to do this a brief digression is 
in order. 
In an influential paper, Derek Parfit distinguishes between ‘teleological’ 
interpretations of equality and ‘deontological’ interpretations of equality.176 Importantly 
for our purposes, Parfit also acknowledges that the same teleological/deontological 
distinction can be applied to theories of justice, as well as to theories of equality.177 
According to the teleological view, (the telic view, for short) judgements of justice and 
injustice are applicable to states of affairs, even if there is nothing any rational agent 
could have done to avoid them. In contrast, according to the deontological view, (the 
                                                
176 D. Parfit, 'Equality or Priority?' in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 81-125, esp. pp.84-100. 
177  ‘Those who take [the Telic View] do not merely think that…inequality is bad. They often speak 
of natural injustice. On their view, it is unjust or unfair that some people are born less able, or less 
healthy, than others. Similarly, it is unfair if nature bestows on some richer resources. Talk of 
unfairness here is sometimes claimed to make no sense. I believe it does make sense.’ Parfit, 
'Equality or Priority?', fn.17, p.122. 
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deontic view, for short) if nothing can be or could have been done to avoid some state 
of affairs, then we cannot describe the resulting situation as unjust.178 To put it another 
way, on the deontic view but not the telic view, injustice ‘necessarily involves 
wrongdoing’.179 Since the principle which constitutes the distributive component applies 
directly to distributions, it can be interpreted as an example of Parfit’s telic approach. 
Since the principles which constitute the interactional component apply to actions, it 
can be interpreted as an example of Parfit’s deontic approach. 
Regardless of its content, then, we know that the distributive component of 
justice is constituted by a telic principle (or principles). This being the case, it is worth 
asking whether there are any candidate principles that we can rule out for the purely 
formal reason that they cannot be coherently and/or plausibly interpreted in a telic 
sense. I shall consider three common types of distributive principle: maximising 
principles; sufficientarian principles; and egalitarian principles.180 I shall argue that only 
the latter two can be coherently and plausibly interpreted in a telic sense and, therefore, 
that the principle that constitutes the distributive component of justice cannot be a 
maximising principle. 
We ‘interpret a principle in a telic sense’ when we use it to assess the justness of 
distributions directly (i.e. without reference to the intrinsic justness of the actions or 
institutions that brought the distribution about). In order to do this (i.e. use a principle 
to assess the justice of a distribution directly) we must use the principle to generate a 
hypothetical ‘ideal distribution’ against which the distribution(s) whose justness we are 
interested in assessing can be compared. The ideal distributions that are generated in 
                                                
178 Parfit, 'Equality or Priority?', p.90. 
179 Parfit, 'Equality or Priority?', p.90 (emphasis added). 
180 I shall not be conducting any separate analyses of various other types of principle which might 
conceivably be interpreted in a telic sense, and which are commonly associated with justice: such as 
principles of need, desert or merit. This is partly for reasons of space. But more importantly, it is 
because much of what I say about the three main types of principle that I do discuss applies to these 
other kinds of principle as well. For instance, the most common versions of the principle of need are 
sufficientarian in nature, and so a discussion of sufficientarianism is relevant to the most common 
need-based principles. And while it is true that the principle of desert and the principle of merit are 
not normally thought to have anything in common with the principle of equality, if we take a very 
loose view of what counts as an egalitarian principle then there is a sense in which the desert- and 
merit-based principles can be interpreted along egalitarian lines, for what they essentially say is, 
‘distribute equally, unless people are unequally deserving or unequally meritorious’. Few people 
dispute the egalitarian pedigree of the luck-egalitarian principle, and yet that principle has more or 
less the same form as the previous two: ‘distribute equally, unless people have chosen unequally’. 
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this way come in two varieties, depending on the type of principle that is used to 
generate them. The first variety of ideal distribution is what I shall call an ‘historical 
ideal’. Historical ideals are generated by asking how things might have turned out had 
past actions/events/institutions gone a certain way. The second variety of ideal 
distribution I shall refer to as a ‘transcendental ideal’. Transcendental ideals, as the 
name suggests, are not worked out relative to any particular historical conditions but, 
instead, are valid in all historical contexts. Principles that generate historical ideals can 
only be usefully employed in a telic sense in an extremely narrow range of cases. 
Principles that generate transcendental ideals, on the other hand, can be usefully used in 
a telic sense in all circumstances. 
To see what I mean, consider the kind of principles I referred to above as 
‘maximising’ principles. Maximising principles – such as the principle of utility, the 
Rawlsian difference principle, or Arneson’s ‘responsibility-catering prioritarian’ 
principle181 – typically apply to actions or institutions. They require that actions are to 
be taken or institutions are to be structured so as to maximise the weighted/non-
weighted sum or weighted/non-weighted average amount of the currency of justice, 
whatever it may be. Now, however, we want to use a maximising principle in an 
atypical way, namely, to assess the justness of a distribution directly. Imagine, then, that 
our aim is to assess the justness of distribution D. Our first task is to use the 
maximising principle in question to generate an ideal distribution against which to 
compare D in order to determine how just it is. How might we go about doing this? 
What we can’t do is compare D to some antecedently given ideal distribution 
based on the principle in question. If we ask in the abstract what an ideally just 
distribution looks like according to a maximising principle, then, as Rawls himself 
acknowledges, there simply is no answer to this question.182 Maximising principles are 
                                                
181 ‘[Arneson’s responsibility-catering] prioritarianism holds that institutions and practices should be 
set and actions chosen to maximize moral value, with the stipulation that the moral value of obtaining 
a benefit (avoiding a loss) for a person is greater, the greater the well-being gain that the person 
would get from it (the smaller the loss in well-being), and greater, the lower the person's lifetime 
expectation of well-being prior to receipt of the benefit (loss)’. R. Arneson, 'Luck Egalitarianism and 
Prioritarianism', Ethics, 110 (2) (2000), 339-349, p.343. 
182 ‘A distribution cannot be judged in isolation from the system of which it is the outcome…If it is 
asked in the abstract whether one distribution of a given stock of things to definite individuals with 
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therefore unable to generate transcendental ideals.183 The alternative is to use the 
maximising principle to generate an historical ideal against which to compare D. We do 
this by asking what D might have looked like had all past actions been such as to 
maximise the currency of justice. Now, if the actual historical circumstances underlying 
D (i.e. the series of actions or the shape of the institutions that gave rise to D) is brief 
and simple enough, we may well be in a position to specify the content of the historical 
ideal according to the maximising principle. It is easy enough to think of trivial 
examples in which the small piece of cake, or the small number of apples, etc., that 
everyone actually ended up receiving might have been larger by some specified amount 
if someone had acted differently during the process of making/harvesting/distributing 
the cake/apples/etc.. I do not deny, therefore, that historical ideals – and, hence, the 
principles that generate them – can be useful in certain circumstances. When, however, 
it comes to assessing the justness of the distribution of goods across whole societies, 
with hundreds or thousands of years of history, or indeed across the world as a whole, 
the usefulness of historical ideals is far from obvious. Even if we take the currency of 
justice to be something (relatively) simple like financial wealth and income, there is no 
way (at least, no way that is accessible to non-godlike beings) of navigating our way 
through the relevant counterfactuals in order to work out what the ideally just 
distribution, according to a wealth-maximising principle, would look like. Possible 
answers to the question ‘How much more wealth might there be now if all past actions 
had been wealth maximising?’ start at ‘zero’ and then continue upwards to some 
radically unknowable amount. This is, clearly, no help to us at all in our stated task of 
assessing the justness of the current distribution of wealth. 
Now consider egalitarian and sufficientarian principles. When it comes to 
interpreting these principles in a telic sense there is an important difference between 
                                                                                                                                    
known desires and preferences is better than another, then there is simply no answer to this question’. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.76. 
183 At least, this is true in cases that are of any interest. It is technically possible that in situations in 
which we have a finite stock of divisible goods and a finite number of people then a maximising 
principle that specifically refers to those goods can be used to generate a transcendental ideal. But 
since these strict conditions are rarely met in any real-life situation I shall ignore this wrinkle and 
continue to talk as if maximising principles are unable to generate transcendental ideals. 
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them and the principles we have discussed so far. The difference is that egalitarian and 
sufficientarian principles can be used to specify transcendental ideals of justice in 
distribution. Imagine once again that our task is to assess the justness of distribution D 
but that we now want to assess how just it is according to either a principle of equality 
or a principle of sufficiency. Now when we ask in the abstract what an ideally just 
distribution looks like, we are able to give an answer: an ideally just distribution 
according to the principle of equality is one in which everyone has an equal amount of 
the currency of justice; an ideally just distribution according to the principle of 
sufficiency is one in which the amount of the currency of justice that everyone has is no 
less than the sufficiency threshold specified by the principle. By comparing these ideal 
distributions with the actual distribution D we can work out how just or unjust D is 
according to the relevant principle. 
Now, it might be objected that the job of comparing D with any particular 
transcendentally ideal distribution will itself often require a great deal of empirical work, 
and that, since such work is highly vulnerable to mistakes, we can infer that 
transcendental ideals are no more useful for determining the justness of a complex 
distribution than historical ideals. The first part of this objection is absolutely right, but 
the inference is mistaken. It is no objection to the point I’m making here that, in 
applying egalitarian and sufficientarian principles, a great deal of empirical work will 
have to be done, and that mistakes will inevitably be made. Every (plausible) 
fundamental principle of justice, whether applied in a telic or a deontic sense, will 
require a certain amount of difficult empirical work to be done. And mistakes will, of 
course, often be made. The reason why maximising principles are not suited to a telic 
interpretation is not that applying them requires difficult empirical work but, rather, 
because the ideals that these principles might generate are themselves radically 
inaccessible to us. We can only begin to work out how closely the actual distribution 
matches the ideal distribution when we have that ideal in hand. Hence, if the dual-
component model is indeed the correct way of thinking about justice, we can rule out 
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all of these principles as possible candidates for the content of the distributive 
component. 
IV. The dis tr ibut ion quest ion:  egal i tar ianism versus suf f i c i entar ianism 
Having shown why we can reject maximising principles as potential candidates 
for the content of the distributive component, I will now suggest why we should favour 
egalitarian principles over sufficientarian principles. Since sufficientarian principles are 
perfectly amenable to a telic interpretation they cannot be ruled out in the same way as 
maximising principles. There are, however, still some formal aspects of the dual-
component model that explain why sufficientarian principles are less attractive as 
candidates for the content of the distributive component than egalitarian principles. 
Moreover there are some powerful substantive objections that have been made to the 
doctrine of sufficiency which further bolster the case for their rejection. I shall look 
first at these substantive objections before explaining what formal grounds we have for 
rejecting sufficientarianism. 
Sufficientarianism, in both its deontic and telic versions, holds that the 
distribution of the currency of justice only generates concerns of (in)justice when the 
amount of the currency of justice that some people have falls below a certain (absolute 
or relative) level. How the currency of distribution is distributed above this level may or 
may not, depending on the particular view in question, raise moral concerns of some 
other type, but it no longer registers as a concern of justice.184 There is certainly 
something to be said for this idea. Intuitively, at least, there does seem to be a 
difference of type, and not just a difference of degree, in the inequalities that pertain 
between, on the one hand, a severely deprived person and a well-off person, and, on 
                                                
184 Andrew Mason refers to this as the ‘extreme’ form of the sufficiency view, see, A. Mason, 
Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian Thought, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.122. The ‘moderate’ form, which Mason thinks is more 
plausible, eschews the absolute priority which the extreme view gives to those below the threshold 
and holds that, sometimes, if the benefits are great enough and the number of people who might 
benefit is big enough, those above the threshold may be favoured over those below it. It is hard to see 
how Mason’s ‘moderate’ sufficiency view differs in any significant way from prioritarianism. Not 
only that, but Mason himself admits that we could recast the ‘extreme’ view as holding that, although 
we still have a reason to care about how well-off people are above the threshold, it only becomes a 
matter of justice when people are below the threshold. This is the version of sufficiency that interests 
me here. 
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the other hand, a well-off person and a very well-off person. Sufficientarianism seems 
better able to capture this idea than egalitarianism.185 Yet, as superficially plausible as 
they sound, the problems with sufficientarian views begin as soon as we try to specify 
the details of the view with more precision. 
How do we decide, for instance, what the sufficiency threshold should be? 
Well, in response to the asymmetry between suffering and happiness (see the last 
footnote) we might decide to set the threshold at a relatively low point – say, the point 
at which people’s basic needs are catered for.186 One advantage of having a fairly 
minimal threshold like this, particularly when applied globally, is that it is (a) easier to 
justify than more ambitious thresholds (since it refers to needs that we all share) and 
therefore (b) more likely to generate its own support in practice.187 The problem, 
however, is that most people also think that questions of justice are raised by 
inequalities above the level of basic need satisfaction and, therefore, that the sufficiency 
threshold must include more than merely basic need satisfaction I shall call this the 
‘incompleteness objection’ to sufficientarianism. 
If we set the threshold higher than the level at which basic needs are satisfied, 
say, at the level at which every person is able to lead a ‘decent’188 life, it seems we can at 
least reduce the force of the incompleteness objection that was raised against the basic 
needs view. Faced with the choice, we care less about a gain to someone who is already 
                                                
185 The intuitive appeal of this idea may be explained by Karl Popper’s remark that there is ‘no 
symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure…Human suffering makes a 
direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the 
happiness of a man who is doing well anyway’. Popper, quoted in, P. Casal, 'Why Sufficiency Is Not 
Enough', Ethics, 117 (2) (2007), 296-326, p.297. 
186 This is David Miller’s view, about which I say more below. Miller argues that the satisfaction of 
basic needs is necessary for a person to be able to lead a ‘minimally decent life’, Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice, pp.181-2. According to Miller, basic needs are to be distinguished 
from societal needs. The former are ‘to be understood as the conditions for a decent life in any 
society, and the latter as the more expansive set of requirements for a decent life in the particular 
society to which a person belongs’, (p.182, emphasis in original). Since, logically speaking, the 
conditions for a decent life in any society cannot be any worse than the conditions for a decent life in 
any particular society, I assume what Miller means here is that basic needs are the conditions for a 
minimally decent life in any society whereas societal needs are the conditions for a (more than 
minimally) decent life in any society. This distinction is important for understanding what I say in the 
next paragraph where I distinguish between a basic needs threshold and a decent life threshold. 
(Although it is worth noting that the two thresholds may coincide under certain conditions in 
particular societies). 
187 Casal refers to (a) and (b) together as the ‘allegiance argument’ for sufficientarianism, Casal, 'Why 
Sufficiency Is Not Enough', p.305. 
188 C.f. Mason, Levelling the Playing Field, p.115; Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p.27. 
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living a decent life than we do about a gain to someone whose basic needs are satisfied 
but who is not yet living a decent life. Of course, one might now object to the ‘decent 
life’ view on the different grounds that it is much harder to reach agreement on what 
constitutes a ‘decent’ life than it is to reach agreement on what constitutes the 
fulfilment of basic needs.189 I shall assume, however, that this objection can in principle 
be overcome. The more serious problem is that the decent life view still fails to fully 
deal with the incompleteness objection. If two well-paid and equally well-off lecturers 
are both competing for an even more lucrative professorship, it still seems highly 
relevant from the point of view of justice how the appointing committee decide who 
should get the job. Even if both lecturers are already living what anyone would consider 
to be decent lives, we would surely still think it unjust if the person who was awarded 
the professorship was awarded it on the grounds that he is married to a member of the 
committee, rather than through a fair and impartial process. This example suggests that 
the distribution of luxuries – defined in a broad sense as those things which a person 
would like but which are not necessary for a decent life – is a matter of justice. 
For those who feel the force of the incompleteness objection when applied to 
the distribution of luxuries, but who nevertheless continue to think that the idea of 
sufficiency has an important role to play in the theory of justice, there are two possible 
responses. The first is to raise the sufficiency threshold as high as it will go, thereby 
ensuring that every distribution short of the conceivable maximum raises concerns of 
justice. This ‘maximal sufficiency’ view obviously avoids the incompleteness objection, 
since it makes it logically impossible for concerns of justice to arise above the threshold 
(i.e. the point at which the amount of the currency of justice held by each person could 
not possibly be any higher).190 However, this solution to the incompleteness objection 
comes at a high price. First, it only applies to views according to which it makes sense 
to talk about a ‘maximum’ holding of the currency of justice. Thus, while there might, 
for example, be a logical limit to the level of well-being achievable by each person, there 
                                                
189 C.f., R. Arneson, 'Why Justice Requires Transfers to Offset Income and Wealth Inequalities', 
Social Philosophy and Policy, 19 (2002), 172-200. 
190 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p.27. 
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is no logical limit to the amount of money they can have. Second, even if some views 
do admit of the idea of a maximum threshold, it seems unlikely that we will be able to 
specify what such a maximum looks like, and even less likely that we will know when 
we have reached it; the idea of perfect bliss is something that is hard to put into 
concrete terms. Finally, even if there are some plausible candidate currencies that 
manage to deal with the first two concerns, it seems clear that we will need auxiliary 
principles to guide us in assessing injustices that occur below the threshold. As 
Christiano says, ‘it is important to know what one must do when there are conflicts of 
interests among those who do not reach [the threshold] of sufficiency’.191 Since every 
conflict of interest we are likely to address in the real world will be below the threshold 
of maximal sufficiency it would appear that these ‘auxiliary’ principles will, in practice, 
be the only ones that are relevant. In the light of these problems I conclude that 
adopting the maximal sufficiency approach is too high a price to pay in order to escape 
the incompleteness objection. 
There is, in any case, a second strategy open to the committed sufficientarian 
who is sympathetic to the incompleteness objection. Rather than combine a maximal 
sufficiency threshold with other principles of justice that regulate distribution below the 
threshold, this second strategy is to combine a more plausible minimal sufficiency 
threshold with other principles that regulate distribution above the threshold. I have no 
general argument against this ‘hybrid’ strategy. Instead, what I shall do in the rest of this 
section is present some considerations which suggest that if the universal luck-
egalitarian principle I am attempting to defend in this chapter is correct, then justice is 
probably not a hybrid ideal. 
Consider, then, the hybrid view referred to by Paula Casal as ‘sufficiency-
constrained luck-egalitarianism’.192 According to the standard (i.e. non-sufficiency-
constrained) luck-egalitarian view, ‘justice places no limits on the extent to which 
individuals can be held responsible for their voluntary choices’.193 The implication is 
                                                
191 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p.28. 
192 Casal, 'Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough', pp.321-3. 
193 Casal, 'Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough', p.322. 
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that there is no injustice if severely deprived people are left to suffer the effects of such 
deprivation as long as their situation is a result of their own free choice. Some critics 
find this implication unacceptable.194 In response, Casal suggests that sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarianism avoids the ‘unacceptable outcomes objection’195 by 
combining the standard luck-egalitarian claim ‘that some inequalities in outcome may 
arise justly’ with the denial of the claim that a person’s ‘having less than enough is ever 
justifiable by appeal to voluntary choice’.196 
Although I am sympathetic to the motivation underlying Casal’s hybrid view, I 
am also sceptical that it presents a genuine and coherent alternative to the standard 
luck-egalitarian view. As Casal is aware, once we accept the luck-egalitarian idea that 
‘choice-generated inequality’ is just, it is not easy to provide a coherent and convincing 
explanation for why ‘choice-generated insufficiency’ is unjust.197 Indeed, if the standard 
luck-egalitarian principle fully explains the justice of a choice-generated inequality 
between someone who is living a life of pure bliss and someone is living just above the 
sufficiency threshold, it is implausible to think that it would provide no justification for 
a choice generated inequality between the latter person and someone who was living 
just below the sufficiency threshold. 
In any case, the concerns raised by the unacceptable outcomes objection can be 
dealt with in other ways. One such alternative, which I think is more promising than 
Casal’s hybrid proposal, is to invoke the distinction between justice and morality and 
say that, although it is not unjust to deny assistance to people who are responsible for 
their own deprivation, it is nevertheless immoral. Such a move would allow us to 
maintain a consistent and thoroughgoing luck-egalitarian view about justice while going 
at least some of the way towards addressing the unacceptable outcomes objection. 
Another possibility is to point out that much of the force of the unacceptable outcomes 
                                                
194 See, e.g., E. S. Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality?' Ethics, 109 (1999), 287-337; S. 
Scheffler, 'Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality', Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 5 
(4) (2005), 5-28. 
195 I borrow this label from, Z. Stemplowska, 'Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility', Political 
Studies, 57 (2) (2009), 237-259, p.251. 
196 Casal, 'Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough', p.322. 
197 Casal, 'Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough', p.322. Casal does in fact think an explanation exists, but 
she does not defend her proposed solution in any detail and I shall not try and reconstruct her view 
here. 
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objection to luck-egalitarianism depends on assuming an implausible and simplistic 
version of the latter view which few if any of its proponents actually hold. As Samuel 
Scheffler has pointed out, most luck-egalitarians think that: 
…the hallmark of [voluntary] choices is, roughly, that they exhibit certain characteristic 
relations to the agent’s deliberations, or that they are sensitive in specifiable ways to the 
agent’s values and preferences, or that they are free of certain specific forms of causal 
interference, or that they possess some combination of these features.198 
According to these kinds of ‘compatibilist’ conceptions of voluntary choice 
referred to by Scheffler, the conditions under which choices and decisions must be 
made in order to qualify as ‘inequality-justifying’ are likely to be numerous and 
complex. This is, of course, a drawback of luck-egalitarianism when it comes to its 
application in the real world. But, at least in theory, it is one of its strengths. It means 
that there is a great deal of scope to explain why ‘choices’ which lead to severe 
deprivation are not in fact the kinds of choices which qualify as inequality-justifying. Of 
course, the question of which conception of voluntary choice we should plug into our 
theory of luck-egalitarianism is a difficult one (and it is not one I shall attempt to 
address here). It is enough to notice that the force of the unacceptable outcomes 
objection depends to a large extent on the conception of voluntary choice that is 
adopted, and that there are some instances – say, a mountain climber who, against a 
background of relative scarcity, repeatedly goes uninsured and unprepared on 
numerous mountain expeditions even though he knows that cost of rescue operations 
are extremely high – in which most people would surely agree that the relevant 
conditions of voluntary choice have been met so that it would not be unjust to leave 
someone to suffer extreme disadvantage as a result of his selfish behaviour. 
The problems with Casal’s hybrid view suggest that if some type of universal 
luck-egalitarian principle does indeed form part or all of the content of the distributive 
component of justice, then this likely excludes the principle of sufficiency as a potential 
addition to that content. However, this leaves open the possibility that the distributive 
                                                
198 Scheffler, 'Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality', p.13. 
 176 
component might be constituted by a non-universal luck-egalitarian principle in 
combination with a sufficientarian principle. Such a view would be very similar to the 
one proposed by David Miller. Miller’s view avoids the problems that beset Casal’s 
view because, unlike Casal, he does not claim that sufficiency always overrides (a non-
luck-egalitarian version of) equality whenever the two conflict. Instead, he argues that 
the two principles have a different scope of application, with egalitarian norms applying 
to distributions within nation-states, and sufficientarian norms applying beyond the 
boundaries of nation-states. According to this ‘split-level’ view of justice, it is 
conceivable that a scope-restricted luck-egalitarian principle that only applies within 
nation-states could be coherently combined with a sufficientarian principle that applies 
globally, and this would mean that the principle of sufficiency does have a role to play in 
the distributive component of justice after all. 
The reasons I think we have for rejecting Miller-inspired split-level views 
should already be clear. First, as I argued in chapters 2 and 3, I believe that statist and 
nationalist attempts to restrict the scope of egalitarian justice neither are, nor can be, 
successful. Since Miller invokes both of these approaches in the course of justifying his 
wider view, we have good reason to doubt its cogency. Of course, by rejecting statist 
and nationalist attempts to restrict the scope of justice what we are effectively doing is 
opening ourselves up again to the global justice trilemma. As I explained in the 
introduction, the advantage of statist and/or nationalist positions is that they appear to 
be able to explain why it is that, although most people think the global distribution is 
radically unjust, they also think that relatively well-off individuals in the developed 
world do not have hugely demanding duties to rectify the situation. If we reject these 
explanations, we must be prepared either to declare common sense intuition wrong, or 
to put a new argument in its place. 
This new argument is provided by the dual-component model. The first of the 
two common sense intuitions listed above, namely, that the global distribution is 
radically unjust, reflects a pure and direct concern with distributive fairness and, hence, 
with the distributive component of justice, which, recall, seeks to answer the question, 
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‘when are goods distributed fairly?’ Providing an objective and impartial answer to this 
question demands that we view things primarily from an impersonal standpoint, and, as 
I mentioned in section II above, this in turn builds a presumption of universalism into 
the distributive component from the start. The second of the two common sense 
intuitions referred to above, namely, that well-off individuals do not have hugely 
demanding duties to rectify global injustice, reflects a concern with the moral limits of 
what can be demanded of people in the name of distributive fairness. This is the 
concern that grounds the interactional component of justice, which seeks to answer the 
question, ‘how can we justly achieve a fair distribution?’ The latter question, unlike the 
former, requires close attention to be paid to the personal standpoint. Different ways of 
moving from an objectively unfair distribution to an objectively fair distribution will 
look more or less identical from the impersonal perspective, but they will each have 
wildly differing impacts, both in terms of their meaning and in terms of their effects, 
when viewed from the perspective of the particular individuals affected. The 
interactional component helps us to decide which of these moves towards an 
impersonally just distribution can be justified to real people. 
Miller’s split-level view does a particularly good job of explaining the intuition 
that the duties owed by those who reside within a particular institutional scheme to 
those outside the scheme are less stringent than the duties these same people owe to 
those inside the scheme. But this does not count against the dual-component model 
because it too can explain this intuition by appealing to the restrictions grounded in the 
interactional component on what can be justly demanded, in the name of egalitarian 
fairness, of people who share different institutional schemes. Where Miller’s split-level 
view does not do so well is in explaining our intuitions about distributive injustices that 
arise between states, when this question is detached from the practical issue of what we 
(or anyone else) should do about it. Consider, for example, a situation in which two 
similar individuals who share similar aspirations are born either side of a state border 
and, as a result, are provided with wildly divergent levels of effective opportunity to 
pursue their plans. As long as the ‘internal’ distribution of opportunity within each state 
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is not too unequal, and as long as neither individual falls below the sufficiency 
threshold of basic needs, then, according to Miller’s view, there is no injustice here. I 
think most people’s intuitions here would say that there is an injustice here, even if they 
would be reluctant to say that it is their duty to remedy it. Of course, this is easily 
explained on the dual-component model, because the unjust distribution of 
opportunities between the two individuals is a separate matter from the question of 
whose responsibility (if anyone’s) it is to remedy that injustice. 
V. The currency quest ion:  wel l -be ing or  resources? 
While my rejection of various non-egalitarian candidates for the role of the 
constitutive principle of the distributive component has obviously not been 
comprehensive, I hope it has been comprehensive enough to allow me to assume an 
egalitarian answer to the distribution question and move on to address the further 
question: an equal distribution of what? I have already stated that the principle I aim to 
defend is the luck-egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity for well-being. In this 
section I explain why I think justice requires us to focus on the distribution of 
opportunity for well-being. In the next section I outline in more detail what I take ‘well-
being’ to be. 
Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of things that are valuable 
to people. And although it is conceivable that some of the things that are valuable to us 
are valuable to us independently of their affect on our well-being, it seems clear that 
most of the things that are valuable to us are valuable to us because they increase, or 
enable us to increase, our well-being. It would appear that we have good reason, then, 
to refer to well-being directly in the formulation of the currency of justice. Some 
writers, however, have rejected this conclusion. They argue that there are a number of 
problems facing any attempt to refer directly to well-being in the formulation of the 
currency of justice: 
 
1) The Justificatory Problem: There is no agreement about what the correct 
standard of well-being is. 
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2) The Practical Problem: Even if we could agree on a single standard of well-
being, it would be impossible to use it in order to measure the distribution 
of well-being. 
3) The Normative Problem: Even if a standard of well-being did exist which 
could be used to measure the distribution of well-being, there are 
independent reasons for rejecting any attempt to make justice sensitive to 
well-being. 
 
The issues raised by the justificatory problem are much too large to deal with 
satisfactorily here. Of course, I hope that the conception of well-being I outline in the 
next section is plausible and attractive enough to convince most people that it is the 
correct conception, but this is no doubt a vain hope. It may well be that the only way to 
reach agreement on practical matters with those who, for one reason or another, prefer 
a different theory of well-being, is to resort to some less controversial currency the 
distribution of which we can all agree is at least of some, if not ultimate, importance 
from the standpoint of justice. While this kind of compromise is obviously not ideal 
from the point of view of anyone whose preferred metric is different from the metric 
that ends up being adopted, neither is it as much of a concession as it may seem. For 
recall that the distributive component of justice is not a direct source of duties of 
justice. Instead, it is a source of reasons of justice that only become duties once they 
have been filtered through the principles that constitute the interactional component. 
The practical requirements that issue from the specification of the distributive ideal are 
thus mediated in a way that is likely to diminish both the strength and the importance 
of any disagreement over the content of the ideal. And in any case, I take it that the fact 
that reaching agreement for practical purposes may require compromise does not 
automatically entail the pointlessness of the theoretical exercise of trying to identify the 
correct theory of well-being. 
I turn then to what I called above the ‘practical problem’, of which there are 
two different versions. The first version is conceptual. It holds that it is conceptually 
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impossible to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being and, thus, impossible to 
determine the justness of the distribution of well-being, without relying on some 
independent notion of a fair distribution of something else (i.e. resources). The second 
version is empirical. It says that even if the conceptual problem can be overcome, it will 
still be impossible, as an empirical matter, to make accurate and reliable interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being. The best-known example of the conceptual version of the 
practical problem is Ronald Dworkin’s ‘fair shares objection’ to welfarist conceptions 
of equality. Since I provide a detailed response to Dworkin’s fair shares objection in the 
penultimate section of this chapter I shall say no more about it here. 
The empirical version of the practical problem is largely a result of arguments 
put forward by Rawls. Rawls placed great importance on the stability of a conception of 
justice (essentially the idea that the principles of justice regulating a particular society 
should be able to maintain the willing support of citizens over time).199 According to 
Rawls, a conception of justice is much more likely to be stable if the principles that 
constitute that conception are such that it can be widely known and understood by 
members of the public that the society in which they live is being run in accordance 
with them. If this ‘publicity condition’ is to be met, argued Rawls, the principles of 
justice themselves must not be too opaque. That is, if the interpersonal comparisons 
that the principles require us to make in order to apply them are too difficult for 
citizens to make (roughly) by themselves, and it is too difficult for citizens to tell 
whether their co-citizens are acting in accordance with them, then a society run 
according to those principles is unlikely to be stable over an extended period of time. 
For this reason Rawls argued against basing interpersonal comparisons of individuals’ 
situations on hard-to-measure welfarist notions such as utility, and in favour of the 
much simpler and more manageable notion of primary goods. 
Whether one is persuaded by Rawls’s argument against adopting ‘complex’ 
(welfarist) metrics largely depends on whether one accepts his claim that a conception 
of justice must satisfy a publicity requirement. Hopefully it is abundantly clear by now 
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that I do not accept this claim, at least as it applies to the distributive component of 
justice. The publicity requirement is only a plausible requirement on principles of justice 
insofar as justice itself is conceived of as a more or less directly action-guiding (or 
potentially action-guiding) ideal. If our aim is to come up with a set of principles that 
people and states can follow directly then it obviously makes sense to keep these 
principles fairly simple in terms of what it takes to verify that people are complying 
with them. But the point of the distributive component of justice is emphatically not to 
provide us with a set of principles that people and states can follow directly. Unlike the 
principles of the interactional component we do not design or construct the content of the 
distributive component, we discover it. And it does not make sense to insist of a 
discovery that it satisfies an independent normative requirement.200 
Having explained why the distributive component is immune to the empirical 
version of the practical problem, I now turn to address the third and final objection to 
welfarism; an objection I labelled above as the ‘normative problem’. The normative 
problem incorporates several distinct issues, only two of which I shall consider here. 
One well-known problem with welfarism, and welfare-egalitarianism in particular, is 
that it appears to recommend transferring resources to people whose welfare is below 
average even when the only reason for their welfare deficit is that they have been 
unable to satisfy their preference for (or increase their happiness by) harming others. 
Any theory which recommends that such ‘offensive tastes’ be taken into account when 
working out who is entitled to what as a matter of justice is often thought, plausibly 
enough, to be mistaken. However, as convincing as it is against certain simplistic 
versions of equality of well-being, the offensive tastes objection is not usually thought 
to cause too much of a problem for more sophisticated welfarist conceptions of justice, 
since it can be dealt with simply by modifying the view so that offensive tastes are ruled 
out from the ‘calculus of justice’ from the start.201 Now this piece of ad hoc modification 
of the welfarist view might be thought to diminish its appeal, but I do not think this 
                                                
200 For a much more detailed argument against the publicity requirement, on which my own argument 
in this paragraph is based, see, Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, chap.8. 
201 Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', p.912. 
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worry is too serious. Although, as always, there will be some hard (i.e. borderline) cases, 
there will also be a wide range of cases in which it is clear that an individual’s tastes are 
relevantly ‘offensive’, and thus not to be included in the welfarist metric. What is true in 
any case is that the existence of hard cases is not enough to impugn the whole idea of 
welfarism, and so I shall follow other writers in moving on to more interesting, and 
more troublesome issues. 
 One such issue is the problem presented to welfarist views by the ‘expensive 
tastes objection’. Imagine two people, A and B, who are identical in all relevant respects 
except that A’s well-being is greater than B’s (however well-being is measured). Now 
consider two different explanations for the inequality in well-being between A and B. In 
the first scenario, B’s well-being suffers because he is struck by an unprecedented 
illness that causes him great pain. In the second scenario, B’s well-being suffers because 
although he purposefully cultivated a taste for haute cuisine in an attempt to get people 
to respect him more, B now not only no longer enjoys the cheaper food he used to 
enjoy, he commands no greater respect than he did before becoming a gourmand. The 
point of the expensive tastes objection is that even though, intuitively, the well-being 
inequality between A and B is only unjust in the first scenario and not in the second 
scenario, proponents of equality of well-being appear committed to denying this, and 
asserting instead that both inequalities are unjust. Well-being egalitarianism is fatally 
flawed because it lacks any sensitivity to the responsibility people have for their choices. 
Few if any people believe that compensation is called for in order to rectify the loss of 
well-being experienced by ‘autonomous snobs’ like B. Nor, for that matter, do people 
think compensation is in order for people who choose to be lazy, or people who freely 
choose to gamble and lose. As Cohen puts it: ‘People with expensive tastes could have 
chosen otherwise, and if and when they press for compensation, others are entitled to 
insist that they themselves bear the cost “of their lack of foresight or self-discipline”’.202 
While the expensive tastes objection raises a serious problem for 
straightforward conceptions of equality of well-being it is now well understood that it 
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does not justify the complete abandonment of welfarism. At most, the expensive tastes 
objection demands that the focus of welfarism be shifted from a concern with the well-
being that people actually achieve (an ‘outcome-focused’ view) to a concern with the 
opportunities people have to achieve well-being. Opportunity-based views have been 
espoused by a number of writers.203 Underlying all such views is the core ‘luck-
egalitarian’ intuition that it is ‘morally fitting to hold individuals responsible for the 
foreseeable consequences of their voluntary choices, and in particular for that portion 
of these consequences that involves their own achievement of welfare or gain or loss of 
resources’.204 The attraction of opportunity-based views is that they allow us, when 
thinking about the justice of distributions, to maintain our focus on well-being while 
also remaining sensitive to the luck-egalitarian intuition. 
The obvious prima facie attractiveness of opportunity-based views belies the 
many problems that confront any attempt to articulate a comprehensive account of 
them. Although I cannot here get into a detailed discussion of these problems I must 
say a few things to clarify the way in which I intend to interpret the concept of an 
opportunity. 
The first thing to note is that opportunities vary hugely in their degree of 
effectiveness, from ‘purely formal’ at one end of the scale to ‘fully effective’ at the 
other. A person has a purely formal opportunity when, even though he is at liberty to 
take it (i.e. no one has the right to stop him taking it), it is physically impossible for him 
to do so. As Cohen says, ‘your [formal] opportunities are the same whether you are 
strong and clever or weak and stupid’.205 In contrast, a person has a fully effective 
opportunity when the only thing preventing him from taking it is his own will.206 To 
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take a trivial example, imagine two people standing next to a tree in a park. Other 
things equal, (and assuming that there are no rules against climbing trees in the park) 
the person who is strong enough to easily lift his own body weight has a fully effective 
opportunity to climb the tree, whereas the person who cannot lift his own weight only 
has a formal opportunity to do the same. In between these two extremes are a range of 
more or less effective opportunities, whose effectiveness is determined by factors such 
as, say, the amount of money or the level of qualifications a person has. A person who 
can easily afford both the time and the money to go on a skiing holiday, for example, 
has a fully or near fully effective opportunity to go skiing, whereas a person who can 
afford to go skiing only if he sacrifices many other things that are of value to him, has 
an opportunity to go skiing that is much closer to being purely formal in nature. 
Now, even in these relatively simple cases it is far from easy to determine 
precisely how ‘effective’ the opportunity in question is, and this might make the 
difficulties facing any wider attempt to determine the effectiveness of people’s 
opportunities for well-being seem insurmountable. It is certainly true that an accurate 
assessment of the effectiveness of the opportunities for well-being that people have will 
be extremely difficult to make. But there is reason to think that, over time, our ability to 
make these assessments will gradually improve. As long as the opportunity-based view 
in question is an egalitarian one – and the one I aim to defend is indeed egalitarian – the 
only differences in the outcomes achieved by different people vis-à-vis their well-being 
should be differences that are attributable to the choices that people have made, rather 
than any facts about their circumstances. In other words, it will be possible to make 
retrospective assessments of the opportunities faced by different people at some earlier 
time by working out what proportion of their current success (or failure) is attributable 
to (brute) luck and what proportion is attributable to the choices they have made. 
Of course, a retrospective judgement like this is not particularly helpful to those 
people who, as it turns out, did not in fact face equally effective opportunities – the 
                                                                                                                                    
and we do not in fact have free will even in a compatibilist sense, then its practical recommendations 
collapse into straightforward equality of welfare. If no one has any control over their actions then it 
would seem rather harsh to guarantee some people lower welfare than others by giving them a strictly 
equal share of resources. 
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best we can do is provide some form of compensation – and this is why I say that our 
ability to get it right from the start will improve over time. But someone might now 
object that this attempt to deal with the problem of measuring opportunities by 
resorting to retrospective judgements of the relative influence of brute luck and choice 
simply brings a new problem into view. The problem is that it is extremely difficult in 
practice to distinguish the part of a person’s success that reflects the opportunities he 
had from the part of his success that reflects both the effort and the choices he has 
made. If X is more successful than Y in securing his well-being, for instance, is this 
because he worked harder and made more sensible choices, or is it because his 
opportunities were better? In response it is worth emphasising that the fact that we are 
unable to detect the relative size of the influence of choice on a particular outcome 
does not entail that this influence is not there, still less does it entail that, if it is there, 
then we should ignore it.207 The mere difficulty of applying a conception of justice in 
practice does not count as a decisive consideration against its cogency in theory – if it 
did, then there would barely be a theory of justice left standing. Once a plausible and 
coherent conception has been worked out in theory the practical aim is to get as close 
as possible to achieving it. The fact that we cannot achieve a state of affairs in practice 
that would be, by the lights of the theory, perfection, does not prove that if we could 
achieve such a state of affairs it would not be perfect. 
VI. The currency quest ion:  an out l ine o f  a theory o f  we l l -be ing 
In the previous section I argued that, although there are numerous problems 
with the idea of referring directly to well-being in the formulation of the distributive 
component of justice, these problems are not serious enough to warrant abandoning 
the focus on well-being altogether. Combined with the earlier discussions in sections III 
and IV we now have solid grounds for thinking that the content of the distributive 
component of justice is given by the principle of equality of opportunity for well-being. 
                                                
207 See Cohen’s discussion of the inconsistent practical recommendations made by Rawls in response 
to the hard-to-detect influences of individual responsibility for taste, on the one hand, and individual 
effort on wealth and income, on the other. See, Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', 
pp.914-16. 
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There is, however, one more serious problem left to deal with, which I referred to in 
the previous section as the ‘fair shares objection’ to welfarism. In order to deal with the 
fair shares objection, I first need to flesh out in more detail what I take to be the 
correct account of well-being. After completing that task in this section I will go on in 
the next section to explain the fair shares objection and to demonstrate how the 
particular understanding of well-being I have outlined avoids it. 
Since what I am ultimately interested in developing is a theory of distributive 
justice, not a theory of well-being, I shall not attempt to do anything more in this 
section than simply outline those aspects of a theory of well-being that are necessary to 
get the theory of justice off the ground – any more comprehensive discussion of well-
being would be surplus to requirements. What I discuss in this section is therefore 
perhaps best described as a ‘theory of justice-relevant well-being’. Moreover, since it 
would take us too far beyond the scope of the current project to argue convincingly for 
a particular theory of justice-relevant well-being (from now on simply ‘theory of well-
being’) I shall restrict myself to stipulating, rather than trying to defend, my preferred 
theory.  
The theory of well-being I shall outline here is a form of preference-satisfaction 
theory. As this label suggests, preference-satisfaction theories hold that a person’s well-
being depends on how well and how many of their preferences are satisfied. But 
preferences come in many different kinds. And, moreover, they can conflict with one 
another from within a single individual’s perspective. Our task, then, is to get clear on 
exactly what kind of preferences we should focus on from the perspective of justice, 
and how the problem of possible conflicts of preferences is to be avoided. 
Turning, then, to the first part of our task, we can begin by noting that 
preferences can be distinguished according to whether they are: 
 
1. Personal or Impersonal. 
2. Ideal or Actual. 
 
 187 
The apparently dichotomous nature of these distinctions is slightly misleading. 
Strictly speaking, the two terms that make up each of these dichotomies represent the 
opposite ends of a sliding scale. Where necessary I shall explain how the ‘sliding scale’ 
interpretation of these distinctions is relevant but, for simplicity’s sake, I shall for the 
most part continue to treat them as straightforward dichotomies. 
Personal preferences are the preferences that people have ‘about their own 
experiences and situation’ (e.g. what career they want, where they want to live, who they 
want to live with, etc.), whereas impersonal preferences are preferences that people 
have about ‘things other than their own or other people’s lives or situations’ (e.g. the 
advance of scientific knowledge or the conservation of a certain species).208 At one end 
of the personal-impersonal scale are theories of justice that only take personal 
preferences into account. At the other end are theories that take the full range of 
personal and impersonal preferences into account. All theories, in other words, take 
personal preferences into account; what differentiates them is the extent to which they 
take impersonal preferences into account. 
Without arguing the case I shall simply follow other writers in holding that, 
while assessments of comprehensive well-being may well need to take impersonal 
preference satisfaction into account, theories of justice-relevant well-being need only be 
concerned with (opportunities for) the satisfaction of personal preferences.209 It seems 
that most people who have given much attention to the problem have been struck by 
the thought that, insofar as we are concerned with what a person is due as a matter of 
justice, we are concerned with what happens to him in particular rather than with what 
happens to the wider world, even if what happens to the wider world is something he 
cares about very much. It also seems as if, for most people, this is as good a 
justification as is needed for excluding the consideration of impersonal preferences 
                                                
208 R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), p.17. Dworkin notes that sometimes personal and impersonal preferences might 
overlap, but I shall follow him in setting this complication to one side. 
209 See, for example, Otsuka, Libertarianism Without Inequality, p.25-9; Arneson, 'Equality and 
Equal Opportunity for Welfare', p.82. 
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from a justice-relevant theory of well-being. The prominent exception is Dworkin, who 
feels the need to produce a further argument to the effect that: 
…insofar as government has either the right or the duty to make people equal, it has 
the right or the duty to make them equal in their personal situation or circumstances, 
including their political power, rather than in the degree to which their differing 
political convictions are accepted by the community, or in the degree to which their 
differing views of an ideal world are realised.210 
The structure of the dual-component model means it is not open to me to 
justify the personal preference restriction in the same way as Dworkin does by 
appealing to ‘the right or the duty’ that ‘government’ has to make people equal. Such an 
appeal might be thought to carry some weight when it comes to working out the 
content of the interactional component of justice, but the whole point of the distributive 
component is that it is supposed to tell us what people are due independently of any 
considerations about who has the right or duty to give it to them. And in any case, it 
seems clear that Dworkin’s appeal to the rights and duties of government relies on the 
deeper intuition noted above, namely, that insofar as we are concerned with what a 
person is due as a matter of justice, we are concerned with what happens to him rather 
than with what happens to the wider world, even if what happens to the wider world is 
something he cares very much about. For unless this deeper intuition is implicitly 
playing some underlying justificatory role in Dworkin’s argument, his appeal to the 
‘rights and duties of government’ in order to explain the exclusion of impersonal 
preferences from the scope of welfarism is unpersuasive; if people are just as much due 
the opportunity to satisfy their impersonal preferences as they are due the opportunity 
to satisfy their personal preferences, then it is very hard to see why government would 
not be equally obliged to provide citizens with both. 
I turn now to the ideal/actual distinction. Actual preferences are the 
preferences that real people currently have about their lives. The advantage that actual-
preference-satisfaction theories have is that people’s actual preferences are empirically 
                                                
210 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p.28. 
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accessible, making it easier to work out when a distribution is just according to the 
preference-satisfaction metric. The problem with taking actual preferences as the raw 
material for a theory of well-being, however, is that they are notoriously vulnerable to 
distortions of various kinds, distortions which many writers have convincingly argued 
should not influence what people are entitled to as a matter of justice. The life plan of a 
repressed or abused housewife, for example, may include nothing more ambitious than 
the goal of successfully fulfilling her domestic duties and avoiding being beaten by her 
husband in the process. We do not and should not say that she has all she is entitled to 
as a matter of justice when these distorted preferences – and hence this distorted life 
plan – are satisfied. 
The solution is to slide along the scale from actual preferences towards more 
ideal preferences. Ideal preferences can differ from actual preferences in a number of 
ways. Preferences become increasingly ideal when the information on which they are 
based is more complete, the conditions under which they are formed are more 
conducive to clear thinking, the historical background conditions behind a person’s 
preference-formation are freer from certain negative influences such as abuse and lack 
of education, and the person whose preferences they are makes fewer errors of 
reasoning when forming those preferences. The obvious problem with ideal-
preference-satisfaction theories is that, unlike actual preferences, ideal preferences are 
not immediately accessible to empirical investigation. Often the best we can do is guess 
what people’s preferences would have been had the various ideal conditions been met. 
Our guesses are often likely to be wrong, and this means that what we think people are 
entitled to as a matter of justice will either be more or less than they are actually entitled 
to. Indeed, there may well be cases – perhaps the majority of cases – in which the most 
reliable way of getting as close as we can to working out what someone’s ideal 
preferences are is simply to take their actual preferences at face value. While regrettable, 
this is not as serious a problem as it sounds. There is a big difference between, on the 
one hand, claiming that satisfying actual preferences is always what justice demands, 
and, on the other hand, claiming that we should satisfy actual preferences when, and 
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only because, this is the best way of getting as close as we can to satisfying ideal 
preferences. 
Now, it’s all very well to say that justice should be concerned with satisfying 
people’s ‘ideal personal preferences’, but it is hard to see what guidance this gives us in 
practice. Perhaps the biggest problem is that each person has a huge number of 
preferences and, often if not always, not all the preferences that a person has are 
satiable within a single life span. This may be simply because he has too many 
preferences. A person’s preferences may include a thousand different activities at which 
he wants to develop a high level at expertise, and it may be that there simply isn’t 
enough time in a normal human lifespan in which to achieve this. Alternatively, it may 
be that a person’s preferences are incompatible with each other, in some more or less 
strict sense. Thus, someone’s preference to be a family man who spends a lot of time 
with his children may not be compatible with his preference to be a top defence lawyer. 
Or someone’s preference to be a professional tennis player may not be compatible with 
her preference to be a professional footballer. Whatever the reason is, if a person’s 
preferences are not collectively satiable within a single lifetime, then we will not know 
how to respond from the point of view of justice. We therefore need some way of 
deciding which of a person’s ideal personal preferences we should be concerned to 
provide him with the opportunities to satisfy. 
My response to this problem involves moving from the rather loose talk about 
‘preference-satisfaction’ to the more restrictive notion of the ‘successful execution of 
life plans’. The notion of a ‘life plan’ refers not only to the bare personal preferences 
(for which read the personal aims, interests, goals, and desires) that a person has across 
their life as a whole but, more specifically, to the way these various preferences fit 
together into a single, rational, ‘harmonious’ scheme. According to Rawls, the notion of 
a life plan is ‘fundamental for the definition of good, since [it] establishes the basic 
point of view from which all judgements of value relating to a particular person are to 
be made and finally rendered consistent’.211 
                                                
211 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.359. 
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Because a person will typically have a wide range of personal preferences that 
are not all compatible or combinable within a single life plan, there will usually be a 
range of different life plans rationally available to that person. Importantly, though, 
some of these life plans are more rational than others. Life plans are rational, in the first 
instance, to the extent that they satisfy the principles of rational choice, which Rawls 
lists as: (a) the principle of effective means, (b) the principle of inclusiveness, and (c) 
the principle of the greater likelihood. The principle of effective means says that life 
plan X is to rationally preferable to life plan Y insofar as plan X achieves more of an 
agent’s preferences with fewer means. That is, plan X is rationally preferable to plan Y 
if it achieves the same preferences but with less costly means, or it achieves more (or 
more important) preferences with the same means. The principle of inclusiveness says 
that plan X is to be preferred to plan Y if plan X achieves all of the preferences 
achieved by plan Y and one or more further preferences in addition. The principle of 
the greater likelihood says that plan X is to be preferred to plan Y if plan X offers a 
greater likelihood than plan Y that the agent’s preferences will actually be realised. 
Together these three principles of rational choice (or ‘counting principles’, as Rawls 
sometimes refers to them) will pick out a rational subset of the full range of life plans 
available to an agent. The most rational plan within this rational subset is the plan that 
the agent would choose under ideal conditions – what Rawls refers to as the conditions 
of ‘deliberative rationality’. Ultimately, says Rawls: 
…a person [is] happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of 
a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favourable conditions, and he is 
reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through. Someone is happy when his 
plans are going well, his more important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure 
that his good fortune will endure. Since plans which it is rational to adopt vary from 
person to person depending upon their endowments and circumstances, and the like, 
different individuals find their happiness in doing different things.212 
                                                
212 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.359. 
 192 
Successfully executing one’s rational life plan is thus not an alternative to, but a 
means of, satisfying one’s preferences. Indeed, it is a particularly effective way of 
satisfying one’s preferences, since in forming a rational life plan one inevitably has to 
decide how best to fit together as many of one’s important and possibly conflicting 
preferences in order to maximise the amount of satisfaction achievable in one’s life. 
Now that we know both what type of preferences the distributive component of 
justice is concerned with and how the problem of how to order those preferences is to 
be dealt with, we are in a position to plug these ideas into our formulation of the 
distributive component of justice. Thus we can say that a distribution is just according 
to the distributive component when each person has an equal opportunity to 
successfully execute the rational life plan he would chosen under conditions of 
deliberative rationality based on his ideal personal preferences. This is, admittedly, not a 
particularly succinct principle. But it is, I believe, the correct one. Our next task is to 
show that, as an archetypal ‘welfarist’ principle, the principle of equality of opportunity 
for well-being can be defended from what has become known as the ‘fair shares 
objection’ to welfarism. 
VII. Avoiding the ‘ fa ir  shares  ob je c t ion’  
Dworkin argues forcefully that the welfarist aim of making people equal in the 
success they achieve in executing their life plans (or, we should now say, their 
opportunities for achieving such success), is implausible unless we already know what 
sort of life plans it is reasonable for people to form in the first place. Dworkin claims, for 
example, that it would be unreasonable for someone to expect an equal opportunity to 
lead the life of someone with ‘supernatural physical or mental powers, or the life span 
of Methuselah’.213 Similarly, it would be unreasonable for someone to expect an equal 
opportunity to pursue a life that ‘someone with an unfairly large share of the world’s 
resources’ might expect to lead.214 What this means, says Dworkin, is that we need to 
know how to distribute resources fairly to people before we even think about equalising 
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opportunity for well-being. But if we already know what a fair share of resources is 
before applying the principle of equality of opportunity of well-being, then the latter 
principle is clearly either redundant or, worse, unjust.  
Dworkin is quite right to point out the possibility that the welfarist principle I 
am defending here could have some very implausible implications if the life plans 
people choose – and to which the principle is supposed to respond – are wildly 
unrealistic. But his conclusion, that the principle of equality of opportunity for well-
being should be replaced by the principle of equal resources, is too quick. It is too quick 
because Dworkin makes the unwarranted assumption that the only ‘reasonable’ life 
plans are those that are formed against an independently justified ‘fair’ background 
distribution of resources. This assumption is too controversial to carry the weight that 
Dworkin places on it, and, indeed, it is an assumption that welfarists explicitly reject, 
since the type and amount of resources that one will have with which to pursue one’s 
life plan is the very point at issue between resourcists and welfarists. Nevertheless, 
Dworkin’s objection still presents welfarists with a serious challenge. For as I said 
above, it does seem true that some life plans are straightforwardly ‘unreasonable’, in the 
sense that the people who form them would not be entitled to expect an opportunity to 
pursue them that is equally as effective as the opportunities others have the right to 
expect with regards to their own more ‘reasonable’ plans (think here of the person who 
forms a life plan based on the assumption that she will have supernatural powers). The 
challenge for welfarists is to show that such unreasonable life plan formation can be 
ruled out without assuming a prior and independent theory of ‘fair shares’ of resources. 
If we can meet this challenge, then we can defeat Dworkin’s objection, since as long as 
the life plans that people choose are reasonable (or perhaps we should now say 
‘acceptable’), there will no longer be any objection to any unequal distribution that 
follows as a consequence of our attempt to provide everyone with equal opportunities 
to execute them. 
How can we demonstrate that it is possible for people to choose acceptable life 
plans without assuming an antecedently fair distribution of resources? In order to 
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answer this question I shall make use of the desert island scenario famously proposed 
by Dworkin himself. We are to imagine that a number of shipwreck survivors are 
washed up on a desert island that has ‘abundant resources and no native population’ 
and, further, that because ‘any likely rescue is many years away’ they must decide how 
to distribute the resources fairly.215 Contra Dworkin, who assumes that the islanders all 
believe that the island’s resources should be divided equally, I shall assume that the 
islanders believe that the island’s resources should be divided as far as possible so as to 
leave everyone with equal opportunity for well-being. There are numerous advantages 
to studying the application of these ideals in the desert island scenario depicted by 
Dworkin. The most obvious is the degree of simplicity that comes from analysing the 
problem of distribution on such a small scale. Another obvious advantage is that we 
don’t have to deal with the problem of prior claims to any of the relevant resources. 
Finally, since the population is constant and everyone ‘starts’ at the same time, we avoid 
the problems caused by continuous changes in the size and identity of the population. 
In what follows I set out how I think the islanders should go about applying the 
principle of equality of opportunity for well-being to the distribution of resources on 
the desert island. 
After people arrive on the island we are to imagine that they each familiarise 
themselves with the rough type and amount of resources available on the island and the 
total size of the island’s new population. We then turn to the task of deciding how the 
resources on the island should be divided up. Here we are to imagine a two stage 
process. The first stage is the ‘life plan formation’ stage. We are to imagine that during 
this stage each person spends some time thinking hard about how best to combine 
their preferences into a ‘coherent and harmonious’ life plan. In order to do so, each 
person will make use of five pieces of information: 
 
(1) Their personal preferences. 
(2) Their innate physical and mental attributes and abilities, and how these 
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compare to the attributes and abilities of others. 
(3) The rough amount and type of resources on the island.216 
(4) The number of people on the island. 
(5) The regime of distribution on the island (goods will be distributed 
according to the principle of equality of opportunity of well-being).217 
 
I shall also stipulate two conditions that constrain the islanders’ formation of 
life plans. The first condition is what I shall call the ‘good faith requirement’. This states 
that people must form life plans on the understanding that they will genuinely pursue 
this plan throughout their life. The good faith requirement does not imply that people 
must actually pursue their chosen life plans single-mindedly throughout their lives, only 
that they must form them as if this were going to be the case (a good way of doing this 
might perhaps be for each islander to imagine, counterfactually, that he will be forced 
by the other islanders to pursue the plan he chooses during the first stage).218 The 
second condition on life plan formation I shall call the ‘determinateness requirement’. 
This stipulates that each life plan must be formulated in such a way that, before a 
person starts pursuing the plan, we can at least conceive of what it would take to 
successfully execute the plan. So, for example, if your only ambition in life is to find a cure 
for cancer, or invent a time machine, your life plan would not be stated as ‘find a cure 
for cancer’, or ‘invent a time machine’, since we have no idea what it would take (or 
even whether it is possible) to successfully execute these plans. We do, however, have a 
                                                
216 I assume for the sake of simplicity that each person has roughly equal ‘technical knowledge’ of 
the possible uses to which the resources might be put. In a more realistic scenario we might imagine 
that technical experts of various kinds are available for consultation during the first stage in order to 
help people assess the feasibility of their life plans bearing in the mind the current state of 
technological development. 
217 I take it that although the regime of distribution is not up for discussion, knowledge of its contents 
is vital for the plausibility of this sort of exercise (although perhaps if the regime of distribution was 
radically uncertain people would still be able to make some sort of rational choice of life plan – 
perhaps by applying the maximin criterion). But in any case, I hope that revealing to the islanders that 
the regime of distribution will be one of equality of opportunity for well-being will free them to 
choose life plans that they genuinely desire to pursue, safe in the knowledge that they will be 
provided with an equal opportunity to pursue these plans.  
218 Once people know that resources will be distributed according to the principle of equality of 
opportunity for well-being it would become rational to ‘inflate’ the ambitiousness, and hence the 
expected costs, of one’s life plan, way past the point at which one would actually prefer to live in that 
way, simply so as to guarantee oneself as many resources as possible. The good faith requirement 
rules out this move. 
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much better idea what it would take to successfully execute a plan of ‘devoting one’s 
life to medical or engineering research’, so this is one way in which the original specific 
and ambitious goals could be coherently incorporated into particular life plans. 
With these two conditions in mind the islanders use the information pertaining 
to the five considerations listed above to form their life plans. There is, however, one 
important piece of information that the islanders don’t or, rather, can’t know during 
this first ‘life plan formation’ stage: the content of other people’s preferences. The reason for 
this is that if we don’t restrict access to such knowledge people may never be able to 
form any life plans at all. We know that the relative strength of a person’s preferences, 
possibly the preferences themselves, and certainly the life plans that are formed on the 
basis of them, will inevitably be affected by knowledge of the preferences of others. 
The problem is that if A changes his preferences in response to B-Z’s preferences this 
will in turn affect the preferences of (some or all of) B-Z, which might in turn affect the 
preferences of A. There may be no way out of this vicious circle. Imagine, for instance, 
that before A knows that lots of other people want to be entertainers, his preference 
for being an entertainer is marginally stronger than his preference for being a 
shipbuilder. When he finds out that nearly everyone (B-Y) prefers being an entertainer 
to being a shipbuilder, A’s preference for shipbuilding may become stronger than his 
preference for entertaining. But now person Z, who only wanted to be a shipbuilder if 
he was going to be the only person building ships, will no longer want to be a 
shipbuilder. How his preferences change in response may in turn influence the 
preferences of others. And so on. (For ease of reference I shall label this the ‘paradox 
of preference formation’). It is technically possible that this process may reach a natural 
conclusion, a point at which everyone settles on a solid and unchanging set of 
preferences which has been formed with full knowledge of everyone else’s preferences, 
thereby dissolving the paradox. But unfortunately we have no antecedent guarantee that 
this will in fact happen. In light of this, the sensible thing to do seems to be to ask 
people to form their preferences, and hence their life plans, in the absence of 
knowledge of others’ preferences. 
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So, bearing in mind the information pertaining to points (1)-(5) on the list 
above, people are to think about how best to combine their preferences into a coherent 
life plan. Since most people will have a wide diversity of preferences not all of which 
are combinable within a single plan it is inevitable that some, or perhaps all, will end up 
forming several distinct life plans between each of which they are indifferent (because 
each plan in the set scores equally well in terms of expected preference satisfaction). This 
creates a problem, but also an opportunity, as we move into the second ‘life plan 
allocation’ stage. 
The problem is that if each person has several different ‘first-best’ life plans (in 
terms of the expected preference satisfaction that would result from their successful 
execution) then it is no longer clear how we can satisfy the principle of equality of 
opportunity for well-being. On the contrary, if everyone had a single first-best life plan, 
then we could ‘simply’ work out how to distribute goods so as to provide everyone 
with an equal opportunity of successfully executing this particular plan.219 But when 
each person has multiple plans between which they are indifferent, we need some way 
of deciding which plan is going to be the one that we provide people with an equal 
opportunity to pursue – different plans will ‘cost’ different amounts, literally in terms of 
the ‘opportunity-costs’ of using resources to provide this particular person with this 
particular opportunity rather than someone else with a different opportunity. The 
rational solution would seem to be to base our choice on considerations of efficiency. 
By choosing the plan from each person’s set of first-best plans that offers the highest 
degree of cost effectiveness, we will be able to maximise the average effectiveness of the 
opportunities we provide people with (this is why I said that the fact that most people’s first-
                                                
219 It is important to acknowledge another serious practical difficulty with any welfarist metric (even 
ones that escape the fair shares objection). The problem concerns how we are to measure the relative 
degrees of success that different people are achieving in pursuing their life-plans. How do we decide 
if the person who wants to be a philosophy professor is achieving more or less success in fulfilling 
his plan than the person who wants to be a successful housewife with four children? Without a 
common metric to compare the two, we seem forced to rely on judgements that will inevitably be 
more or less arbitrary. The force of this objection to welfarism is undeniable, and I do not have a 
good response to it. All I can say, once again, is that, if a welfarist principle is the correct 
fundamental principle of justice, then the fact that we are unable to judge with any accuracy when it 
is being satisfied does not constitute a reason for rejecting it (though it may be a reason for adopting a 
more easily measurable proxy). 
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best set of life plans will contain multiple plans presents us with an opportunity as well 
as a problem). 
But now we face a similar problem to the problem raised by the paradox of 
preference formation. How can we tell which life plan from a person’s first-best set is 
the most ‘cost effective’ without first knowing exactly which plans everyone else will be 
pursuing? Imagine that everyone’s first-best set consists of only three plans: they all 
want to be either an entertainer or a shipbuilder or a woodcutter. How do we know 
which plan to help people pursue? Presumably it will in general be cheaper to provide 
naturally talented entertainers with opportunities to be entertainers, naturally talented 
shipbuilders with opportunities to be shipbuilders, and naturally talented woodcutters 
with opportunities to be woodcutters. This is not only because it is difficult (and hence 
costly) to train people for jobs for which they have no natural aptitude, but also 
because people are most productive in jobs at which they are naturally talented. But 
appealing to people’s natural aptitudes will not solve the problem entirely, for there are 
bound to be many people who are roughly equally suited to many different 
occupations. Imagine X, Y, and Z are all equally naturally talented at the three 
occupations in the example. Analysing X’s first-best set we might decide it would be 
most cost effective to provide him with the opportunity to be a woodcutter, since all 
we need to give him is an axe and some brief instructions on how to use it. But then, 
analysing Y’s first-best set, and then Z’s first-best set, we will come to a similar 
conclusion in each case: all three should be given the opportunity to be woodcutters 
because, taken one at a time, this is the most cost effective life plan from each 
individual’s set. Now, however, we have lots of woodcutters, and no entertainers or 
shipbuilders. Since it is likely that some if not most people’s wider life plans will include 
preferences for entertainment and the goods that come from using ships, our decision 
to set X, Y and Z up for woodcutting now appears more costly than it first seemed (in 
terms of our ability to provide for these other aspects of people’s life plans).  
The solution to the problem is to give up trying to individually analyse each 
person’s first-best set in order to determine the least expensive plan for that person 
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taken in isolation and, instead, to take all the plans in everyone’s first-best set together 
and work out a combined solution that allocates life plans to people according to the 
cost effectiveness of the entire, integrated scheme (while ensuring, obviously, that each 
person ends up with an equal opportunity to pursue a plan that was in their original 
first-best set). So, taking X’s, Y’s, and Z’s first-best sets jointly into consideration, for 
example, we might decide that the most efficient way of giving each an equal 
opportunity to successfully execute (one of) his first-best life plan(s) is to allocate X the 
resources he needs to be a woodcutter, Y the resources he needs to be an entertainer, 
and Z the resources he needs to be a shipbuilder. There is no necessary reason, of 
course, why the individuals in question should be matched up with the jobs they are in 
fact matched up with. But notice that neither X, nor Y, nor Z can complain that they 
have been treated unfairly (and I should perhaps stress here that talk of ‘matching 
people to jobs’ and of ‘allocating life plans to people’ is not meant to imply that people 
do not have freedom of occupation. The aim here is to set out a scheme for 
distributing goods to people in order to provide them with fair opportunities to satisfy 
their preferences, not to tell them, or force them, to use these opportunities in a certain 
way). Ex hypothesi each individual was indifferent between the three options, and now 
they each have the most effective opportunity possible to successfully pursue one of 
these options, consistent with the others having an equally effective opportunity to 
pursue a different option. Of course, as the picture becomes much bigger and more 
complicated, we may need to use increasingly powerful computers to carry out the 
necessary combinatorial calculations. But the possibility of solving the problem stands, 
at least in principle. 
It might be helpful to briefly recap how the two-stage process works: In the 
first ‘life plan formation’ stage, people form one or more life plans between which they 
are indifferent (in terms of expected preference satisfaction) based on their knowledge 
of key facts about the world in which they will attempt to execute their life plan 
(including its resource wealth, the number of people who have a claim on this wealth, 
and their attributes and abilities). In the second ‘life plan allocation’ stage, the sets of 
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preferred life plans that people form during the first stage are collected together and 
one life plan from each person’s set is allocated to that person in such a way that when 
we apply the principle of equality of opportunity for well-being, each person is 
provided with an equal and maximally effective opportunity to successfully execute 
their allocated plan. The point of the two-stage process is to demonstrate how people 
might come to form ‘acceptable’ or ‘reasonable’ life plans without assuming a prior 
theory of fair shares of resources. I shall now briefly assess how successfully the two-
stage process achieves this aim. 
One potential concern is simply that the two-stage process does not, in fact, 
rule out the possibility that people will form life plans that are ‘unreasonable’. We must 
be careful to state the right form of this objection. We cannot object, as Dworkin does, 
that it is ‘unreasonable’ for one to form a life plan based on the assumption that one 
will or might have an unequal share of the world’s resources; to repeat, the share of 
resources one will have with which to lead one’s life is precisely the point at issue 
between resourcists and welfarists, and so this form of Dworkin’s objection is 
straightforwardly question-begging. Instead, we must object on the grounds that it is 
unreasonable to assert a claim to any amount of resources when the preferences (or life 
plan) on which the claim is based are of a certain unacceptable kind. Are the life plans 
that people are allocated through the two-stage process of this unacceptable kind? I do 
not think so. The good faith requirement rules out the formation of life plans that 
people would not be genuinely happy to actually follow, thus ensuring that no one tries 
to manipulate the system in his favour by disingenuously inflating the ambitiousness 
and thus costliness of his life plan. The determinateness requirement ensures that the 
life plans which people do form are formulated in such a way that we know, or at least 
would not have too much trouble working out, what would be required to provide 
someone with an effective opportunity to pursue it. When these two conditions are 
combined with the further implicit requirement that people form rational life plans 
based on their aim of securing the highest expected degree of preference satisfaction in 
light of a rough idea of the total amount and type of resources and the number of other 
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people who have a claim to these resources, I think we can be reasonably certain that 
the life plans people form will not be ‘unacceptable’ in the relevant sense. This is not to 
deny the possibility that people might form extremely ambitious life plans during the 
first stage of the process.220 But there are several things we can say in response to this. 
First, people’s knowledge of the resource (and technological) limitations of the world 
will likely rule out insanely ambitious plans (it would be irrational, for instance, to form 
a plan to visit all the stars in the galaxy). Second, whenever a person is indifferent 
between a hugely ambitious life plan and a rather less ambitious life plan, we can be 
fairly confident that the latter life plan will be allocated to him in the second stage. And, 
third, even if the only life plan a person chooses is extremely ambitious, it is important 
to remember that this reflects his preferences in the same way that all first-best life 
plans do. If anyone objects to the person who has a much larger share of resources 
devoted to his life than anyone else does, the correct response, as long as the process 
has been conducted properly, is that there is nothing unfair about this.221 
A second concern with the two-stage process is that it is not sensitive enough 
to the luck-egalitarian intuition because, although it is welfarist in spirit, it still allows 
brute luck too much influence in determining people’s life prospects. By allowing 
people to form life plans based not only on knowledge of their own attributes and 
abilities but also their place in the distribution of talents we are allowing people’s life 
plans to be too heavily influenced by irrelevant contingencies. This concern is 
unwarranted. Allowing people to form their life plans on the basis of information about 
their own and others’ attributes and abilities is intended to enable them to make rational 
decisions about how best to satisfy their preferences. Consider a person who would 
prefer being a professional singer to being a professional footballer in a world where he 
                                                
220 Indeed, as the population of the world we are talking about increases, the likelihood of people 
forming extremely ambitious life plans also increases, since the bigger the population, the smaller the 
difference will be in the relative effectiveness of the opportunities with which people can be provided 
in order to pursue a moderately ambitious life plan compared to an extremely ambitious life plan. 
221 It is worth noting that this objection could, and most probably would, be pressed not only against 
very able individuals who formed very adventurous life plans, but also far less able, or even disabled 
individuals, who formed less adventurous but equally ‘ambitious’ life plans. The life plan of a 
naturally athletic individual who desires to travel to the edge of the solar system may turn out to be 
no more costly than the life plan of a disabled individual who desires to play professional football. 
Both of these individuals would receive the same amount of assistance in pursuing their goals. 
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was the best singer and the best footballer, but who would prefer being a footballer to 
being a singer in a world where he was an average singer and excellent footballer. 
Absent the information pertaining to his and others’ attributes and abilities he might 
form a life plan to be a singer, but with the information he might, if it turns out that he 
is a more talented footballer than he is singer, form a life plan to be a footballer. Since 
the second world is the one he actually has to live in it seems sensible to allow rather 
than restrict the relevant information. Now consider someone else who only wants to be 
a professional footballer, regardless of how naturally gifted a footballer he is. For this 
person, the information about his and others’ attributes and abilities will make no 
difference; even if he is physically disabled (within limits), it may still be rational to 
form a life plan to be a footballer. This shows that the objection that the two-stage 
process is not sensitive enough to the luck-egalitarian intuition is groundless. 
A related but more serious concern is that severely mentally disabled people are 
excluded from the two-stage process altogether, since participants in the process are 
assumed to be capable of forming life plans. I don’t know how to solve this problem 
(though I take it that this is no special mark against my theory in particular). One 
possibility would be to ask friends or family of the disabled person to act as a trustees 
and to form a life plan or plans for the disabled person which could then be entered 
into the second stage along with everyone else’s plans. The obvious problem with this 
idea is that if a person is incapable of forming a life plan for themselves then it is likely 
that they will also be incapable of consistently and purposefully pursuing it. Indeed, it 
seems that the principle of equality of opportunity for well-being is simply the wrong 
principle when it comes to the question of justice for severely mentally disabled people. 
The idea of providing ‘opportunities’ is a far less attractive solution to the problem of 
justice in this case, and the theory of well-being as the successful execution of life plans 
is equally unhelpful. I suspect, therefore, that the most plausible and satisfactory way of 
dealing with this issue is to come up with a new principle that would supplement the 
principle of equality of opportunity for well-being. The distributive component of 
justice would then say that a distribution is perfectly just when all people who are 
 203 
capable of forming and pursuing life plans have equality of opportunity for well-being 
and all people are not capable of forming and pursuing life plans have X. Unfortunately 
it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to speculate about what ‘X’ might be in 
this case. 
A final set of problems with the two stage process are not moral, but practical 
in nature. What plausibility the scheme has as a whole depends to a large extent on our 
accepting some pretty extravagant idealisations and far fetched abstractions. In my 
defence, I shall simply repeat what Dworkin says: 
…our project is in the main…entirely theoretical. Our interest is primarily in the design 
of an ideal, and of a device to picture that ideal and test its coherence, completeness, 
and appeal. We shall therefore ignore practical difficulties, like the problem of 
gathering information, that do not impeach these theoretical goals, and also make 
simplifying counterfactual assumptions that do not subvert them.222 
Whether or not the two-stage process I have described here is more or less 
unrealistic than Dworkin’s auction and hypothetical insurance market is irrelevant. The 
real test, as Dworkin says, is whether the two-stage process can help us to see (and, 
ultimately, convince us) that the principle of equality of opportunity is coherent, 
complete, and appealing. As long as it succeeds in doing this then that is all that can be 
reasonably asked. 
VIII.  Conc lus ion 
I have argued in this chapter that the content of the distributive component of 
justice is given by the principle of equality of opportunity for well-being. More 
specifically, I have argued that a distribution is only fully just when every individual has 
an equally effective opportunity to successfully execute one of his first-best life plans 
constructed under ideal conditions from ideal personal preferences. My argument for 
this conclusion involved a number of steps. First, using the formal features of the 
distributive component (e.g. the fact that its content must be constituted by principles 
                                                
222 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp.72-3. 
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that are able to be applied in a teleological as well as a deontological sense) I argued that 
the content of the distributive component is most likely to be constituted by either an 
egalitarian or sufficientarian principle, rather than some form of maximising principle. I 
then argued that egalitarianism is to be preferred to sufficientarianism on substantive 
grounds. Having established to a fairly high degree of confidence that the content of 
the distributive component is given by some form of egalitarian principle, I then argued 
that the most plausible candidate for the currency of this egalitarian principle is 
‘opportunity for well-being’. I defended and explained the need to appeal to opportunities 
for well-being, rather than outcomes, and I then addressed a number of different 
objections to the idea of appealing to well-being in the formulation of principles of 
justice, most notably the ‘fair shares’ objection. My solution to the fair shares objection 
involved first setting out a theory of justice-relevant well-being according to which a 
person’s well-being is to be judged according to how successful they are in executing a 
rational life plan formed from their ideal personal preferences. I then claimed that by 
getting everyone to form a set of first-best life plans on the basis of restricted 
information and then allocating one of these life plans to each person through a 
combined assessment of the most efficient way of maximally satisfying everyone’s life 
plans we would be able to avoid the fair shares objection. 
Obviously I hope that my defence of the principle of equality of opportunity 
for well-being is successful, or at least persuasive. But it is clearly a very complex 
argument, and that means there are inevitably many points at which it might be 
criticised. However, even if my argument is neither successful nor persuasive, the 
implications of this failure should not be misunderstood. The cogency of the dual-
component model as a whole is independent of the plausibility of any particular 
conception of the content of (either of) its components. If the principle of equality of 
opportunity for well-being is found to be fatally flawed, all it shows is that more work 
needs to be done in order to work out the content of the distributive component of 
justice. But, having said that, for all the problems it faces, I do think that the principle 
of equality of opportunity for well-being is a plausible interpretation of the ideal of 
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basic distributive fairness. More than that, I think the idea that the world will only be 
fully just when each person has a genuinely equal chance to pursue his or her goals and 
desires is an inspiring one. It now only remains to be seen in the next chapter what 
sorts of considerations could potentially block our path to achieving it. 
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(8) The Interactional Component of Justice 
I .  Introduct ion 
The central claim of the dual-component model of justice is that there are two 
necessary conditions of a perfectly just distribution. First, the distribution in question 
must mirror the ideal of basic distributive fairness. Second, it must have been brought 
about without the violation of the principles of justified coercion. If my argument so 
far has been correct then we can say that the ideal of basic distributive fairness consists 
in an equal distribution of opportunity for well-being, and that it is therefore a 
necessary condition of a perfectly just distribution that all persons have an equal 
opportunity for well-being. In this chapter I turn my attention to the second necessary 
condition of a perfectly just distribution. Unlike my treatment of the distributive 
component, however, my discussion of the interactional component will not feature 
any attempt to work out the precise content of its fundamental principle(s). The reason 
for this, as I explained in section IV of chapter 6, is that determining the content of the 
principles of justified coercion is a much more difficult task than determining the 
content of the distributive component (and we have already seen how difficult the latter 
task is). The distributive component is concerned with articulating a single, important 
value: basic distributive fairness, but the interactional component, due to its inherently 
practical, action-guiding nature, must incorporate a much wider range of relevant 
considerations. Rather than trying to work out the detailed content of the interactional 
component then, I shall be content with the more modest aim of explaining more 
clearly why the interactional component of justice is so important and why we should 
care about it, and to indicate the kinds of things that one would need to consider in 
order to begin to work out its content. 
To be even more specific, my primary concern is to bring the discussion back 
to the topic of global justice with which we started, and to explain why the dual-
component model may prove to be a particularly helpful tool in making sense of the 
normative problems we face in this area. The distributive component on its own is 
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clearly of little use; for even if we could all agree that equality of opportunity for well-
being (or whatever conception of basic distributive fairness one prefers) is an attractive 
ideal to aim for at some point in the future, what we really need to know now is what 
can and should be done about the current global state of affairs. This latter question is 
the one to which the interactional component of justice seeks to provide an answer. In 
light of this, though, it might be wondered why we should bother with the distributive 
component at all. Why not just start and end with the interactional component? A poor 
answer to this question is that until we know where we are going it is difficult, and 
perhaps impossible, to work out how to get there. As Sen has recently argued, it is 
simply false to claim that we need to know what perfect justice looks like before we can 
improve the justice of the world as it currently is.223 Trying to determine the content of 
ideal justice is undoubtedly a very interesting exercise, but it seems unlikely that success 
in this endeavour is a necessary condition on progress towards an incrementally more 
just world in the here and now. 
A better answer refers not to the immediate practical benefits of developing these 
two distinct components of justice but to the long term practical benefits on the one 
hand, and the obvious theoretical benefits on the other. Being clear about our reasons 
for eradicating injustice may not expedite the initial remedy, but it is surely likely to 
increase the robustness of that remedy when it eventually comes. And, of course, in 
order to get clear about our reasons for eradicating injustice, it is not enough merely to 
want to see an end to injustice; we need to know why something counts as an injustice 
in the first place. By developing the distributive component of justice as a first step 
towards formulating a complete theory of justice we make it much easier to 
subsequently set out and explain the role of the interactional component within that 
theory. There is no necessary reason why the interactional component could not be 
developed as a freestanding element within a particular conception of justice – this is, 
after all, what proponents of the coercion view of justice do all the time. But the 
                                                
223 Sen, The Idea of Justice, esp., Introduction. 
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interactional component makes much more sense, and will ultimately, I hope, have 
much more impact, when it is discussed in relation to the distributive component. 
As I explained in chapter 6, a useful way of characterising the role of the 
interactional component is as specifying the limits of what we may justifiably coerce 
people to do in order to realise and maintain the ideal of basic distributive fairness. 
Having seen in the previous chapter what the ideal of equality of opportunity for well-
being entails we can be sure that any attempt to realise and maintain a distribution that 
mirrored that ideal will be very demanding task. Of course, if realising and maintaining 
the ideal in the real world was all we cared about, then presumably we would be willing 
to do whatever it takes. But realising and maintaining the ideal of distributive fairness is 
not all we care about. And when we consider some of the things that realising and 
maintaining the ideal would require us to do, then we may, all things considered, judge 
them to be rationally undesirable and perhaps even intrinsically unjust. The 
interactional component’s role is to respond to the potential undesirability and intrinsic 
injustice of attempts to realise the ideal of basic distributive fairness and to offer 
practical guidance in the form of principled limits on how people may justifiably 
exercise coercion over one another. If these limits are violated then even though the 
distribution that results from such violations might ultimately mirror the ideal of basic 
distributive fairness, it will nevertheless be tainted with injustice. My modest aim for 
this chapter is to give some indication of where the source of this injustice lies. 
II .  Rational  undes irabi l i ty  and intr ins i c  in just i c e  
In the last paragraph of the previous section I referred to the interactional 
component’s role in constraining the potential rational undesirability and intrinsic injustice of 
attempts to realise and maintain the ideal of basic distributive fairness. In this section I 
explain what I mean by the ‘rational (un)desirability’ of attempts to realise the 
distributive ideal. In doing so it will hopefully become clear both why the rational 
desirability of attempts to realise the distributive ideal is relevant to the content of the 
interactional component, and what the difference is between saying that an attempt to 
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realise the distributive ideal is rationally undesirable and saying that such an attempt is 
intrinsically unjust. 
One caveat: various attempts to realise the ideal of basic distributive fairness 
might be rationally undesirable in a whole host of different ways, depending on the 
values they promote or demote, and the relative weight of these values. These issues are 
far too complicated to discuss adequately here. I shall therefore restrict the scope of my 
discussion of the rational desirability of attempts to realise the distributive ideal to their 
rational desirability when judged purely from the perspective of the distributive ideal itself. It is also 
important to emphasise that throughout this section I shall leave any concerns about 
the intrinsic injustice of various attempts to realise the distributive ideal to one side. 
So, in attempting to realise or maintain the ideal of basic distributive fairness, 
there are bound to be a wide range of different ways in which we can coerce each 
other, either directly or through the state, that will help bring us closer to our goal. Let 
us refer to these different ways of coercing one another as ‘strategies’ for realising and 
maintaining the distributive ideal. I shall say that a particular strategy for realising and 
maintaining the distributive ideal is desirable, in the first instance, to the extent that it 
achieves its aim of producing a distribution of equality of opportunity for well-being. 
Moreover, I shall say that one equality-achieving strategy is more desirable than another 
equality-achieving strategy if the equal opportunities it produces are more effective than 
the opportunities produced by the alternative strategy. This conclusion (that an equality 
in which everyone is better off is better than an equality in which everyone is worse off) 
is not explicit in the formulation of the distributive component, but it is nevertheless 
entailed by it. To take an example of Christiano’s, imagine two scenarios, in the first of 
which A has 2 and B also has 2, (A:2, B:2) and in the second of which A has 5 and B 
also has 5 (A:5, B:5).224 (The numbers stand for the effectiveness of A and B’s 
opportunities for well-being). Both scenarios obviously satisfy the distributive 
component of justice, and both are therefore perfectly just. But in the second scenario 
                                                
224 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p.33. 
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everyone is better off than they are in the first scenario, and so the second scenario is to 
be preferred even when judged purely from the point of view of the distributive component. 
How can this be explained? The answer Christiano gives is this: 
There is an internal connection between the rationale for equality and the value of the 
relevant fundamental good that is equalised. If it were not true that more well-being is 
better than less, then there would be no point to equality. There would be no reason to 
care about equality. Since the importance of well-being or opportunity for well-being 
seems to be built in to the principle of equality – it is the reason for the principle taking 
the shape that it does – [egalitarians] cannot be indifferent between these two 
[scenarios].225 
The second scenario (A:5, B:5) is to be preferred to the first (A:2, B:2), 
according to the distributive component, because not only is the distribution in the 
second scenario equally just when compared to the distribution in the first scenario (a 
point that is obviously directly relevant according to the distributive component) but 
also because the overall level of opportunity for well-being is higher in the second 
scenario than the first, (a point that is relevant according to the rationale underlying the 
distributive component). 
What are the implications of this for the interactional component? Well, 
imagine there are only two feasible ‘strategies’ available to us for attempting to realise 
the distributive ideal. Strategy 1 promises to produce the first scenario (A:2, B:2), and 
strategy 2 promises to produce the second scenario (A:5, B:5). Both strategies involve 
the exercise of coercion over various people in numerous different ways, but since the 
intrinsic injustice of these coercive strategies is not in question, the only basis on which 
we have to choose between them is their relative desirability in terms of achieving the 
goal of distributive fairness. I believe that our preference for the second scenario over 
the first scenario should be taken to imply that the principles of the interactional 
component should rule out the coercion involved in implementing strategy 1 as 
unjustified (or at least, they should rule out as unjustified any coercion involved in 
                                                
225 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p.33. 
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implementing strategy 1 that is not required in order to implement strategy 2). Notice 
that it would not be (derivatively) unjust according to the distributive component to 
implement strategy 1, since the result would still be a perfectly just distribution of 
equality. My claim is that the implementation of strategy 1 would be directly unjust 
according to the interactional component, because such coercion would make everyone 
worse off than they need to be, and this is rationally undesirable even on the 
distributive component’s own terms. 
What if the only feasible choice is not between the first scenario and the second 
scenario, but between the first scenario (A:2, B:2) and a third scenario in which A has 1 
and B has 5 (A:1, B:5)? The implication here is that the only way to distribute 5 to B is to 
pursue a coercive strategy (strategy 3) that leaves A with 1. I think what we should say 
in this case is that the principles of the interactional component should rule out as 
unjustified any coercive practice that is uniquely implied by strategy 3. The reason for 
this is that although the third scenario seems preferable in terms of overall opportunity 
for well-being compared to the first scenario, the third scenario is nevertheless unjust 
(in terms of the distributive component). The general rule here, I think, (though see the 
caveat in the next paragraph), is that the undesirability of an unequal, and hence unjust, 
distribution trumps the desirability of a higher overall level of opportunity for well-
being (again, only when viewed purely from the perspective of the distributive 
component). If our only two feasible strategic options are to produce either an equal 
distribution in which all parties have moderately effective opportunities for well-being 
or an unequal distribution in which some parties have extremely effective opportunities 
for well-being and some parties have slightly-less-than-moderately effective 
opportunities for well-being, then, insofar as the principles of the interactional 
component are concerned with the desirability of the alternative strategies relative to the 
distributive component, these principles should prohibit the implementation of the 
second strategy. 
I have argued that, as a general rule, the justice (i.e. equality) of a distribution 
usually trumps its preferability in terms of overall opportunity for well-being (assuming 
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such a quality is in principle measurable). This means that when our only two strategic 
options are to produce either an equal distribution, or an unequal distribution in which 
some are (slightly) lower and some are (much) higher, the principles of the interactional 
component should prioritise the former by allowing any coercion that is necessary, and 
prohibiting any exercise of coercion that is not necessary, to the implementation of the 
strategy that produces the equal distribution. The caveat to this general rule arises when 
our only two strategic options are to produce either an equal distribution, or to produce 
an unequal distribution that is (at least weakly) pareto superior. Let’s say our only two 
feasible strategic options are to produce either the first scenario (A:2, B:2) or a new, 
fourth scenario, in which the distribution is (A:2, B:5). If we were applying the general 
rule, we would presumably conclude that the first scenario is more desirable from the 
perspective of the distributive component than the fourth scenario, because although 
there is a higher overall level of opportunity in the latter, there is also inequality, and 
inequality trumps aggregate opportunity. This doesn’t seem right, however. Recalling 
Christiano’s distinction between the principle of equality itself and the rationale 
underlying the principle, it seems that although the inequality in scenario four is to be 
regretted in one sense as unfair (and hence not perfectly just), it is nevertheless a more 
desirable distribution, on the distributive component’s own terms, than the first 
scenario, because the opportunities under that scenario are better for some and worse 
for none. In this situation, when it comes to determining the limits that the 
interactional component should place on justified coercion, the correct solution is to 
say that the coercive strategy required to bring about scenario four should be permitted 
and any coercion that would be required to produce scenario two should be prohibited. 
To recap the argument of this section: I have argued that the content of the 
interactional component can be at least partially determined just by analysing the 
comparative desirability – from the perspective of the distributive component – of 
various distribution-producing coercive strategies. I considered four different 
possibilities: 
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Scenario one – achieved by coercive strategy 1 – (A:2, B:2) 
Scenario two – achieved by coercive strategy 2 – (A:5, B:5) 
Scenario three – achieved by coercive strategy 3 – (A:1, B:5) 
Scenario four – achieved by coercive strategy 4 – (A:2, B:5) 
 
Ignoring questions about the intrinsic injustice of these various coercive 
strategies, I compared strategy 1 against each of the other strategies and decided which 
coercive strategy the interactional component should prohibit/permit based purely on a 
judgement of the relative desirability of the scenarios that were achievable by pursuing 
each strategy. Comparing strategies 1 and 2, I concluded that the principles of the 
interactional component should permit strategy 2 and prohibit strategy 1. Comparing 
strategies 1 and 3, I concluded that the interactional component should permit strategy 
1 and prohibit strategy 3. Comparing strategies 1 and 4, I concluded that the 
interactional component should permit strategy 4 and prohibit strategy 1. The argument 
for permitting 2 while prohibiting 1 seems uncontroversial, since both 1 and 2 are 
equally just and everyone benefits from 2 compared to 1. The argument for permitting 
1 while prohibiting 3 is fairly straightforward too, since an injustice is introduced in 3 
and this injustice comes at the cost of A, who loses out compared to 1. The argument 
for permitting 4 and prohibiting 1 is perhaps most controversial, since here the 
introduction of a distributive injustice is being tacitly endorsed by the interactional 
component. But since the injustice does not come at anyone’s cost, there does not seem 
anything objectionable in principle about the interactional component’s tacit endorsement 
of this injustice (recall that the distributive component still recognises an injustice here). 
What all this shows is that some fairly substantive conclusions about the 
content of the interactional component can be derived simply from assessing the 
relative desirability of various strategies for achieving the distributive ideal. This is even 
before we get on to the tricky questions of the possible intrinsic injustice of such 
strategies. As a final point it is worth noting that even if one doesn’t agree with the final 
claim I make in the preceding paragraph – that is, even if one thinks that, judged purely 
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from the perspective of the distributive component, the relative desirability of the 
distributions that are produced by strategy 1 and strategy 4 means that the interactional 
component should rule out the implementation of strategy 4 and thereby ensure the 
implementation of strategy 1 – there are still other grounds for thinking that the 
interactional component should allow 4 and prohibit 1. These grounds refer to the 
intrinsic injustice of treating people merely as a means to the production of a fair 
distribution, even when no one else benefits from this. Questions about the intrinsic 
injustice of attempts to realise the distributive ideal thus offer us entirely independent 
grounds for permitting or prohibiting the exercise of coercion. 
III .  Intr ins i c  in just i c e :  two appl i cat ions for  the interac t ional  component 
In order to a gain a clearer understanding of the ways in which the intrinsic 
injustice of attempts to realise and maintain the distributive ideal can trigger the 
interactional component to rule them out as unjustified, it is helpful to think of the 
principles of the interactional component as applying to two different types of 
situation. Up to this point I have been talking about the permissibility of attempts to 
‘realise and maintain’ the ideal of basic distributive fairness, without making any attempt 
to distinguish between the questions raised by attempts to realise the ideal and the 
questions raised by attempts to maintain the ideal. Distinguishing these two sets of 
questions will help us to pinpoint what exactly is intrinsically unjust about certain types 
of coercion, and this in turn should make it easier to draw out the kinds of underlying 
considerations that motivate the interactional component itself. 
Consider first the problem of maintaining a distribution that mirrors the ideal of 
basic distributive fairness. When we talk about wanting to ‘maintain an ideal 
distribution’ we are obviously talking about a situation in which we want to move from 
one state of affairs in which the ideal distribution exists to another state of affairs in 
which the ideal distribution exists. What we want the interactional component of justice 
to do in this situation is to tell us how we may justifiably coerce people in order to 
effect a move from one state of affairs to the other without disrupting the distribution 
of equality of opportunity for well-being already in place. I shall refer to this as the 
 215 
‘ideal application problem’, since the problem here is one of applying the principles of 
justified coercion to a situation which is, in one sense at least, ideal. 
Next consider the problem of realising a distribution that mirrors the ideal of 
basic distributive fairness. In this case we are obviously talking about a situation in 
which we want to move from a state of affairs in which the ideal distribution does not 
exist to another state of affairs in which the ideal distribution does exist. What we want 
the interactional component of justice to do in this situation is to tell us how we may 
justifiably coerce people in order to effect a move from a situation in which some 
people’s opportunities for well-being are less effective than others’ to a situation in 
which everyone has equally effective opportunities for well-being. I shall refer to this as 
the ‘non-ideal application problem’, since the problem here is one of applying the 
principles of justified coercion to a situation which is, in one sense at least, non-ideal. 
In drawing a distinction between the ideal and non-ideal application problems I 
do not mean to imply that the precise content of the interactional component is 
somehow dependent on context or circumstance. Once the principles of the 
interactional component have been formulated they are no more liable to revision than 
the principle that constitutes the distributive component. The point of separating the 
ideal and non-ideal application problems is not to suggest that there are two distinct 
sets of interactional principles, one applying to ideal situations and the other applying to 
non-ideal situations, but rather to help us locate and articulate the intuitive concerns 
that underlie the various principles which constitute its content. 
IV. The ideal  appl i cat ion problem and freedom of  oc cupat ion 
Since the practical question that I am particularly concerned to address refers to 
the stringency of our duties of justice in light of one specific problem, namely, the 
problem of global injustice, I shall not spend too long discussing the issues raised by 
the ideal application problem. For most plausible conceptions of basic distributive 
fairness we can be fairly certain that the current global distribution does not satisfy 
them. Thus, the really important practical questions to which the interactional 
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component promises to provide answers are raised by non-ideal application problems 
(such as the one we face with the current global distribution). 
Nevertheless, important truths can be ascertained by studying the ideal 
application problem, one of which I want to highlight in this section. Imagine, then, 
that equality of opportunity for well-being prevails in a particular society. Such a society 
is ideally just according to the distributive component. But now imagine that the only 
way in which the state can maintain equality of opportunity for well-being is by 
threatening many of the most talented members of the society with extreme 
punishments in order to coerce them into taking on certain occupations. Since there is 
no reasonable alternative to doing what the state demands, the talented members of the 
society take on the occupations in question, thus ensuring that equality of opportunity 
for well-being is maintained. Let us stipulate further that, if the talented individuals in 
question were not coerced to take on the relevant occupations, then they would 
probably not choose to do so voluntarily, and that, if they do not take on these 
occupations (voluntarily or otherwise) then the potential result226 will not only be that 
their opportunities for well-being significantly increase, but the opportunities for well-
being of many other members of the society will be significantly diminished. 
Is there anything unjust about the state coercing the talented members of the 
society into taking on certain occupations? We know that if justice only consisted of a 
distributive component then the answer to this question would be ‘no’. This seems like 
the wrong answer. By taking away the talented citizen’s freedom of occupation, the 
state appears to be engaging in an archetypal unjust act, (or rather, because the violation 
of freedom of occupation is fairly systematic, it would perhaps be more accurate to say 
that the state has set up a derivatively unjust institution). The intuition that underlies 
this claim is obviously a standard liberal one. It does not refer to the consequences, 
good or bad, that such a violation of freedom of occupation will bring about. Instead, 
the distinctive wrong involved here – the intrinsic injustice of such coercion – resides in 
the state’s failure to respect the distinctive moral status of its citizens. I shall not repeat 
                                                
226 The potential, rather than certain, nature of this result is important, as I explain below.  
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here everything I said above (in chapter 6) about the importance that each person’s 
pursuit of his or her own projects assumes from the personal moral standpoint. All I 
shall say is that to deny a person the freedom to choose how to work, to choose which 
occupation into which to put his time and efforts, is to display indifference to this fact. 
It is to fail to respect a person’s nature as a being that is capable of making these choices, 
and one that attaches huge significance to them having made them. 
The intrinsic injustice of the state’s violation of (some of) its citizens’ freedom 
of occupation in this example clearly shows how the interactional component of justice, 
by placing limits on the justified exercise of coercion, can come into conflict with the 
distributive component of justice. Now, in response, it might be objected that, although 
I have shown how such a conflict can arise, I have not actually explained how such a 
conflict is to be resolved. On the contrary, continues the objection, I have merely assumed 
that the deontological restriction that the interactional component places on the state’s 
exercise of coercion overrides the reason that the distributive component provides the 
state with to go ahead and exercise this coercion. I confess that there is indeed a sense 
in which I have ‘assumed’ that this is the correct answer. The ‘assumption’ in this case 
is based on a strong intuition about how to correctly balance these opposing aspects of 
justice, and, realistically, I do not see how such intuitive balancing is to be avoided. 
Fortunately, though, I believe we can say a little more than this. 
In many cases, of which the scenario discussed in this section is one example, it 
seems to make sense to prioritise the interactional component over the distributive 
component. This is because in many situations, respecting the interactional component 
does not rule out the possibility of satisfying the distributive component, whereas 
ensuring the satisfaction of the distributive component inevitably rules out the 
possibility of respecting the interactional component. As soon as the state violates its 
citizens’ freedom of occupation it transgresses the principles of justified coercion, thus 
tainting the resulting distribution with injustice and, ultimately, defeating its original 
purpose of bringing about a just distribution. If, however, the state respects the 
interactional component by granting its citizens freedom of occupation, then it does 
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not automatically rule out the possibility of realising a fully just distribution. Depending 
on how effectively motivated they are by the claims they recognise from the impersonal 
standpoint, the citizens in question may choose to take on those occupations after all. 
Or, after choosing different occupations, they may decide to do other things (such as 
redistributing money or doing volunteer work, etc.), and these further activities may go 
some or, perhaps, all of the way to satisfying the distributive ideal. The point is that 
respecting the interactional component does not preclude the satisfaction of the 
distributive component, and in an ideal world where the distributive component is 
already realised, this truth is particularly salient. 
V. The non- ideal  appl i cat ion problem and s tabi l i ty  o f  expec tat ion 
In our world, of course, the distributive component is far from being realised, 
and the question whether, and how far, to respect the interactional component in the 
face of such gross unfairness is a much more difficult and pressing issue. I want to 
exercise the reader’s intuitions about this issue, and in order to do so I set out in this 
section a series of ‘divided world’ scenarios.227 To ensure that these scenarios generate 
intuitive responses that are as clear and untainted as possible I have gone to some 
lengths to specify them in detail. The general aim is to try to work up from fairly simple 
and straightforward situations to a more complicated situation which is similar in some 
important respects to the one in which we currently find ourselves in the real world. 
What I hope to highlight in particular is one important way in which the conflict 
between the global rich and global poor arises. In the course of analysing this conflict I 
shall discuss an important but often neglected source of the claims that are made on 
behalf of the global rich, namely, their claim to a certain degree of ‘stability of 
expectation’ that will allow them not only to form life plans in the first place, but to see 
them through over time, free from the potentially devastating interference of others. 
                                                
227 Divided world scenarios are often used in discussions of global justice, but the particular way I set 
the scenarios up in this section owes a lot to Michael Blake, who in turn (explicitly) borrows some of 
his ideas from James Buchanan. See, Blake, 'Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy', 
pp.289-94. 
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I also have a different motive for setting up the discussion of the divided world 
scenarios in the way I have. My hope is that by analysing one of the ways in which the 
conflict between the rich and poor arises, and by analysing how each side responds, we 
will naturally come to see how the dual-component model can help us make sense of 
the problems of global justice. As well as investigating a further potential source of the 
interactional component’s content, then, the aim of this section is to provide further 
support for the dual-component itself. Here, then, is the first scenario: 
 
Riverworld 
Riverworld is a world consisting of two land masses separated by a river. On 
either side of the river live two primitive societies, Fertileland and Barrenland. Although 
the people of Fertileland and Barrenland think of themselves as belonging to distinct 
societies with distinct cultures, it just so happens that the members of both groups 
share strongly egalitarian and universalist views about distributive justice. What I shall 
call the ‘original distributive ideal’ is held to be a universal truth by the members of 
both societies: 
 
Original Distributive Ideal: a distribution is just when each person, no matter 
where he or she lives or what national or cultural group he or she is a member 
of, has an equally effective opportunity for well-being, where a person’s well-
being is defined in terms of his or her success in executing (one of) the life 
plans he or she would have chosen under ideal conditions. 
 
The Original Distributive Ideal is held by the members of both societies to be 
the single fundamental principle of a single-component conception of justice. That is, both 
the Fertileans and the Barrenians think that the Original Distributive Ideal not only 
represents a conception of basic distributive fairness, but also that it is directly action-
guiding, in the sense that the exercise of coercion is justified whenever necessary to 
realise and maintain the ideal. 
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Now, although the river separating the two societies is wide, it does not stop 
people from either society frequently travelling across it (mostly by boat, let us say, until 
they get round to building bridges) and mingling with the people on the other side. The 
societies members’ common belief in the validity of the original distributive ideal leads 
them at a very early stage in their development to decide to share between the members 
of both societies any benefits generated by social and economic advances made by either 
society so that the distribution of opportunity remains equal across all individuals in 
Riverworld. (For now, at least, I am not concerned with how such sharing is conducted 
and coordinated. Perhaps Fertileland and Barrenland are small enough so that inter-
societal institutions are unnecessary for regulating and maintaining equality, or perhaps 
not. It is important, though, that both societies retain their distinct group identities. 
This prevents any inter-societal transfers that do occur, whether institutionalised or 
otherwise, from being seen as establishing a single super-society.) 
At a certain point in time (T1), the level of development of the two primitive 
societies is the same, but it is very low. (I shall label this low level of development ‘level 
1’ on an arbitrary scale that is simply meant to represent increasing levels of social, 
economic, technological and cultural development. Although what we really care about 
is the effectiveness of the opportunities for well-being that each individual has in this 
scenario, it is not, I think, unreasonable to take a society’s level of development as a 
proxy for the effectiveness of the opportunities that are generally provided to people in 
that society, at least for the purposes of this discussion). 
Over time it becomes obvious that, for a number of reasons, (none of which 
relate to any relevant moral difference between the members of the two societies) the 
share of the societies’ combined benefits generated by the Fertileans is three times that 
generated by the Barrenians. The Fertileans are aware of their own society’s higher 
productivity, but they do not complain, because the Barrenians are doing the best they 
can with their less fertile land, and it would therefore be unjust to demand more than 
an equal share of the benefits they are jointly, but unevenly, producing. 
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The speed of development is slow to begin with and it takes a thousand years 
until, at T2, the societies have developed to level 99 on the objective development 
scale. The speed of development is always increasing, however, and so it only takes 
another year, at T3, for both societies to have reached level 100. Importantly, whatever 
level of development one of the societies reaches, the other society will also be at that 
level, because of their joint commitment to sharing the benefits of development 
equally. Assuming that the Fertileans and the Barrenians are right about the content of 
the original distributive ideal, it seems uncontroversial that the distribution of 
opportunities for well-being in Riverworld is just. The scenario can be represented thus: 
 
T1  T2  T3 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mountainworld Scenario 1 
Now imagine a different world, Mountainworld, exactly like Riverworld in all 
respects except that, instead of an easily traversable river dividing the two societies, 
there is an impenetrable mountain range (impenetrable because it is too high/too 
treacherous to climb, and because the kinds of machines that would be able to fly over 
them are not yet invented). Because of the mountains, nobody in Fertileland or 
Barrenland knows of the existence of the other society. But, since all other details about 
Mountainworld are the same as Riverworld, at T1 both societies (which retain their 
egalitarian views of justice) are again at a development level of 1. 
Time passes on Mountainworld and after a thousand years, at T2, Fertileland 
has advanced to a much higher level of development than Barrenland. Recall that, at T2 
on Riverworld, both societies had advanced to the same level, level 99, because the 
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joint product of both societies was shared equally between Fertileland and Barrenland. 
In Mountainworld, however, no such inter-societal sharing takes place – the possibility 
never occurs to the members of either society because of the epistemic barrier 
represented by the mountains. Thus, at T2 on Mountainworld, Fertileland finds itself at 
level 150 while Barrenland has only managed to develop to level 48 (and at T3, a year 
later, I shall imagine that both societies develop a further stage, to 151 and 49 
respectively. This developmental step obviously does not quite fit the general pattern of 
Fertileland’s threefold advantage over Barrenland, but it is useful to keep the sum of 
the two societies’ level of development (200 at T3) the same across both worlds, and it 
is easier to keep to whole numbers). The scenario on Mountainworld can be 
represented thus: 
T1  T2  T3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, in the previous scenario on Riverworld, I said that the distribution of 
opportunities for well-being (at T1, T2 and T3) was just, because the individual 
members of the world as a whole had equal opportunities for well-being at all times. I also 
said that, ex hypothesi, this equal share of opportunities for well-being is in fact what 
justice demands (the original distributive ideal is correct), and this is independent of 
whether the Fertileans and the Barrenians know it (although I have obviously 
constructed the example so that they do know it, and act accordingly). In 
Mountainworld, however, the distribution of opportunities for well-being between the 
two societies at T2 and T3 has become extremely unequal. This implies that, unlike the 
distribution on Riverworld, the distribution on Mountainworld at T2 and T3 is unjust. 
Is this right? To answer this question it will help to imagine a second scenario on 
Mountainworld. 
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Mountainworld Scenario 2 
At T1 the situation in the second scenario on Mountainworld (M2) is identical 
to the situation at T1 in the first scenario on Mountainworld (M1): Fertileland and 
Barrenland, both at a primitive ‘level 1’ stage of development, are cut off from each 
other by the mountain range. Time passes on M2 and, just as in M1, Fertileland 
develops at three times the rate of Barrenland. The difference this time, however, is 
that shortly before T2 (almost a thousand years after T1) a group of hikers from 
Barrenland chances upon a hitherto secret passageway through the mountains. 
Following the passage they eventually come out the other side to find a much more 
advanced society before their eyes – Fertileland. The Barrenian explorers explain the 
situation to the Fertileans and a reciprocal party from Fertileland travels over to 
Barrenland to verify the story. 
 Whatever else the people of the two societies think on discovering that they are 
neighbours, it soon becomes clear to all that the deviation from the original distributive 
ideal represented by the large inequality between Fertileland and Barrenland would 
never have been allowed to happen had they been fully aware of the situation from the 
start. The Barrenians are particularly aware of this fact, and they begin to put pressure 
on the Fertileans to transfer to them whatever goods will rectify the arbitrary inequality 
between the two societies. The Fertileans feel the force of the Barreanians’ demands – 
after all, they share the same view of what justice requires – but they can’t help feeling 
that there is nevertheless something unfair about the situation they find themselves in. 
If only, think the Fertileans, the full details of the situation on M2 had been revealed 
two or three generations earlier or later, then the life plans adopted and cherished by 
the current generation would not have faced the massive disruption that now threatens 
them in the face of what the Barrenians see as their just demands. They realise, of 
course, that a similar complaint could and would have been made by whichever 
generation of (suitably economically advanced) Fertileans had been alive when the 
Barrenians made contact. But this thought merely supports their view that it is unfair to 
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expect any particular generation of Fertileans to sacrifice (what they see as) their 
legitimate expectations and bear the full costs of restoring justice in M2. 
 Reasoning in this way, the Fertileans present an argument to the Barrenians 
which they hope will satisfy everyone. Far from rejecting the original distributive ideal, 
the Fertileans affirm its importance, but they suggest to the Barrenians that the 
restoration of equality should not be put into action immediately (by ‘immediately’ I 
mean as fast as is practically feasible, which, I shall assume, covers a period of one year, 
the time between T2 and T3). Rather, they suggest, equality should be seen as a long 
term aim for the inhabitants of M2, a distributive goal to be achieved gradually over 
several generations. Such a policy, say the Fertileans, would see that justice was 
eventually done on M2, but in such a way that would avoid the need for radical 
restructuring of Fertilean society and the disruption of the current generation of 
Fertileans’ life plans that would accompany it. 
The Barrenians see the logic of the argument put forward by the Fertileans, but 
they are not sympathetic to its conclusion. Why, say the Barrenians, should the current 
generation of Barrenians miss out on opportunities for well-being that are rightfully 
theirs, according to justice, simply so that the current generation of Fertileans do not have 
their life plans disrupted? The Barrenians point out that the Fertileans agree with them 
about two things: that distributive justice is concerned with the idea of giving people 
their due; and that what people are due is determined by working out what an equal 
distribution of opportunities for well-being amounts to. There is no room in the shared 
conception of justice represented by the original distributive ideal, say the Barrenians, 
for the Fertileans’ special pleading. Moreover, although the maintenance of the original 
distributive ideal was, in the past, a consensual matter within each distinct society, the 
Barrenians will have no hesitation in this new situation in invoking the connection 
between justice and coercion in order to justify an attempt to forcibly take from the 
Fertileans that to which they believe they are entitled if the Fertileans continue to refuse 
to hand it over voluntarily. 
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The Barrenians argument is a powerful one, especially as it appears to use the 
Fertileans’ own view about justice against them. I said earlier that the Fertileans’ view of 
justice does not affect what justice is – I have assumed, in other words, a non-relativist 
position – but, nevertheless, the Fertileans’ bargaining position is inevitably weakened 
by the fact that they have manifested a belief in the correctness of the original 
distributive ideal in their previous actions. The question, then, remains: does the fact 
that the distribution at T2 on M2 is a long way from the distribution recommended by 
the original distributive ideal mean that the Fertileans must give in to the Barrenians’ 
demands to transform the distribution into what it should and would have been had it 
not been for the fact that the two societies are divided by a mountain range rather than 
a river? 
Seeing that the problem with their original attempt to escape this conclusion lay 
in the fact that they left the original distributive ideal intact, the Fertileans try a different 
strategy which, they hope, will allow them to consistently maintain their belief that 
justice demands equality (thereby enabling them to maintain that they have always acted 
according to what they thought justice demanded in the past) while at the same time 
avoiding the conclusion that what they owe collectively to the Barrenians represents 
such a big proportion of their total wealth that it threatens to render their individual 
plans of life – on which many of them will have invested huge amounts of time and 
effort – no longer viable. The potential way out involves modifying the original 
distributive ideal itself so that, on one hand, their past actions remain consistent with it 
while, on the other hand, it can no longer be used by the Barrenians as a means of 
justifying their threat to appropriate so much of the benefits that contribute to 
Fertileland’s current level of development. 
The original formulation of the ideally just distribution stated that a distribution 
is just when opportunities for well-being are distributed equally between all individuals, 
regardless of where these individuals reside. The Fertileans (and the Barrenians) 
thought they were living according to this conception up until T2, at which point the 
discovery of the passageway between the mountains revealed the full picture. Now the 
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full picture has been revealed, however, the Fertileans do not think the Barrenians have 
the right to coerce them into restoring equality across M2. This suggests that they think 
the correct principle of justice incorporates some constraint on the demands that can 
be made of particular individuals in the name of equality. The Fertileans suggest a 
modified formulation along these lines: 
 
Modified Distributive Ideal: a distribution is just when the only reason that 
opportunities for well-being are distributed unequally is that coercively 
enforcing a more equal distribution would have an unacceptably adverse impact 
on the continued ability of one or more individuals to pursue their life plans. 
 
By modifying the distributive ideal in this way the Fertileans hope to be able to 
explain how it is that their willingness to maintain an equal distribution in their society 
between T1 and T2 is consistent with their unwillingness to equalise the distribution 
between Fertileland and Barrenland immediately after T2 (i.e. between T2 and T3). The 
following diagram compares the two solutions to the inequality in M2 offered by the 
Barrenians’ and the Fertileans: 
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Whether the Fertileans’ appeal to the ‘unacceptably adverse impact’ of any 
attempt to enforce equality carries any normative weight is a question I shall come to 
shortly. Before that, I want to note that the Fertileans’ ‘solution’ to the problem they 
face is essentially to build a personal prerogative into the formulation of the distributive 
ideal. I have already explained in chapter 6 what the problem with this move is. The 
‘modified distributive ideal’ effectively redefines the unequal distribution that exists at 
T3 as fully just, because the only reason the distribution at that time is not equal is 
because any attempt to enforce equality would have had an unacceptably adverse 
impact on the ability of some of the Fertileans to pursue their life plans.  
What the Fertileans should have done instead is invoke the dual-component 
model of justice. Rather than incorporating the personal prerogative within the 
distributive ideal, what they could, and should, have done is build it into a principle or 
set of principles that are entirely separate from the distributive ideal (i.e. the 
interactional component of justice). In the context of the scenario on world M2 the 
advantage of separating the interactional component of justice from the distributive 
component of justice is clear. By retaining the egalitarian ‘purity’ of the original 
distributive ideal we retain our ability to celebrate any move towards greater equality as 
a move towards a more just distribution. At the same time, however, by using the 
interactional component to restrict the stringency of the demands that can be made of 
those who are well-placed to advance the distributive ideal, we incorporate respect for 
the separateness of persons and acknowledge the fact that, when the epistemic barrier 
which prevented the achievement of justice in the past is lifted, there are more just and 
less just ways of assigning responsibility for restoring distributive justice. 
Does the Fertileans’ appeal to the unacceptable disruption to life plans carry any 
normative weight in response to the Barrenian’s claim to have opportunities for well-
being across Mountainworld immediately equalised in line with the egalitarian principle 
expressed in the original distributive ideal? I shall assume for the sake of argument that 
the empirical claim that lies behind this appeal is correct. The move towards equality 
that the Barrenian’s are demanding will inevitably require a huge transfer of resources 
 228 
from Fertileland to Barrenland, and it is unlikely that such a transfer could be 
conducted without massive disruption to the life plans of the Fertileans. The most 
obvious and immediate effect will be the collapse of many of the businesses and 
industries in which the Fertileans work, which in turn will effectively end many of their 
careers as a result. The loss of income on such a massive scale will make it harder for all 
Fertileans to pursue their non-work-related projects, and there may be less direct 
consequences that follow in the wake of this economic shock – such as social and 
political instability – which cause people to feel unsafe and mistrustful of one another. 
The one thing that it might be hoped would survive the impact of the transfer would be 
the personal relationships of Fertilean citizens, but even these may come under severe 
strain as familial incomes are drastically reduced and the related social, political and 
economic problems make it harder to sustain a wide network of relationships. 
Of course, any reduction in the overall effectiveness of the opportunities for 
well-being that the Fertileans have will be no more than is required to bring the 
opportunities of the Barrenians up to a similar level. But assuming this level of 
convergence is significantly lower than the level currently enjoyed by the Fertileans (an 
assumption that is more likely to be true if the population of Barrenland is much higher 
than the population of Fertileland), then the changes to Fertilean society that are 
necessary to effect the required reduction, and the impact these changes will have on 
the lives of Fertileans, will inevitably be fairly dramatic. 
When viewed purely from the impersonal standpoint, the Barrenian’s claims of 
justice to an equal distribution of opportunity for well-being clearly seem to override 
the unfortunate consequences that will befall the Fertileans as a result of any attempt to 
satisfy these claims. From the impersonal standpoint, as far as justice is concerned, the 
Fertileans have up until now been enjoying opportunities that they were not strictly 
entitled to. They may not be blameworthy for this (how could they have known?) but 
this doesn’t change the fact of the matter. Viewed from the personal standpoint, 
however, the dictates of justice are not so unequivocal. Life plans that have already 
been formed and which are already being lived have a special significance for those who 
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are living them. I believe that this fact generates a characteristically deontological 
requirement to be especially respectful of the normative significance of important 
projects that people are already pursuing and to which they have already devoted much 
of their short (in the grand scheme of things) lives. Our natures as purposive beings 
with only one life to lead means that we are entitled (within limits, as I mention below) 
to a certain degree of ‘stability of expectation’ – the expectation that our lives as we 
know them, and as we have worked to create them, will not be interfered with in such a 
dramatic way that we can no longer identify with or find value in what we do. 
This deontological requirement is supplemented by the consequentialist 
consideration that, without some degree of stability of expectation, the basic value of 
any human life is diminished. What makes having opportunities for well-being valuable 
is the fact that they are used – to pursue plans and projects, to form attachments and 
allegiances, and to create a life that one can identify with, in a deep sense, as one’s own. 
Some degree of stability of expectation is a necessary precondition of these basic 
elements of a good life. A similar point is made, far more eloquently, by Bernard 
Williams:  
[At some point] one reaches the necessity that such things as deep attachments to 
other persons [as well as other things that are valuable from the personal standpoint] 
will express themselves in the world in ways which cannot at the same time embody 
the impartial view, and that they also run the risk of offending against it…They run 
that risk if they exist at all; yet unless such things exist, there will not be enough 
substance or conviction in a man’s life to compel allegiance to life itself. Life has to 
have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial 
system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the 
impartial system, and that system’s hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure.228 
It is clear that the strength of the claim to a certain degree of stability of 
expectation depends to an extent on the severity of the deprivation of those whose 
situations could be improved by destabilising these expectations. The stable future of 
                                                
228 Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, p.18. 
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well-off persons is clearly more or less irrelevant when others face the immediate threat 
of serious suffering or death. But when the deprivation of others is less severe, the 
normative relevance of any potentially significant disruption to life plans that have 
already been formed and are already being lived creeps back in. My suggestion is that 
people have a claim of justice to a certain stability of expectation that can only be 
entirely overridden by the manifest suffering, rather than the merely unequal 
opportunities, of the disadvantaged. This is the truth in the Fertileans’ argument, and it 
is a truth to which the interactional component of justice must respond. 
VI. Conclus ion 
In this chapter I have considered several different ways in which the 
interactional component may be thought to place limits on the permissibility of various 
attempts to realise the ideal of basic distributive fairness that forms the content of the 
distributive component. I distinguished questions about the rational desirability of 
various coercive strategies from questions about the intrinsic injustice of these 
strategies, and argued that the principles of the interactional component must be 
sensitive to both types of consideration. From the perspective of the distributive 
component itself it seems rational to design the principles of the interactional 
component so that they prohibit any coercive strategies that do not achieve the highest 
feasible level of equality, and to permit any coercive strategies that are necessary in 
order to achieve any further pareto improvements. These rationally-grounded 
permissions and prohibitions are themselves subject to the intrinsic justice/injustice of 
the coercive strategies in question. And here there is likely to be a wide range of 
considerations to take into account. 
I have only discussed two such considerations. The first is the limit that must 
be placed on the exercise of coercion when such coercion threatens to violate persons’ 
freedom of occupation. The second is the limit that must be placed on the exercise of 
coercion when it threatens to undermine what I referred to as persons’ ‘stability of 
expectation’. I do not claim that these considerations themselves represent fundamental 
principles of the interactional component of justice; perhaps there is some more basic 
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principle that constitutes the content of the interactional component that is capable of 
capturing the intuitive concerns underlying both considerations (and perhaps more 
besides). My more modest aim was merely to provide some examples of the kinds of 
consideration that might be thought to generate reasons for limiting the pursuit of the 
distributive ideal, and thus ultimately to form the content of the interactional 
component of justice. 
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(9) Conclusion 
I began this essay by setting out what I referred to as the ‘global justice 
trilemma’. The trilemma arises from the mutual inconsistency of three claims that, 
taken on their own, seem intuitively plausible. As I originally formulated them the three 
claims stood as follows: 
 
(a) The distributive claim: The current global distribution of material and 
non-material goods is radically unjust. Those who are badly-off under the 
current distribution have a claim to redistribution which, if satisfied, would 
lead to a significant increase in justice. 
 
(b) The conceptual claim: The claims that people have as a matter of justice, 
unlike claims grounded in other moral values, entail the existence of strong, 
enforceable duties on others to respect or satisfy these claims. 
 
(c) The duty claim: Relatively well-off individuals do not have strong, 
enforceable duties to make the kinds of significant changes in their lives 
that would be required in order to eradicate global injustice. 
 
One obvious response to the mutual inconsistency of the distributive claim, the 
conceptual claim, and the duty claim is simply to reject one (or more) of them. In 
chapters 2 and 3 I considered what I take to be the most promising versions of this 
‘rejectionist’ strategy – the statist version and the nationalist version – and found both 
of them wanting. I then argued that, rather than rejecting one or more of the claims, a 
preferable response to the trilemma would be to show how all three claims can be 
simultaneously endorsed. My aim in chapters 4-8 was to defend this ‘accommodationist’ 
strategy by demonstrating how the concept of justice could be plausibly interpreted 
according to what I call the dual-component model of justice. In this concluding 
chapter I assess the extent to which I have succeeded in achieving this aim. 
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Taking each claim in turn I will ask whether the truth of the claim as it was 
originally formulated is consistent with the dual-component model interpretation of 
justice. If the truth of all three claims as originally formulated is consistent with the 
dual-component model, then my proposed accommodationist response to the trilemma 
will be straightforwardly vindicated. If the truth of one or more of the claims as 
originally formulated is not consistent with the dual-component model, then consistency 
may still be achievable through a slight modification of the way in which the claim(s) in 
question is formulated. As we shall see, some such modifications are indeed necessary 
in order to achieve consistency and thus vindicate my accommodationist strategy. This 
should not be surprising. As I made clear in the introduction, my initial presentation of 
the trilemma was intended as a starting point for discussion. Any attempt to formulate 
the three claims of the trilemma more precisely at that point would have arbitrarily 
restricted the terms of the discussion and begged a whole range of important questions. 
Now, however, when we ask whether the truth of the claims is consistent with the 
highly specific and complex conceptual framework represented by the dual-component 
model, it is quite proper that some of the claims require a more precise reformulation. 
What is crucial is that these reformulations involve only minor changes that do not 
substantially alter the meaning of the original claims. As long as this is the case, and 
consistency between the truth of the three claims and the dual-component model of 
justice can be achieved, then my goal of accommodating all three claims within a single 
conceptual framework and thus dissolving the trilemma will have been realised. 
I begin with the distributive claim. If we focus initially on assessing the truth of 
this claim purely from the perspective of the distributive component of justice, and as 
long as we agree that the content of the distributive component is given by the 
principle of equality or opportunity for well-being that I defended in chapter 7, then the 
distributive claim is obviously true. The current global distribution is a long way from 
satisfying such a demanding egalitarian principle. But of course, the principle of equality 
of opportunity for well-being is only one possible conception of the content of the 
distributive component of justice. On a different conception, say, one that held that the 
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content of the distributive component is given by some kind of very minimal 
sufficiency principle, it might not be quite so obvious that the global distribution is 
radically unjust (indeed, it is possible that on some conceptions of the distributive 
component the global distribution may not be considered unjust in the slightest, though 
such a conception would surely lack plausibility). From this we can see that the 
distributive claim is only contingently true, not necessarily true, when justice is 
interpreted in terms of the dual-component model; the global distribution will only be 
considered radically unjust according to the dual-component model if the content of 
the distributive component is sufficiently demanding. This is the first qualification that 
must be made to my claim that the dual-component model is consistent with the truth 
of the distributive claim. 
The need for a second qualification to be made to this claim arises when we no 
longer focus purely on the distributive component but rather consider both the 
distributive and the interactional component of justice together. Recall that, according 
to the dual-component model, the satisfaction of the distributive component is not 
sufficient on its own to guarantee the justice of a distribution; it must also be the case 
that the satisfaction of the distributive component is brought about in the right way (i.e. 
without violating the constraints on justified coercion specified by the interactional 
component). Bringing about global equality of opportunity for well-being through, for 
example, the temporary mass enslavement of the wealthy will, if it is done effectively 
enough, bring about basic distributive fairness, but it will not bring about a perfectly 
just distribution. This fact calls for a slight modification (indicated by the use of italics, 
below) of the distributive claim as originally formulated: 
 
(a') The (modified) distributive claim: The current global distribution of 
material and non-material goods is radically unjust. Those who are badly-off 
under the current distribution have a claim to redistribution which, if 
satisfied in a morally acceptable way, would lead to a significant increase in 
justice. 
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While the role of the distributive component is to help us determine exactly 
how unjust the current global distribution is compared to the ideal of basic distributive 
fairness, the role of the interactional component is to tell us what counts as a ‘morally 
acceptable’ way of responding to this injustice in order to realise a distribution that 
matches, or at least matches more closely, the ideal of basic distributive fairness. Strictly 
speaking, therefore, the dual-component model does not endorse the truth of the 
original distributive claim since there are ways of satisfying the ‘claims to redistribution’ 
of the badly-off that would not necessarily result in a significant increase in justice 
(because the result would be infected with injustice as a result of the violation of the 
interactional component). However, I think it is fair to say that the proposed 
modification to the original distributive claim does not alter the core meaning of the 
claim in any significant way, and, crucially, I suspect that the vast majority of those who 
held the claim to be true beforehand will continue to hold it to be true in its modified 
form. With this qualification and the last duly noted, I therefore conclude that the dual-
component model of justice is indeed consistent with the (modified) distributive claim. 
I now turn to the conceptual claim. Here we need to ask whether it remains 
true, when justice is interpreted according to the dual-component model, that claims of 
justice entail strong, enforceable duties. The problem we face is that according to the 
dual-component model claims of justice come from two directions, as it were. On the 
one hand, people have claims of justice to receive what they would get under a 
distribution that matched the ideal of basic distributive fairness. On the other hand, 
people have claims of justice to be treated in a way that is consistent with the non-
violation of the principles of justified coercion. As originally formulated, the conceptual 
claim implies that the various claims people have that are grounded in these two 
different components of justice will entail enforceable duties on others to satisfy these 
claims. But I have argued that when attempts to enforce the duties that arise from the 
distributive component come into conflict with the principles of justified coercion that 
constitute the interactional component of justice, the latter should take priority. The 
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implication is that claims grounded in the distributive component of justice do not, in 
fact, entail the existence of enforceable duties. Since this directly contradicts the 
conceptual claim as originally formulated it would appear that the dual-component 
model of justice is not in fact compatible with the conceptual claim, and that as a 
consequence I have failed in my aim of showing that the dual-component model 
enables us to adopt an accommodationist strategy in response to the global justice 
trilemma. 
Before conceding defeat too quickly, however, it is worth asking whether the 
conceptual claim can, just like the distributive claim, be modified in such a way so that, 
without altering the core meaning of the claim, it can be made consistent with the dual-
component model. As a first step towards this goal we might note that the duties that 
arise as a result of the distributive component are at least presumptively enforceable. This 
presumptive enforceability of the duties arising from the distributive component goes 
some way towards vindicating the conceptual claim, for whereas in the case of most 
‘non-justice’ moral duties we require a further reason to explain why the coercive 
enforcement of such duties is justified, the presumptive enforceability of duties arising 
from the distributive component means that no further reason is required to justify 
their enforcement, and indeed a reason must be given to explain why the coercive 
enforcement of such duties in a particular situation is unjustified. The link between 
justice and coercion to which the conceptual claim draws our attention is thus partly 
vindicated by the fact that, according to the dual-component model, duties grounded in 
justice, unlike duties grounded in other moral values, are at least always presumptively 
enforceable. 
The mere fact that duties grounded in the distributive component of justice are 
presumptively enforceable is not enough on its own, however, to fully vindicate the 
conceptual claim. This is because the normative force of the presumption in favour of 
enforceability can range from very weak to very strong, and this has implications for the 
plausibility of the purported link between justice and coercion. For instance, if the 
presumption in favour of the enforceability of the duties grounded in the distributive 
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component was only very weak, then their enforceability would be capable of being 
overridden by a wide range of (justice-related and non-justice-related) moral concerns, 
as well as perhaps a whole range of non-moral concerns. In this situation I think we 
would have good reason to reject the conceptual claim altogether when justice is 
interpreted along the lines of the dual-component model. The claim that there is a close 
conceptual link between justice and coercion would ring rather hollow if the coercive 
enforcement of duties of justice was only justified in what would presumably be the 
fairly narrow range of cases in which such enforcement did not conflict with any 
countervailing practical consideration whatsoever. If, on the other hand, it can be 
demonstrated that the presumption in favour of the enforceability of the duties 
grounded in the distributive component is much stronger, then the grounds for 
maintaining that there is in fact a close conceptual link between justice and coercion will 
also prove to be that much stronger. 
I have argued not simply that the presumption in favour of enforceability is 
‘very strong’ in the case of the duties that arise from the distributive component, but 
that the only circumstances in which the presumptive enforceability of such duties can 
be overridden is when such enforcement conflicts with the fulfilment of other claims of 
justice. According to my particular interpretation of the way in which the two 
components of justice interact, the duties that arise in response to claims grounded in 
the interactional component automatically take priority over duties that arise as a result 
of the distributive component. Different interpretations of the order of priority 
between the two components of justice are of course possible. The important point is 
that, according to the dual-component model, the only occasions when claims of justice 
do not directly give rise to enforceable duties is when the enforcement of such duties is 
incompatible with the fulfilment of duties that arise from prior claims that are also claims 
of justice. If this is right, then it does not constitute grounds for rejecting the conceptual 
claim out of hand. Unlike the notion that the enforceability of duties of justice can be 
overridden by duties grounded in a wide range of competing (moral and non-moral, 
justice and non-justice) considerations, the claim that the enforceability of duties of 
 238 
justice can only be overridden by other enforceable duties of justice does not challenge 
the close conceptual link between justice and coercion. It does, however, call for a 
more careful restatement of the conceptual claim along the following lines: 
 
(b') The (modified) conceptual claim: The claims that people have as a 
matter of justice, unlike claims grounded in other moral values, entail the 
existence of presumptively enforceable duties on others to respect or satisfy 
these claims. The presumptive enforceability of such duties is only defeated when it is 
incompatible with the fulfilment of duties arising from prior claims of justice (where the 
‘relationship of priority’ between competing claims of justice is given by a particular 
conception of justice). 
 
It is worth emphasising once again the unique aspect of the dual-component 
model that gives rise to the need to modify the conceptual claim in this way. The idea is 
this: when a duty generated in response to a claim grounded in the distributive 
component is rendered unenforceable (because it conflicts with the fulfilment of a duty 
that arises in response to a claim grounded in the interactional component), then the 
original claim (the one grounded in the distributive component) does not cease to exist or 
to exert any normative force. Were this not the case – were it the case, in other words, 
that the original distributive claim ceased to exist once its enforcement was deemed 
incompatible with respect for the interactional component – then the conceptual claim 
could be maintained in its original form, for in this case it would be true that every 
genuine claim of justice gives rise to an enforceable duty to satisfy or respect it. As I 
have argued at length, however, there is much to be said for the ability to recognise the 
continued validity of a claim grounded in the distributive component even when the 
coercive fulfilment of such a claim is no longer justified. The new and rather unwieldy 
formulation of the conceptual claim that is necessary as a result is, I think, a small price 
to pay for this theoretical advantage. 
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I have now shown that the distributive claim and the conceptual claim are both 
consistent, albeit in slightly modified form, with the dual-component model of justice. I 
now turn my attention, finally, to the duty claim. The question that concerns us here is 
whether the dual-component model is consistent with the claim that relatively well-off 
individuals do not have strong, enforceable duties to make the kinds of significant 
changes to their lives that are necessary to rectify the injustice of the global distribution. 
If it can be shown that the dual-component model is consistent with this third and final 
claim, then the accommodationist response to the global justice trilemma will itself be 
vindicated. 
It seems clear that the answer to our question about the consistency of the duty 
claim and the dual-component model depends on the particular conception of the dual-
component model that one holds. That is to say, there is no necessary entailment from 
the premise that justice should be formally interpreted according to the dual-
component model to the conclusion that well-off individuals do not have a strong, 
enforceable duty to make significant changes to their lives in response to the radical 
injustice of the global distribution. Assuming for instance that the global distribution is 
indeed condemned as radically unjust by the distributive component, it is a separate 
question how far the principles of justified coercion as specified by the interactional 
component will serve to limit the liability of the well-off to any justified coercive 
intervention carried out in the name of bringing about global distributive fairness. The 
answer to this separate question can only be determined by working out the content of 
the interactional component of justice in detail. 
I have not attempted to provide any such detailed specification of the content 
of the interactional component in this essay. Although in chapter 8 I analyse some 
considerations that are potentially relevant to such a task, my discussion leaves open the 
question whether the content of the interactional component of justice is such that the 
well-off members of the global population do in fact have strong, enforceable duties to 
make significant changes to their lives in response to what has antecedently been 
judged, through the application of the distributive component, as a radically unjust 
 240 
global distribution. However, what is important for now is the fact that the dual-
component model of justice is consistent in principle with the duty claim (and unlike the 
other two claims this is true without any modification of the original formulation of the 
duty claim). 
My aim in this concluding chapter was to demonstrate how the three claims of 
the global justice trilemma – the distributive claim, the conceptual claim, and the duty 
claim – could be simultaneously endorsed when viewed from the perspective of a 
single, unified theory of justice, namely, the dual-component model of justice. Taking 
each claim in turn I have shown that the dual-component model is in principle 
consistent with all three of them, and therefore that it is indeed possible to 
simultaneously endorse all three claims of the trilemma. The result is that the trilemma 
itself dissolves once justice is interpreted according to the dual-component model. 
More generally, in order to explain and motivate the dual-component model I 
have had to take a long detour away from the more immediate problems of global 
justice with which I started and into a highly abstract discussion of the conceptual 
foundations of distributive justice itself. The reason I felt this was necessary derives 
from the general lack of clarity and understanding in the literature about (a) what 
exactly distributive justice is and (b) what a theory of distributive justice is meant to 
achieve. Such a lack of clarity has led to much confusion in the literature and has caused 
many theorists to talk at cross-purposes, if not directly past one another. Rather than 
simply throwing another conception of justice, and hence another possible source of 
confusion and misunderstanding, into the mix, I have tried to be as clear and explicit as 
possible about what I take the theory of distributive (and therefore global) justice to be 
about. 
Of course, I hope the reader will agree that the dual-component model itself 
presents a fruitful way forward in the debates over global justice. But even if this turns 
out to be overly optimistic, I hope that the schema I have set out in the preceding 
chapters for categorising the four interpretations of the concept of justice will 
encourage others to refine these interpretations, and perhaps even prompt political 
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theorists to be clearer in future what they mean when they talk about distributive 
justice, global or otherwise. 
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